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Abstract
Although it is commonly used in a variety of debates in normative political 
theory, the concept o f practical identity is undertheorized and unclear. My 
dissertation aims to rectify this problem by providing a fully elaborated and 
philosophically robust account of identity. In developing this account I adopt the 
theory-indexed approach, which looks to define identity from the viewpoint of 
some normative conception o f the person and society, rather than the viewpoint 
o f shared but unsystematized intuitions about identity. Specifically, my enquiry 
is nested within the liberal perspective that affords individuals’ reasons for action 
a central place in political justification. Starting from this theoretical background, 
I examine the prospects for defining identity as a determinant o f individuals’ 
reasons.
I first discuss some prominent current arguments that link identities to 
individuals’ reasons. I maintain that the Rawls-inspired argument that identities 
generate reasons grounded in self-respect fails because Rawls’s “social bases of 
self-respect” cannot be understood as the argument requires. Harry Frankfurt’s 
view of identities as constraints on the individuals’ power of willing rests, I 
suggest, on a flawed interpretation o f volitional inability. Finally, I find that 
Christine Korsgaard’s view o f identities as the subjective grounds for maxim- 
adoption vacillates between an unacceptably naturalist understanding o f identity 
and one that cannot account for the particularity of identities. Following these 
criticisms, I suggest that the link between identities and reasons needs to be 
investigated by reconsidering the notion o f a reason for action. I argue that for a 
conception o f reasons to be acceptable to liberals, it must present reasons as 
universal in scope. This condition is met by Kant’s conception, according to 
which reasons consist in the conformity o f maxims with certain objective 
principles. Accepting this conception, I argue that identity can be seen as a 
sensible, but inscrutable, condition for the possibility of universal reasons.
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1. From labels to reasons in the study of identity
1.1. Introduction
The objective o f this thesis is to investigate the notion o f personal identity as it is 
employed in debates in normative political theory. While the concept o f identity 
is frequently and confidently used in a variety o f such debates, there have been 
few attempts to define or explain it. This has led to uncertainty about the proper 
meaning of “ identity”. David Copp describes the situation as follows:
Th[e] idea o f “identity” is important both to moral and to political 
philosophy, but it has not been given an adequate philosophical 
explication. Indeed, it might be that there is not a single idea o f 
“identity”, but that instead there is a family o f ideas that have not 
been well distinguished from one another.1
Another author states that “The concept of identity is... quite poorly 
circumscribed. Nothing in the nature o f things dictates a particular usage and no 
convention has been elaborated to constrain its application.”2 Yet another writer 
observes:
Although the English language is rich in synonyms, there are 
some words that are islands o f desperate poverty in this respect.
1 David Copp, “Social Unity and the Identity o f  Persons,” Journal o f  P olitical Philosophy 10, no. 
4 (2002): p. 365.
2 Daniel Weinstock, “Is ‘Identity’ a Danger to Democracy?,” in Identity, Self-Determination and  
Secession, ed. Igor Primoratz and Aleksandar Pavkovic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 15.
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“Identity” is one of them. It stands in for so many different
concepts that to use it at all is a recipe for confusion.3
Even within the sociological literature, which has been a major influence in the
adoption o f identity into the normative discourse, the term “tends to mean too
much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak 
sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)”.4
My aim in this thesis is to provide a clear and philosophically robust account of 
identity that is applicable in normative political theorizing. In this chapter I will 
present and defend one general approach to defining identity, as well as one 
particular orientation within that approach. The general perspective on identity 
that I will favour can be termed “theory-indexed” . Its distinguishing mark is that 
it strives to define identity from the viewpoint o f some normative conception of 
the person and society, rather than the viewpoint o f shared but unsystematized 
intuitions about identity. I will introduce and argue for the theory-indexed 
perspective on identity in section 1.2. In section 1.3 I will discuss an especially 
popular account o f identity that instantiates this general approach. This is Kwame 
Anthony Appiah’s account of identities as descriptive “labels” that individuals 
attach to themselves. Its supposed basis, as will be seen, is Mill’s theory of the 
development o f individuality through choice. However I will argue, against 
Appiah, that the connection between Millian individuality and identities as self­
applied descriptive labels is problematic. Therefore I will propose, in section 1.4, 
to develop an account o f identity from the standpoint o f another normative theory 
-  the liberal conception o f political justification through the use o f reasons that 
hold for all citizens.
3 Henry Harris, “Preface,” in Identity, ed. Henry Harris (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. v.
4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society  29, no. 1
(2000): p. 1.
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1.2. Two approaches to defining identity
Uncertainty about the proper meaning of the term “identity” can be resolved only 
by fixing the rules of its usage, or constraints on how the word “identity” is used. 
These rules will be given by a specification of some features o f persons or the 
social world that the concept uniquely “picks out” and that set it apart from other 
concepts. In working out this unique set o f features that belong to the concept of 
identity, two approaches are available. One o f them is to define identity in 
relation to existing intuitions, or pre-theoretical notions about what falls under 
the concept, based on how it is ordinarily used and the situations in which using 
it seems appropriate.5 The important aspect o f intuitions, in this context, is that 
they are not a result o f inference from some broader theory o f the person or the 
society. Rather, they are beliefs and judgments that are independent of theoretical 
frameworks; they are natural or “gut” feelings about what seems right to say 
about identity. The intuitive approach to identity seeks to give a definition of 
identity that accommodates and, if possible, explains these natural feelings. The 
other perspective on conceptualizing identity stands diametrically opposite to the 
intuitive approach. It does not look for constraints on how the concept should be 
used in the untheorized beliefs o f the users o f the concept; rather, it starts from 
some normative theory, asking how “identity” ought to be understood in order to 
be consistent with that theory. This theory-indexed approach thus relates to the 
beliefs o f users o f the concept in a distinctive way: instead o f accommodating 
accepted but unsystematized convictions about identity, it aims to produce an 
account of identity that those committed to some preferred theory should accept.
5 The definition o f  intuitions I am working with here is very rough and loose, but serves to 
highlight the pre-theoretical nature o f  intuitions. A more stringent definition is given by Michael 
DePaul: “An intuition is just a belief in a proposition that (1) the person does not currently hold 
because o f  perception or introspection or memory or testimony or because the person has 
explicitly inferred the proposition, but (2) the person now holds simply because the proposition 
seems true to the person upon due consideration.” (Michael R. DePaul, “Intuitions in Moral 
Inquiry,” in The Oxford Handbook o f  Ethical Theory, ed. David Copp (N ew  York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p. 595.)
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The two approaches to identity have different aims. Minimally, the objective of 
the intuition-based approach is to deliver an account that systematizes diverse 
intuitions about identity. Typically, the hope is however also that intuitions can 
be brought under a concept that is practically useful: a concept that applies to and 
resolves existing disputes regarding identity, such as whether identities ought to 
be politically preserved or not, or whether a liberal state may legitimately 
promote a sense o f liberal civic identity. On the intuitive approach, a concept of 
identity is constructed -  pieced and assembled from shared convictions -  in order 
to answer such questions. It is this anticipation o f practical utility, more than 
anything else, that legitimates the activity of designing the concept. By contrast, 
the theory-indexed approach is not in the business o f putting together a concept 
o f identity from loose and potentially divergent material. Its starting point is an 
ordered system of thought, a theory o f how to regard the man and society, from 
which a concept o f identity must be drawn. The task here is to conceptually 
extend the theory to cover a new, and hitherto unaccounted for, aspect of 
individuals. What warrants the whole enquiry is not so much the expectation of 
settling normative disputes, but the goal o f developing and enriching the theory. 
This activity can have practical import, but only indirectly: insofar as the 
overarching theory captures something about human practice, its extension will 
also have a bearing on real-world issues. The contestable points of both 
perspectives on identity are thus clear: in the case o f the intuitive approach, it is 
the reliability and clarity o f pre-theoretical intuitions; with the theory-indexed 
approach, it is the plausibility o f the underlying theory.
I wish to present a case for theory-indexed conceptualization of identity by 
considering one version o f the intuitive approach, and showing that it, too, relies 
on certain theoretical assumptions. While this does not amount to a positive 
defence of the theoretical approach, it at least shows that that approach cannot be 
easily dismissed in thinking about identity. This point can be illustrated by 
considering Copp’s intuition-based analysis of identity. His notion of “self­
esteem identity” fits the aforementioned characterization of the intuitive 
approach in its aim to capture the “central features of these intuitions [about
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identity] better than the competing accounts” .6 It also promises to be “useful in a 
wide variety o f contexts,” from patriotism to the politics of multiculturalism.7
Copp begins his article by briefly reviewing some current understandings of 
identity: the philosophical accounts o f Charles Taylor, David Miller, Christine 
Korsgaard, and Kwame A. Appiah, and the socio-psychological account of 
Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams.8 He sums up Taylor’s approach to identity 
by saying that, according to Taylor, identity amounts to self-recognition -  it is 
given by a person’s answer to the question “Who am I?” . Yet, counters Copp, 
that question may yield answers that are too trivial, or too bound up with the 
person’s current situation, to be useful in thinking about identity. Copp charges 
Hogg and Abrams’s similar account with the same error: it appears insufficiently 
selective because the person’s ‘self-image’ is just down to her belief that she has 
such-and-such properties. But, intuitively, we do not count all of a person’s 
characteristics among her identity, even she earnestly believes she has them, and 
in fact has them. We would not consider her statement that she is 6-foot tall, for 
example, a statement about her identity. Another account of identity in Copp’s 
survey, that o f Korsgaard and Miller, involves reference to a particularly 
entrenched system o f personal values. However, suggests Copp, that reference 
implausibly rules out from the definition of identity those traits that are 
constitutive of the person’s personality, but which the person lv a lu e s .  Finally, 
Copp also distances himself from the “social identity” approach proposed by 
Appiah. While the latter captures an important dimension o f others ’ response to a
6 Copp, “Social Unity and the Identity o f  Persons,” p. 369.
7 Ibid.: pp. 365-66.
8 The works Copp discusses are: Charles Taylor, “The Politics o f  Recognition,” in Philosophical 
Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).; David Miller, On Nationality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).; Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, ed. 
Onora O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).; Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
“Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994).; and Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social 
Identification: A Social Psychology o f  Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London: 
Routledge, 1988).
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person’s characteristics, it neglects the first-person perspective on identity that 
Copp is interested in.
However, Copp’s criticisms of the rival accounts are themselves rooted in 
implicit theoretical pre-commitments, rather than merely reporting allegedly 
innocuous intuitions. The implicit theoretical background behind his supposedly 
intuitive points seems to be a hedonistic view o f persons: namely, that persons 
are experiencers o f pleasant or unpleasant emotions.9 This view shapes his 
engagement with the rival philosophical accounts of identity, in that his 
objections to them presuppose the hedonistic view o f persons. Taken at face 
value, without that background assumption, Copp’s objections are overly quick 
and uncharitable.' For instance, it is correct to say that for Taylor a person’s 
identity consists in her answer to the question “Who am I?”. However, Copp’s 
criticism that answers to that question can be arbitrary or trivial is based on a 
misunderstanding o f the context within which, for Taylor, the question arises. 
The question o f identity is not triggered by the need for self-recognition, such as 
when one reviews an old school photograph; it is triggered by one’s need to 
determine what one ought to regard as valuable. The proper context for the 
question is individuals’ practical reasoning which, for Taylor, can only take place 
in view o f fixed ideas o f the good. These ideas are provided by the cultural 
structure of meaning and significance. To ask about one’s identity is to ask about 
one’s own place in relation to one’s culture -  the roles, norms and symbols of 
one’s community. Individuals hence cannot arbitrarily invent their identities, but 
must work them out in dialogue with these determinate, historically given 
cultural components. To suggest otherwise, as Copp does, is possible only from
9 Cf.: “[0]n  the positive side, a person can feel satisfied, or feel sustained and enheartened, or feel 
boosted, bolstered or ‘enhanced’ by something. On the negative side, a person might feel 
worthless or despondent or have a sense o f  insecurity or lack o f  confidence. A person can feel 
shame, humiliation, or embarrassment, or feel disgraced, or feel discredited, or feel embarrassed 
or mortified. She can feel insulted. She can feel ‘diminished’ by something. All o f  these emotions 
can enter into a person’s relevant feelings about herself.” (Copp, “Social Unity and the Identity o f  
Persons,” p. 371.)
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some preconceived standpoint that rejects Taylor’s view of practical reasoning. 
But that just means that the criticism is theory-laden, not theory-free.10
Theoretical assumptions enter Copp’s argument even more prominently when he 
elaborates his own notion of “self-esteem” identity. Based on the hedonistic view 
o f persons, he defines identity as a set o f putative facts about a person that 
ground that person’s pleasant or unpleasant emotions about himself: “[A] 
person’s ‘identity’ at a particular stage in her life is the set o f propositions about 
her, each o f which she believes, where her belief grounds an emotion of 
esteem.” 11 Yet, it is unclear why putatively pure intuitions would mandate 
exactly that conceptualization of identity. To explain: Copp seeks support from 
psychological research that shows a link between self-conceptualization and self­
esteem.12 The link is clearly o f interest to psychology, since that science is 
interested in detailing the various processes that govern human thought and 
behaviour. But the link, credible though it is, is not obviously relevant to political 
philosophy. For a psychological concept to be adopted in normative debates, 
such as those on nationalism and multiculturalism, it needs to be judged morally 
as well as descriptively appropriate. This is why, for instance, the theory of 
Pavlovian conditioning is not discussed by political philosophers, despite strong 
experimental evidence in its favour. The principal insight of that theory is that 
external stimuli can be used to induce desired physiological reflexes in conscious 
organisms, including humans. Although the theory is descriptively successful, it 
is normatively unacceptable since regarding persons merely through the prism of 
their behaviour, which can then be modified from the outside, is considered 
objectionable. Copp’s decision to build his concept of identity around the idea of 
self-regarding emotions therefore presupposes that it is valuable that persons 
maintain a positive self-appraisal. Yet this claim is not self-justifying but must
10 Copp similarly misrepresents Korsgaard’s and Appiah’s accounts o f  identity, but I cannot 
argue the point here. Appiah’s and Taylor’s views will be discussed in greater detail in the second 
half o f  this chapter, and Korsgaard’s in chapter 5.
11 Copp, “Social Unity and the Identity o f  Persons,” p. 375.
12 Ibid.: pp. 369-70.
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rely on some further normative theory -  for example, a theory o f psychological 
well-being.
My claim that Copp’s conceptualization of identity is held together by an implicit 
theoretical framework is not enough to discredit the intuitive approach to identity 
overall. This broader critique would require showing that a concept o f identity 
can never be built upon the foundation of intuitions alone. It is plausible to 
assume that this type of argument would also raise deeper doubts about the status 
o f intuitions in normative inquiry more generally. While I have sympathy for 
such claims, I cannot rehearse them here. What I can claim, though, is that the 
flaws I identified in a prominent version of the intuition-based approach provide 
enough o f a rationale to consider the contrasting perspective. The principal 
payoff that Copp’s perspective has to offer, a suitable systematization of our 
intuitions regarding identity, is of dubious value -  since those intuitions seem to 
have been already ordered prior to the investigation into identity. Undoubtedly, 
other varieties o f the intuitive approach can be formulated, and some o f them 
perhaps will not be open to that objection. In the meantime, my suggestion is to 
try a different tack, with different rewards in store: to follow the contrasting 
theory-indexed route that starts from the constraints integral to some normative 
conception, with which the concept of identity must cohere. The hope is that the 
resulting concept o f identity will enrich the underlying theoretical framework.
I will start by examining Appiah’s influential theory-indexed account o f identity. 
This account is remarkably attractive because it utilizes insights from other 
scientific disciplines -  principally, sociology and social psychology -  while 
remaining firmly rooted in the normative theory that sees individuality as a key 
component of persons’ well-being.
1.3. Nominalism and individuality
In order to introduce Appiah’s elegant and provocative conceptualization of 
identity it will be useful to first briefly sketch the broader context within which it 
is situated. O f particular importance is the relationship between the concern with
14
individuals’ identity as a practical concept, as it figures in normative debates, 
and the one with individuals’ identity as a metaphysical concept. In the general 
metaphysical context, the concept of identity denotes the constitutive properties 
o f objects, with reference to which they can be identified as the objects they are, 
and re-identified through time. The question that the metaphysical notion o f 
personal identity looks to answer is: which are the permanent and stable features 
o f things that separate those things from other things, and guarantee their 
sameness despite changes to their other, non-essential characteristics? A typical 
test-case for this type of investigation is provided by the ancient tale of the “ship 
of Theseus”, in which a ship is slowly and gradually repaired, plank by plank, 
until it ends up sharing no planks with the ship that first went in for repair. The 
problem is to determine whether it is meaningful to say that the original and the 
extensively modified ship are one and the same, and, if so, in virtue of what.
However, the identity of human individuals cannot be simply brought under the 
general heading o f metaphysical identity o f things and organisms. An enquiry 
into the identity of humans must take account of their unique ability to self­
consciously make decisions and thus shape their own lives. This humans’ ability, 
which sets them apart from not only inanimate objects but also other living 
beings, is to not only think or act but to also know that they are thinking or 
acting. Our existence is not merely a series of interactions with our environment; 
it contains also an “inner” dimension, a domain of our thoughts about ourselves 
in relation to the things that surround us, and to life in general. The issue of 
humans’ identity therefore concerns not only the conditions of their being the 
beings that they are, but also the added factor o f their own reflection on their 
constitutive features. The idea here is not that humans’ self-reflection influences, 
or even fully determines, their metaphysical status -  their numerical identity with 
themselves over time (as a special kind o f entity among other entities, such as 
ships, trees, and ants). The point is merely that, although it must be presumed, 
the connection between humans’ self-regard and their part in the order of nature 
remains unclear. This makes the topic of human identity especially difficult. 
Faced with this difficulty, the overwhelming majority o f authors do not attempt 
to give an integrated account o f identity, but instead side with one o f two
15
approaches.13 One of them abstracts from humans’ self-consciousness, and 
regards their identity in parallel to the identity of inanimate objects and other 
living beings. The other approach divorces humans’ self-regard from 
metaphysical issues from the opposite end, by confining the search for the 
essential properties o f individuals to their first-person perspective. Its guiding 
question is: which o f their features do persons regard as constitutive of 
themselves, as self-conscious beings? This latter perspective is summed up well 
by Bhikhu Parekh, when he writes that “To explore an individuals’ identity is to 
ask what makes him who he is, how he views and relates to himself and the 
world, and why as a result he is this person and not anyone else.” 14
The overwhelming majority of authors that write about the ethical import of 
identity adopt the second approach to identity. It is concerned with what persons 
take to be the defining features of themselves as the persons that they are. 
Typically, the question asks about the particular ways in which persons classify 
themselves. An identity refers to a person’s self-description in terms of 
categories such as witty, British, mother, risk-taker, trustworthy, and so on. In a 
passage representative of this approach Bernard Williams writes that identity
has a sense which... relates to a type or a general thing. A gay or 
lesbian identity, a native American identity, or that of a Lombard 
as opposed to an Italian, are all type things, because such an 
identity is shared. Indeed, it is particularly important that it is 
shared, and an insistence on such an identity is an insistence on 
the ways in which it is shared.” 15
Furthermore, it is thought that to quality as a constituent of a person’s identity a 
self-description must be particularly important to the person -  for example, one
13 For a rare attempt at unifying the metaphysical and the practical perspective on identity see  
Kim Atkins, N arrative Identity and M oral Identity (N ew  York: Routledge, 2008).
14 Bhikhu Parekh, A New Politics o f  Identity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 9.
,5 Bernard Williams, “Identity and Identities,” in Identity, ed. Henry Harris (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), pp. 7-8.
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that the person holds especially valuable, or that he is least prone to revise. It 
must “explain or underlie a lot of the individual’s activities, emotions, reactions 
and, in general, life. It is from the point of view of those who endorse it a deep 
social classification.”16 This rules out from the scope of the concept o f identity 
those self-descriptions that are trivial or ephemeral. For instance, looking out 
one’s office window at children playing in the park, one might recognize one’s 
exhaustion and envy at their careless existence. But this passing thought is not 
enough to conclude that the fatigue and the jealousy are parts of that individual’s 
identity. These emotions capture the way he is feeling at the moment, but they do 
not describe his person , with a determinate character that stretches over time. 
Hence it can be said that an identity refers to any self-description that the person 
in question considers central to his being the person that he is. Despite his 
temporary jadedness, our office worker might continue with his work, intently 
and devotedly, because he recognizes its importance for his family’s well-being. 
His identity, then, is that of a “provider” . This approach to identity owes much to 
the sociological perspective of thinking about individuals’ identity as their social 
identity, as “a way o f locating ourselves in relation to other people”.17 As Hogg 
and Abrams explain, “just as we categorize objects, experiences and other 
people, we also categorize ourselves”, which “causes one to perceive oneself as 
‘identical’ to, to have the same social identity as, other members of the category 
-  it places oneself in the relevant social category, or places the group in one’s 
head”.18
Nonetheless, although the view o f human identities as essentially social, framed 
in terms o f group categories, has wide currency in sociological circles, it raises a 
philosophical concern. The worry is whether defining identity as self-description
16 Ibid., p. 9. Parekh similarly notes: “Not every distinguishing feature constitutes his 
[individual’s] identity, only those that are an integral part o f  him, matter to him deeply, and in 
whose absence he would no longer be the same person.” (Parekh, A N ew Politics o f  Identity, p. 
9.)
17 Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identity,” in Handbook o f  S e lf  and Identity, ed. Mark R. Leary and 
June Price Tangney (N ew  York: Guilford Press, 2002), p. 462.
18 Michael A. H ogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 
19, original emphasis.
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in terms o f group categories can capture the sense in which identities are of, and 
refer to, discrete and unique individuals. One aspect o f this thought is voiced 
well by Appiah: “If  what matters about me is my individual and authentic self, 
why is so much contemporary talk of identity about large categories -  gender, 
ethnicity, nationality, ‘race’, sexuality -  tha t seem so far from individual?”19 
Appiah’s complaint is normative, that regarding individuals through the prism of 
group memberships, even if  they are self-attributed, reduces the multiplicity of 
their projects and attachments to that category alone. It diminishes their 
autonomy by corralling them into types of behaviour that are seen as “authentic” 
expressions o f that category:
There will be proper ways o f being black and gay, there will be 
expectations to be met, demands will be made. It is at this point 
that someone who takes autonomy seriously will ask whether we 
have not replaced one kind o f tyranny [that o f neglect for 
identities] with another.20
The “identity model”, Fraser similarly argues,
puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given 
group culture. Cultural dissidence and experimentation are 
accordingly discouraged, when they are not simply equated with 
disloyalty. So, too, is cultural criticism, including efforts to 
explore intragroup divisions, such as those o f gender, sexuality 
and class... The overall effect is to impose a single, drastically 
simplified group-identity which denies the complexity o f people’s 
lives, the multiplicity of their identifications and the cross-pulls o f 
their various affiliations.21
19 Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” p. 
149.
20 Ibid., pp. 162-63.
21 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition,” N ew  Left Review  3 (2000): p. 112. Following up on 
this worry, Anne Phillips argues with Fraser that the aim o f  authenticity is normatively
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Appiah’s work on the ethics of identity can be seen as a sustained attempt to 
chart a path between the two “tyrannies”: the denial of equal dignity that comes 
with suppressing identities, and the reduction of persons’ choices to group- 
specific ideals and types. In order to appreciate his way out o f the dilemma it is 
necessary, first, to appreciate that he frames the difficulty with identity in 
distinctly Millian terms.22 This is the sense in which Appiah’s conceptualization 
is theory-indexed: it aims to resolve a problem that is conceivable as a problem 
only from the standpoint of Mill’s conception of individuals’ development. What 
Appiah means when he notes that rigid social categories may curtail persons’ 
autonomy is that they undercut their possibilities for developing their 
individuality. By a person’s individuality Appiah understands “the set of 
capacities she exercises and develops in managing her life well” 23 The ideal of 
the development of one’s individuality (which is a distant, less metaphysically 
charged echo of Aristotle’s views about the human function) is one of persons 
honing themselves to the best that they can be. As Mill memorably argues, an 
indispensable element o f this pursuit is the free and extensive exercise o f choice 
-  not as an intrinsic end, but as a means of nurturing all of one’s powers.24 And it
undesirable, but also that it plays little part in justifying actual demands for recognition. More 
often than not, these demands amount to pleas for the acknowledgement o f  the group’s 
distinctness, and equal validity o f  its political voice. According to Phillips, it is the value o f  
equality, not authenticity, that drives identity politics. (Anne Phillips, “Recognition and the 
Struggle for Political V oice,” in Recognition Struggles and Social Movements, ed. Barbara 
Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).; Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism  
without Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).)
22 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), pp. 1-35.
23 Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Reply to Gracia, Moody-Adams and Nussbaum,” Journal o f  Social 
Philosophy 37, no. 2 (2006): p. 316.
24 Cf.: “He who lets the world, or his own portion o f  it, choose his plan o f  life for him, has no 
need o f  any other faculty than the ape-like one o f  imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, 
employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, 
activity to gather m aterials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and 
exercises exactly in proportion as the part o f  his conduct which he determines according to his
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is this irreplaceable instrument o f self-improvement that is undercut by the 
constraints that accompany aligning oneself with rigid social categories. 
Appiah’s solution to this problem is to claim that self-categorization is 
indispensable for, rather than inimical to, individuality and choice. In light o f the 
just mentioned complaints about the “essentializing” tendencies of identity- 
discourse, this claim sounds surprising. As will be seen, it requires a 
sophisticated and original analysis o f identity-claims, which I will examine now.
The first step in Appiah’s programme is to show that self-categorization is 
compatible with the development o f individuality. In order to make that claim he 
needs to show that self-categorization does not lock the person into fixed and 
immutable modes o f behaviour. The idea that identities have a true, or authentic, 
essence to which identity-bearers must be true is hence clearly unsuited for 
Appiah’s purposes. However, that idea cannot be dismissed out of hand as it 
seems to give the best account o f the meaning of identity-statements, or self­
categorizations. It explains, in other words, in what sense the categories to which 
individuals appeal have a real existence. It accounts for the sense that there must 
be something -  a group, or a pattern o f behaviour -  to which individuals claim 
allegiance but which nonetheless has fixed boundaries. Without this fixity of 
categories, placing oneself under them would be meaningless: since there would 
be nothing real, nothing sharply delineated, about a label, using it would stand 
for nothing. If, for example, the application of the label “British” was completely 
unconstrained, there would be nothing that it is to be British. One simple and 
convenient way o f avoiding this problem is to say that social categories are 
ontologically real, with a stable essence that logically precedes individuals’ self- 
categorizations. On this interpretation o f identity-statements, they mean that the 
person who makes them is a version o f an ideal, or perfect, representative o f the 
relevant category. To call oneself British is to claim some connection with 
prototypical and primordial “Britishness”.
own judgment and feelings is a large one.” (John Stuart M ill, On Liberty, ed. David Bromwich 
and George Kateb (N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 124.)
The view just presented can be termed the realist approach to identity- 
statements, after a position in the traditional philosophical debate about the status 
o f universals. This debate, central to medieval philosophical discussions, focused 
on explaining how abstract signs -  common terms that can apply to a multitude 
o f objects, such as “horse”, or “sweet” — can be predicated of particular objects. 
The realist answer is that particular objects that fall under a common term 
themselves have something in common, something that logically precedes the 
practice o f calling them by the same name. Abstract terms point to the existence 
o f abstract objects, o f which particular objects are versions, or instantiations. In 
Plato’s version of realism, these mind-independent, eternal, and primary objects 
are Forms. An object falls under a universal concept insofar as it imitates, or 
participates in, the universal Form that, for Plato, exists in a purely intelligible 
world, inaccessible to senses. We can call an animal a “horse” because it is, in 
some sense, a copy o f the perfectly rational concept o f the horse. The 
transcendental Form makes the talk o f particular horses meaningful.
The realist approach to abstract terms seems unsatisfactory, in general as well as 
an explanation o f identity-statements. One objection to it is that it does too little 
to justify its postulation o f a contentious and, ultimately, mysterious world of 
pure categories -  in other words, that the notion o f logically basic categories is 
little more than a convenient, ad hoc account o f how particular objects fall under 
universal terms. This was the criticism that the empirically-minded Aristotle 
levelled against Plato, and one that equally applies to the realist interpretation of 
identity-claims. The notion that our ontology should include basic and really 
existing social types, such as “the British”, “the mother”, and “the homosexual”, 
seems too fanciful and wildly unsupported to be acceptable. One author who 
advanced claims o f this sort, specifically with respect to national types, was 
Herder, with his Leibniz-inspired view o f national characters as self-contained 
and self-directing monads. Herder thought that each culture has a “singular, 
wonderful, inexplicable, ineradicable” spirit.25 However his mystical vision of
25 Johann Gottfried von Herder, quoted in Samuel Fleischacker, Integrity and M oral Relativism  
(Leiden; N ew  York: E.J. Brill, 1992), p. 167.
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national spirit, as well as other attempts to reify social categories, is ontologically 
dubious and must be resisted.
The objection to the realist account of specific social categories is not the only 
one that can be raised against realism about identities. Although persuasive, it is 
also not the one that informs Appiah’s own account of identity. While it is indeed 
difficult to show that there are really existing and pure types to which individuals 
correspond, and what they are, Appiah’s opposition to realism runs deeper. For 
him, there is nothing outside the linguistic activity o f categorization that 
underlies the application o f social categories to individuals. Racial and other 
designations are entirely “socially constructed”, which means that “there are no 
African Americans independent o f social practices associated with the racial 
label”.26 A ccordingly Appiah proposes the following definition o f identity: a 
self-categorization X qualifies as an identity if  (1) there is a social conception of 
Xs; (2) some people identify themselves as Xs; and (3) some people treat others 
as Xs.27 By a social conception Appiah understands a set o f shared views about 
what makes some social category distinctive -  typically, these are loose and 
imprecise stereotypes about what it is to belong to the category. For an identity 
of, say, the British or the black, to exist these stereotypes also have to be 
affirmed and passed on by individuals. Furthermore, some persons’ membership 
o f the relevant group must be sufficient to provide reasons -  for members as well 
as non-members -  for dealing with them in certain ways.
Appiah’s definition is rich and subtle, and warrants patient examination. 
However what primarily matters to me here are not its specific stipulations, but 
how it prepares the ground for Appiah’s normative claims about identity. 
Specifically, I am interested in how Appiah’s definition leads to an interpretation 
o f identity-statements that is compatible with the development o f individuality. 
In this regard the definition can be called markedly non-realist because it does 
not reify social types. The meaning o f identity-statements therefore cannot be 
that they assert a connection between an individual and mysterious ontological
26 Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 23.
27 Ibid., pp. 66-69.
entities called “culture”, or “race”, or “nation”. Appiah calls his understanding 
nominalist because it “explainshow the identities work by talking about the 
labels for them”.28 His claim is imprecise because it is not clear how the phrase 
“how identities work” should be understood. Nonetheless, it is possible to get a 
sense o f what Appiah has in mind by returning to the earlier question of how 
abstract signs can be predicated o f particular objects. The nominalist answer 
denies that particular objects that fall under a common term have anything deep 
and underlying in common: abstract terms are just names that we assign to 
particular objects, but that do not imply the existence o f abstract objects. In the 
same vein Appiah argues that identities are just names, just labels that do not 
track any ontological entities. Consequently, the meaning o f identity-claims does 
not consist in any connection between features o f the person and a category 
prototype. Their meaning is just that the person adopts a certain mode o f 
speaking about himself, or “script” as Appiah calls it.29
Claiming that identity-statements are just expressions o f commitment to regard 
oneself in some particular, historically created and contingent, way fulfils the 
first task of Appiah’s programme: it removes the tension between identities and 
individuality. To make sense o f identities it is not necessary to postulate modes 
o f being that represent their true or authentic cores. Identifying oneself with a 
group or a category therefore need not entail constraints on the person’s freedom 
to develop and express his individuality. However, as I noted earlier, Appiah also 
wants to advance a further, stronger claim -  that individuality requires 
identification. In making this point he appeals to the connection that Hacking,
28 Ibid.: p. 365. He continues: “The main motivation for the nominalism is that it allows us to 
leave open the question o f  whether the empirical presuppositions o f  a labelling practice are 
correct. Since many social identities are like folk races in being shot through with false belief, 
this is a decided advantage.” (Appiah, “H ow to Decide If Races Exist,” p. 365.)
29 When I place m yself under a social category, writes Appiah, I “fit my life story into certain 
patterns— confirmation at puberty for a religious identity, tenure in your mid-thirties for a 
professorial one— and I also fit that story into larger stories; for example, o f  a people, a religious 
tradition, or a race. (Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 68.)
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30borrowing from Elizabeth Anscombe, makes between actions and descriptions. 
Hacking’s discussion of “kinds of people” starts from the Foucauldian 
assumption that creating social labels is an active intervention into the social 
reality. Defining and naming social types such as “the child”, “the depressed”, 
“the perverse”, does more than classify persons; it creates new ways of being a 
person. Devising a new social label “makes up” people by reconfiguring the 
horizon o f social expectations and options that persons face. It opens up a whole 
new context for human action: it enables them to attend to new sorts o f projects 
and pursue novel excellences, but also to experience distinctive setbacks and 
suffer fresh prejudices. In an instructive passage Hacking writes:
People spontaneously come to fit their categories. When factory 
inspectors in England and Wales went to the mills, they found 
various kinds o f people there, loosely sorted according to tasks 
and wages. But when they had finished their reports, millhands 
had precise ways in which to work, and the owner had a clear set 
o f concepts about how to employ workers according to the ways 
in which he was obliged to classify them.31
People come to fit their categories because -  and this is the principal thesis that 
Appiah takes from Hacking -  all intentional action is done “under a description”. 
That thesis consists in the apparently unremarkable claim that we cannot form an 
intention to perform an action which we cannot conceptualize. Cavemen, for 
example, could not intend to recite Shakespeare because that action was not 
among the options they could conceive. Equally, one could not intend to receive 
communion without having a notion o f transubstantiation, which is in turn 
possible only if  there exists the categorization “Catholic”. Descriptions, not only 
o f things around us but also of ourselves, ground our intentions. As Hacking
30 See Ian Hacking, “Making up People,” in Reconstructing Individualism, ed. Thomas C. Heller, 
Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986).; Ian Hacking, 
Rewriting the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 235-36.; G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).; G. E. M. Anscombe, 
“Under a Description,” Nous 13, no. 2 (1979).
31 Hacking, “Making up People,” p. 223.
24
notes, “Who we are is not only what we did, do, and will do but also what we 
might have done and may do. Making up people changes the space o f 
possibilities for personhood.”
The thesis o f the dependence of actions on descriptions is nonetheless not trivial 
because it highlights the social embeddedness o f choice. Identities do not, as the 
realist would have it, prescribe certain modes of being as uniquely possible. But 
they enable us to conceive o f  different modes of being, and thereby create options 
from which persons can choose in their efforts at self-improvement. When 
Appiah writes that we make our lives “as men and as women; as Americans and 
as Brits; as philosophers and novelists”,33 he is not merely reporting on people’s 
opinions. He is saying something about the way in which persons must regard 
themselves in order to be able to reason practically. The only way in which we 
can develop their distinctive capacities is by making ourselves into a particular 
kind of person from a “tool kit o f options made available by our culture and 
society.”34 In this regard, “To value individuality just « t o  acknowledge the 
dependence o f the good for each o f us on relationships with others. Without these 
bonds, as I say, we could not come to be free selves, not least because we could 
not come to be selves at all.”35
Appiah’s analysis of identity is better elaborated and more sophisticated than 
most. It is also commendably sensitive to the difficulties with understanding the 
connection between individuals and social types, and to the different approaches 
to the meaning o f identity-statements. Several aspects of Appiah’s account of 
identity are open to questioning -  from its underlying, and highly contentious, 
theory of the perfection of individuals’ capacities, to its nowadays fairly
32 (Ibid., p. 229.)
33 Appiah, “H ow to  Decide If Races Exist,” p. 370, original emphases.
34 Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” p. 
155.
35 A ppiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 21, original emphasis. Ronald Dworkin comes from a 
similarly Millian position when he depicts his membership o f  the American political community 
as a “condition o f  a good life” for him. (Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 261.)
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uncommon nominalist stance.36 However, I am here only interested in Appiah’s 
account as a version o f the theory-indexed approach to defining identity. My 
concern is whether it is a plausible version of that approach. In order to 
determine this, it is necessary to evaluate Appiah’s conceptualization o f identity 
on its own terms -  in relation to the theory to which it is supposed to be indexed, 
rather than alternative normative frameworks or positions in the philosophy of 
language. My question is, therefore, whether Appiah’s portrayal of identity really 
coheres with Mill’s theory of the development of individuality through choice. If 
it does not, a different kind of theory-indexed construal o f identity will need to 
be sought.
Unfortunately, it cannot be said that Appiah’s account o f identity satisfies the 
requirement that, by aiming to extend Mill’s normative framework, it sets itself.
36 For example, one might object that Appiah does not really explain what it is for a particular 
person to have an identity, as a general social type. This objection is an extension o f  the classic 
criticism o f  nominalism, which is that it “seems incapable o f  explaining the generality in thought 
and language”. (Cynthia Macdonald, “Tropes and Other Things,” in C ontem porary Readings in 
the Foundations o f  M etaphysics, ed. Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), p. 331.) The general thought is that the nominalist view o f  language is, in an 
important sense, question-begging. It states that objects referred to by the same common name do 
not have anything in common ontologically, but does not explain in virtue o f  what they fall under 
the same common name. In the context o f  identities, even if  the realist view o f  identity-bearers as 
versions o f  a common archetype is implausible, the nominalist position appears equally 
unsatisfactory. Since it treats identities as mere names, it fails to cast light on what warrants 
calling a multitude o f  persons by a same common name -  in other words, on the criterion o f  
correct categorization. It may be supposed that Appiah would wish to avert this criticism by 
insisting that identification is je(f-categorization. It is persons who attach identity-labels to 
themselves. Therefore it appears misplaced to ask about the criterion o f  correct categorization: it 
is appropriate for a person to call him self anything he decides to call himself. However this 
rejoinder is o f  dubious value because it destroys the generality o f  identities. If identification is 
self-justifying unilateral stipulation -  o f  the type “I am French because I say so” -  identities 
become a private rather than a common thing. Identification is then not a matter o f  placing 
on eself under an existing social type, but o f  tweaking the type so as to fit one’s own, ultimately 
unconstrained, decision. Because it would undermine the generality o f  identities, the decisionist 
rejoinder would not be able to explain what it is to bear an identity. I cannot further discuss this 
objection or the way in which Appiah might respond to it here.
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It looks to resolve a problem conceived in the terms o f that framework by using 
resources that are available within that framework. Specifically, Appiah sets out 
to reconcile self-identification and choice by arguing that self-identification 
enables individuals to conceive o f different options. If  this argument is 
successful, it delivers a paradigm of identity that “matters for ethical and political 
life”37 because it is rooted in Mill’s defence of the value of individuals’ choice. 
However it is unsuccessful. Therefore, Appiah’s conceptualization of identity 
fails -  not tout court but by its own theoretical lights, as it cannot be regarded as 
an extension of Mill’s conception. It mistakenly claims connection with that 
conception because its claim about the ethical significance of identities cannot 
find support in Mill’s normative claims.
The difficulty is that Appiah’s nominalist outlook provides ultimately too slim a 
foundation for his Millian defence o f the ethical import o f identities. Specifically, 
it rules out the view that self-categorization makes intentional actions possible, 
which is Appiah’s intended position. His argument for this view is quite terse. 
However it can be noted that it involves a remarkable transition: from the claim 
about the necessity o f regarding actions under a description Appiah purports to 
show that one must regard oneself under a description. This transition cannot be 
made from the standpoint o f nominalism about identity. Let me explain this point 
by elaborating on an earlier example, which is not Appiah’s but can be used to 
illustrate his argument. It is a plausible enough thought that one can only intend 
to receive communion if one possesses the concept o f transubstantiation. Now, 
the further claim that Appiah wants to add is the following: what makes it 
possible for anyone to have the concept o f transubstantiation is the existence of 
the social category “the Catholic”. By this he means that the Catholic identity 
creates distinctive ideals, excellences, and patterns o f behaviour, one o f which is 
attending the Eucharist. However this further claim cannot be borne out by 
Appiah’s nominalism. Recall that identities are just labels. To be sure, there is a 
gamut o f conventions, habits, and doctrines associated with social types. 
However, at bottom, identities are nothing more than names, manners of 
speaking about oneself and one’s projects -  and it is hard to see how, on its own,
37 Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 69.
27
attaching a certain label to oneself and others can make possible the communion. 
A great many things that are not just manners o f speaking -  a religious text, an 
ecclesiastic tradition, an appropriate social standing of the church, and so on -  
are also required for the communion to be conceivable, aside from the mere 
designation “Catholic”. All these elements combined, it seems, co-operate in 
shaping a distinctively Catholic way o f being a person.38 Names, on their own, 
do not expand the horizon of human opportunities.
Appiah’s attempt to connect identities to the Millian theory of individuality is 
unconvincing. The nominalist analysis o f identity, which promises to fend off the 
essentializing tendencies o f identity-discourse, turns out to be too slender to bear 
out the claim that identification is a precondition for choice. Therefore Appiah’s 
particular version o f the theory-indexed approach to defining identity cannot be 
accepted. This finding is important because Appiah’s account represents one of 
the most prominent and sustained attempts at explaining identities. Given that it 
fails, it is legitimate to enquire into the possibilities for devising alternative 
theory-indexed understandings o f identity. In the rest o f this thesis I will look 
into the prospects for one such alternative account, which is rooted in a 
normative theory that is distinct from Appiah’s Millianism but nonetheless very 
influential. This is the liberal theory o f reasons-based justification, which I will 
briefly present in the next section. As I will show, the central place that 
conception affords to individuals’ reasons for action provides an opportunity for 
an attractive conceptualization of identity.
38 Appiah counters the argument I have just given by appealing to a famous sociological 
experiment. (Ibid., pp. 62-64.) In the “Robbers Cave” study two groups o f  el even-year-old boys, 
previously unacquainted with each other, were placed in an isolated camp area and monitored 
over a period o f  four days. Left to their own devices, the two groups developed markedly 
different conventions, ideals o f  proper behaviour, and pastimes. Before long, a fierce 
competitiveness and sense o f  enmity arose between the groups, which however disappeared once 
the two groups were assigned to work on a common task. Appiah attributes the development o f  
different social structures exclusively to the groups’ adoption o f  different labels (the Rattlers and 
the Eagles). However, this suggestion is highly questionable in light o f  the variety o f  other factors 
influencing the groups’ behaviour: absence o f  the boys’ parents, the fact o f  group co-habitation, 
the camp setting, comparison with the other group, and so on.
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1.4. Identities and reasons
The liberal theory o f reasons-based justification states, in short, that all political 
principles must be justifiable by recourse to reasons that hold for all citizens. It 
can be introduced by, first, defining a reason as a consideration that, for the 
agent, counts in favour o f some action.39 By referring to reasons as 
considerations that favour some action, liberals adopt the normative perspective 
on reasons -  a perspective that asks about the justification for acting. This 
approach can be usefully contrasted with the explanatory approach to reasons, 
which uses the notion o f a reason in order to tell a coherent causal story about 
happenings in the world. Saying that a shipwreck survivor had a reason to drink 
saltwater is, from this point o f view, perfectly acceptable. It serves to describe his 
behaviour as purposeful: even though we cannot comprehend what his reason 
was, his doing it shows that he must have had some reason for it. From the 
normative perspective, however, the notion o f a reason is not descriptive but 
prescriptive: it tells us that an action is the sensible thing for the person in the 
circumstances. In this sense, reasons are always good  reasons: they rationally 
recommend or support taking some action. Viewed from this angle, to say that an 
agent had a reason for doing something is not equivalent to saying that his 
purposeful behaviour produced certain outcomes in the world; it is to state that 
there was something in light o f which his action was appropriate.
One common way o f regarding the requirement for universal justification 
connects it to the issue o f legitimacy.40 On this view, which has roots in older 
liberal theories o f the social contract, subjecting citizens to coercive measures 
that he could not consent to amounts to coercion. The condition o f public 
justifiability is therefore a means o f ensuring the legitimacy of the state’s use of 
power. The liberal insistence on justification through universally acceptable
39 This is a widely accepted definition o f  a reason. See for example Thomas M. Scanlon, What 
We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), p. 17.; Jonathan Dancy, 
Practical R eality  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 1.
40 S ee for example John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed. (N ew  York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), p. 217.
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reasons can be illustrated by briefly looking at the way in which reasons figure in 
the design of John Rawls’s “original position” . The appeal to the original 
position represents the contractarian aspect of Rawls’s theory, in which he seeks 
to justify certain principles o f justice by recourse to the consent of individuals 
under certain hypothetical circumstances.41 This type o f contractarianism is 
morally constrained, which means that among the stipulations that govern the 
construction o f the choice-scenario are moral stipulations -  principally, that the 
ensuing principles o f justice must be fair.42 The resulting conception o f justice 
has an inevitable moral component because it is built into it from the very start.
At the heart o f morally constrained contractarianism is the idea that justice 
results from individuals’ choices grounded in proper reasons -  namely, those 
reasons that are relevant to justice. In Rawls, reasons relevant to justice are those 
that are exclusively based on two interests o f the choosing parties: their interest 
in developing and exercising their conception o f the good, and their interest in 
developing and exercising their sense o f justice.43 For political principles to be 
just, according to Rawls, it must be possible to regard them as the preferred 
option of individuals guided only by these interests. However, he also recognizes 
that individuals are ordinarily not guided by such considerations. Making social 
organization dependent on the actual choice o f persons in their real 
circumstances would therefore result in unjust principles. For that reason, Rawls 
places deliberators in a deliberately counterfactual context o f choosing, the
41 However, contractarianism is not the only aspect o f  Rawls’s theory: the principal burden o f  
justification in his conception is carried by the procedure o f  “reflective equilibrium”. This issue is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
42 For the distinction between morally constrained and morally unconstrained contractarianism 
see for example Christopher W. Morris, “Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing,” in Rational 
Commitment and Social Justice: Essays fo r  Gregory Kavka, ed. Jules L. Coleman and 
Christopher W. Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 189.; and Cynthia A. 
Stark, “Hypothetical Consent and Justification,” Journal o f  Philosophy 97, no. 6 (2000): pp. 314- 
15.
43 Although implicit in A Theory o f  Justice, the idea o f  “higher-order” interests as the basis for 
deliberation on principles o f  justice is explicitly discussed only in later Rawls’s writings. See 
John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal o f  Philosophy 77, no. 9 (1980): 
p. 525.; and Rawls, P olitical Liberalism, pp. 73-75,105-07.
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“original position”. That imagined standpoint isolates the parties’ relevant 
reasons by radically restricting the set o f facts that they can rely upon in 
deciding.44 In particular, they are imagined as shorn of any of their particular 
circumstances, such as their natural talents, race, wealth, and so on. Deprived of 
these facts about themselves, Rawls argues, the choosing parties could only opt 
for political conditions that allow them to utilize and preserve their conception o f 
the good and sense o f justice. The design o f the choice situation thus embodies 
procedural fairness, which gives us, ordinary citizens with full knowledge o f 
their circumstances, reason to accept the contractors’ principles.
In the rest o f this dissertation I will examine the prospects for framing the 
concept of identity in terms of individuals’ reasons. More specifically, I will ask 
whether or not identity can be seen as a determinant of individuals’ reasons for 
action. One o f the facts than might be thought to constitute a person’s identity is 
that he endorses some evaluative self-description, as Christine Korsgaard thinks 
o f identity; or, in Harry Frankfurt’s conceptualization, that he has some 
commitment that he cannot bring himself to violate. Facts o f this sort, it may be 
claimed, stand in an intimate connection with the person’s reasons: they either 
generate certain reasons, or they constrain the range o f reasons that it is possible 
for the person to have.
My question is therefore whether such facts function as what Peri Roberts calls 
the theoretical limits on reasons -  as “assumptions that necessarily underpin our 
reasoning”.45 If culturally mediated and subjective identities do set limits to 
reasons in this way, Roberts argues, we may worry about reasons being 
“different for different people at different times and places”.46 For him, it is their 
potential threat to the universality of liberal justification that makes identities 
normatively significant. However since there is considerable uncertainty
44 Cf.: “[T]he veil and other conditions o f  the original position are designed to focus our attention 
upon the reasons that are m orally relevant, and to exclude those that are not, to justifying 
principles o fjustice.” (Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 144.)
45 Peri Roberts, Political Constructivism  (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 120.
46 Ibid.
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regarding how to understand identity, as I have shown, it cannot be simply 
assumed that they pose this threat. My enquiry is therefore not primarily guided 
by the objective o f defending the possibility o f universally valid reasons. I will 
probe the thesis that identities constrain reasons in order to determine what can 
be plausibly said about identities, since there is currently no rigorous and widely 
accepted account o f identity. This investigation has a normative dimension 
insofar as it looks to nest the concept o f identity within the liberal conception o f 
reasons-based justification. If  identities are the roots o f all reasons, they are an 
issue o f some normative importance. They then determine what kind o f reasons 
persons can have. And this, it seems, has implications for the kind of 
justifications that can be given to others, which is relevant to those who think 
that all political principles must be supported by shareable reasons.
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the methodological 
question o f whether it is possible to give an individualist analysis o f identity, in 
the face of Charles Taylor’s thesis o f “irreducibly social goods”. Chapter 3 
considers the Rawls-inspired argument that identity constrains individuals’ 
reasons insofar as they care to maintain their self-respect. Chapter 4 evaluates 
Harry Frankfurt’s claim that identities determine persons’ reasons by 
constraining their power of willing. Chapter 5 discusses Christine Korsgaard’s 
view that identities are the subjective grounds for maxim-adoption, and as such 
lie at the basis o f all reasons. Chapters 6 and 7 develop a Kantian account o f 
identity as a transcendental condition o f reasons, and chapter 8 concludes.
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2. The possibility of individualism about identity
2.1. Taylor and the dynamic concept of the self
In this chapter I will discuss a comprehensive objection against the kind of 
account o f identity that I wish to develop. In the previous chapter I announced 
that I am interested in the prospects for devising a concept o f identity from 
within the theory o f reason-based justification. One way o f conceiving o f identity 
from that standpoint, and the one I care to examine, is to think o f it as a 
determinant of individuals’ reasons for action. However, before developing such 
a concept o f identity it is necessary to put to bed a well-elaborated line of 
argument that contests its very possibility. That argument is Charles Taylor’s 
rejection of the “atomist” method o f studying the society through an examination 
o f the properties of individuals that compose it.
If successful, Taylor’s critique discredits the “atomist”, or analytical, approach to 
a variety o f phenomena that involve humans in their social setting. I am here 
only concerned with how Taylor’s'arguments relate to the investigation of 
identity, and specifically to the project o f devising a reasons-based concept of 
identity. That project is liable to Taylor’s critique of the analytical method 
because it assumes that, since individuals are the only units o f moral standing, 
reasons can only be o f individuals. A concept o f identity that is based in this 
perspective can therefore also admit only of individuals’ identities. However, 
Taylor has argued that this narrowly individualist approach to identity 
impoverishes the reality o f social and ethical life. There is, on his view, 
something intrinsically “undecomposable” about lived communal practice, which 
exists above and beyond any attempt to compartmentalize it. Whittling the worth 
o f identity to a set o f propositions about individual attachments is flawed from 
the start. A practical implication of this Taylor’s view is that there can be no talk
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of partial cultural accommodation o f identities, only full -house autonomy for the 
community that shapes and nurtures identities. In this chapter I will present and 
evaluate Taylor’s critique of individualism about identity, focusing on his thesis 
of “ irreducibly social goods”.
Taylor defines identity as follows:
To know who I am is a species o f knowing where I stand. My 
identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which 
provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine 
from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what is or ought to 
be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the 
horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.1
This instructive passage is extremely compressed, weaving together several 
distinct and complex argumentative strands. Nonetheless, it can be summarized 
as follows. Its central theme is opposition to the analytical separation o f the 
subject’s identity from his actions and commitments as a member o f a particular 
social world. Concepts, including ethical concepts, are based on prior 
engagement with the world, where this engagement is not random or arbitrary 
but guided by the horizon o f shared understandings. The distinctive feature of 
this constitutive horizon, in turn, is its groundedness in the community’s 
conception o f what constitutes a good or fully-realized life. Since the conception 
is itself the product o f a dynamic process, an expression o f the community’s 
unique way o f life and deliberative practices, the subject’s selfhood is also best 
conceived not as fixed but a matter o f dialogical self-interpretation. 
Underpinning the self-interpretive project is an essentially communal 
understanding o f the good.
As it may perhaps be gathered from this brief sketch, Taylor’s philosophical 
treatment o f identity incorporates two mutually reinforcing insights: one is the 
dynamic Hegelian notion o f the emerging self; the other is the more Aristotelian
1 Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the S e lf  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 27.
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idea that self-interpretation can only be conducted in view o f the good. In 
conjunction, the two notions work against two constituents o f what Taylor terms 
the malaise of “atomism” . The dynamic notion o f the self is directed against that 
part of the atomistic outlook which Taylor calls “ontological individualism”, the 
view according to which one “can and ought to account for social actions, 
structures, and conditions in terms of properties of the constituent individuals”.2 
The contested view here is that societies must be understood and arranged from 
the perspective o f individual human persons. However this claim is easily 
misunderstood. In particular, it may be thought that Taylor wishes to advocate an 
alternative picture o f personhood -  for example, one in which collectivities can 
also be moral persons. But Taylor is not a collectivist.3 In fact, his objection to 
ontological individualism is not at all directed at the sort o f entities that it picks 
out as subjects. Rather, his criticism targets its analytical method, which draws 
its roots from Descartes -  and specifically its freezing o f the social categories. 
The analytical approach in philosophy breaks down the object o f its scrutiny into 
progressively smaller constitutive parts with the objective o f observing their 
individual contributions to the working o f the whole. In the study o f society, this 
method manifests itself in the reduction o f the lived practice o f the society to the 
series o f relations between distinct individual agents. An inevitable part o f this 
reduction, argues Taylor, is the conceptual separation of individuals from each 
other and from the practices in which they are involved. Without this separation, 
the project o f observing the way in which these disparate agents interact would 
be impossible.
However, Taylor claims, this strict division o f the societal whole into neatly 
individuated agents is contrived and incoherent. In looking for neat and
2 Charles Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in Philosophical 
Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 181.
3 Collectivism about personhood is not a commonly held view  nowadays. A rare recent proponent 
o f  it is Vernon Van Dyke, for example in Vemon Van Dyke, “Collective Entities and Moral 
Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought,” Journal o f  Politics 44, no. 12 (1982).; Vemon  
Van Dyke, “The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory,” W orld  
Politics 29, no. 3 (1977).; and Vemon Van Dyke, “The Cultural Rights o f  Peoples,” Universal 
Human Rights 2, no. 2 (1980).
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manageable categories it compromises fidelity to reality. This is evident in two 
explanatory failures o f the analytic concept of the individuated self: its failure in 
accounting for the nature o f the self, and in expressing why selfhood is valuable. 
On the first note, that approach supposedly cannot explain how we relate to 
ourselves. This argument starts from the idea, which echoes Hegel’s criticism of 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy, that “our representations o f things -  the kinds o f 
objects we pick out as whole, enduring entities -  are grounded in the way we 
deal with those things.”4 The analytical approach runs counter to this idea by 
assuming that individuals can be regarded in abstraction from their engagement 
with the social world. What drops out o f consideration within this perspective is 
that persons necessarily regard themselves under certain descriptions. In other 
words, they always think o f themselves as such-and-such persons: as honest, 
witty, sporty, conniving, intellectual, Danish and so on. In identifying themselves 
in this way they cannot but use concepts borrowed from their culture, which is 
why the self is always coloured by communal ideas and ideals. Secondly, 
reduction also fails to acknowledge that one values and takes pride in oneself 
precisely because o f the traits and dispositions captured in this comprehensive 
self-conception -  not because one is an abstract moral unit, but because one is a 
human being o f a certain sort: for example, a caring mother, or a good socialist. 
For Taylor, these deficiencies o f the analytical account o f selfhood warrant 
embracing an alternative, dynamic concept o f the self. It is a concept in which, 
rather than a finished article, the self is a continuous project: the project of 
becoming a person o f a determinate sort through ongoing interaction with others. 
Essential to this project is the process o f receiving and granting recognition -  that 
is, assurance o f selfhood. Recognition is a dialectical notion, which means that 
affirming the selfhood of another person (as “the mother”, “the socialist”, or 
whatever) at the same time establishes one’s own subjectivity.5
4 Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 11.
5 This view  o f  the se lf is developed extensively in Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Phenomenology o f  Spirit, trans. Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
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Although the dynamic conception o f selfhood that Taylor adopts is developed 
most systematically by Hegel, the connection between recognition and 
unimpaired selfhood has earlier roots. Aspects o f it can, for example, be found in 
Rousseau’s sentimental romanticism about self-expression.6 There is a way of 
being that is peculiar and appropriate to my own unique self, Rousseau writes, 
and happiness and self-realization can be only be found in a life that reaches this 
genuine mode o f existence. But his writings also reveal a special kind o f worry 
about the fragility of identity. Civilization has supplanted man’s natural instincts 
with self-indulging inclinations: all traces o f compassion have been eradicated, 
innate and innocent self-love exchanged for selfishness. The modern man is shut 
off from all that was once true and untainted about him, the great corruptors 
being the over-production o f goods and, resulting from it, private property. They 
have imposed on humanity the stultifying dictate o f uniformity answering to the 
demands o f economic expediency. In this precarious position the duty o f the 
alienated individual is to cry out in search o f himself -  to embark on the most 
penetrating project o f self-discovery in which the only assurance of his own 
selfhood is the cry itself.7
But, so the argument continues, not only must the quest for authenticity be given 
expression, it must also be publicly recognised as worthwhile. Without 
recognition the quest is futile, for the individual’s objective of asserting that he is 
somebody, somebody worthy o f respect, is baldly and easily defeated when the 
enormous strength o f common opinion is harnessed into convincing him that he 
is an insignificant speck. Or, for that matter, when his plea is plainly ignored. 
This worry is adopted and taken extremely seriously by contemporary identity-
6 On a radical interpretation, Rousseau can even be seen as a direct predecessor o f  H egel’s 
dynamic concept o f  the self. Guignon thus notes: “For the more authentic form o f  self-revelation 
Rousseau envisions, what the self-portrait presents is not a faithful copy o f  the subject but a 
representation o f  the subject’s ongoing search for the truth o f  the self. The image is authentic 
because the s e lf  ju st is this search .” (Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic (N ew  York, London: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 69, original emphasis.)
7 The brief sketch o f  Rousseau’s position is extracted from The Social Contract and the two 
D iscourses, both in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, and D iscourses, trans. G. D. H. 
C ole (London: Dent, 1993).
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theorists, to the degree that Nancy Fraser is justified in saying that “the usual 
approach to the politics o f recognition -  what I shall call the ‘identity model’ -  
starts from the Hegelian idea that identity is constructed dialogically, through a 
process of mutual recognition.”8 This demand for recognition is thus the demand 
for an appropriate societal attitude towards individuals’ striving for authenticity, 
where it encompasses both a negative aspect -  that one’s quest be tolerated, 
meaning that he is not held in contempt or abused because o f his 
pronouncements o f identity; and usually also a positive aspect -  that the value of 
the quest is given proper public acknowledgement (or that diversity is cherished, 
as the slogan goes).
2.2. Self-interpretation and irreducibly social goods
A further and distinctive part of Taylor’s position is the special importance he 
gives to self-interpretation in the context o f recognition.9 It is at this point that 
the Hegelian strand o f Taylor’s argument is joined by the Aristotelian insistence 
on the communal nature o f evaluative standards. This insistence can be seen as 
Taylor’s rebuttal of the other aspect of the atomistic doctrine: what may be 
termed “justificatory (or value-) individualism”. Whereas ontological 
individualism is an approach to the study o f persons, justificatory individualism 
is an approach to the study o f goods. Its central claim is that the property of 
goodness can be examined in relation to individuals alone. Against this claim, 
Taylor argues that the goodness o f some goods -  for instance language, and civic 
virtue -  cannot be explained with reference to lone individual agents. This is the 
position o f justificatory (or value-) holism. Taylor’s idea can be approached by 
returning to the thought that in addition to recognizing ourselves as such-and- 
such persons, we also take an evaluative stance towards our being the way that
8 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition,” New Left Review , no. 3 (2000): p. 109. For arguments 
that draw, to a lesser or greater extent, on this Hegelian idea see Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  
Recognition  (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995).; Axel Honneth and Avishai Margalit, “Recognition,” 
A ristotelian Society, Supplem entary Volumes, no. 75 (2001).; and Avishai Margalit, The Decent 
Society  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
9 Cf. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, 46-47.
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we are. One does not only care to know that the road she is following in her 
endeavours is one o f a mother, or socialist; one also wants to know where she is 
standing in this course and how well she is doing in her strivings. In fact, one 
must ask oneself these strong evaluative questions, as Taylor calls them, because 
there is no way o f attaching these labels to oneself without appealing to public 
standards o f goodness. Asking about the good comes before saying anything 
about oneself, as its transcendental condition.
In explaining the inevitability o f strong evaluative frameworks Taylor often 
invokes the spatial metaphor: when a lost traveller asks where is Mont 
Tremblant, it will not do for the native o f the region to blindfold him and drop 
him off at the foot o f the mountain the next day. The traveller will, to be sure, 
have found the spot and in one sense his curiosity has been satisfied; but, in 
another and more important respect, he is as lost as he was before. For, he has no 
concept o f the geographical area and, despite his being brought to the destination, 
no understanding o f where he is in relation to where he was before, or to other 
places in the known world.10 But this is not the position one finds oneself in 
when trying to work out his identity. Self-interpretation is an own effort, 
consisting in placing oneself in some role or under some description fo r  oneself -  
which means that one cannot rely on the benevolent native for guidance but is 
compelled to go by his own well-informed understanding o f the map. The 
framework that fixates the ethical terrain and make finding one’s way possible, 
continues Taylor, is the shared understanding o f what is a good, or worthwhile, 
way o f being.11
10 Ibid., 41-42.
11 Cf.: “In the light o f  our understanding o f  identity, the portrait o f  an agent free from all 
frameworks rather spells for us a person in the grip o f  an appalling identity crisis. Such a person 
wouldn’t know where he stood on issues o f  fundamental importance, would have no orientation 
in these issues whatever, wouldn’t be able to answer for him self on them. If one wants to add to 
the portrait by saying that the person doesn’t suffer this absence o f  frameworks as a lack, isn’t in 
other words in a crisis at all, then one rather has a picture o f  frightening dissociation. In practice, 
we should see such a person as deeply disturbed.” (Ibid., p. 31.)
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However, Taylor’s communitarian understanding of goods goes further than the
claim that any self-interpretation must make use o f cultural categories and ideals.
This claim is not very controversial or uncommon. In fact one of the major
liberal currents, the Millian version of liberalism, explicitly acknowledges the
deep entanglement of individuals’ choices and the cultural context. One of
central points of Appiah’s approach to identity, as we saw in the previous
chapter, is that the development of individuality requires “the complex
10interdependence o f self-creation and sociability”. And Joseph Raz maintains 
that aside from independence and appropriate mental abilities, there is also a
I 'Isocial condition of individuals’ autonomy: an adequate range of options. 
Autonomous choosing is choosing between valuable options. What differentiates 
Taylor from these socially sensitive liberals is that he regards some goods as 
unanalyzable to the interests, or well-being o f individual agents. For Appiah and 
Raz, the social context provides indispensable resources for the development of 
individuals’ character and their exercise of autonomy, respectively. Taylor goes 
beyond these claims by postulating a class o f goods that are only meaningful in 
relation to a community that is composed of, but cannot be reduced to, 
individuals.
Taylor’s irreducibility thesis should be clearly distinguished from the benign 
claim about public goods which present-day liberalism can easily wrestle with. 
One cannot enjoy fresh air without the same good being had by others. On the 
modern understanding o f the state, where it is not seen as a decentralized cluster 
o f corporations with private armies, there can be no system of national defence 
that benefits only some citizens and not all. Provision of the good o f national 
security requires the pooling o f considerable financial resources, which can in 
itself stimulate public debate on current norms of political inclusion and state’s 
duties; it may be associated with intense feelings o f pride and obligation to the 
national community; and in some extreme cases it engages individuals in 
undertaking sacrifices that would seem to outweigh the expected benefits, 
especially when their lives are endangered. But none o f this affects the fact that
12 Appiah, The Ethics o f  Identity, p. 17.
13 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 372-73.
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national defence, like fresh air, is open to a reduction. In the final analysis, they 
are both goods for lone individuals, so that “the good is a good only because it 
benefits individuals” .14 Each is intrinsically “decomposable”, meaning that in 
order to gain insight into how and why they carry value it is sufficient to look 
into the separate satisfactions that compose them.
Public goods thus point to intersubjectivity only in the weak, non-constitutive 
sense. However, in addition, Taylor argues for another category o f goods: those 
by their nature unsusceptible to any reduction. He points out that thinking of 
culture and language, in particular, as decomposable takes something away from 
their goodness: how individuals relate to their culture slips out o f sight on an 
analytical account. So, one part o f this objection to the atomist theory of the good 
is that the individuals’ relationship towards their culture is best conceived as 
holistic. The actions we find ourselves performing and the social roles we find 
ourselves occupying are the actions and roles that are prescribed and delineated 
by the totality o f social interchange. Describing certain behaviours as morally 
praiseworthy and others as reprehensible, working out and conceptualizing the 
ingredients o f the good life, coming to the awareness o f our unique traits and 
capacities -  all these activities we inevitably conduct in the language o f our 
cultural community. We are thoroughly implicated in the practices and shared 
understandings o f our culture.
But this is not all that Taylor is saying. His claim is not only that culture is an 
irreducible feature o f the society; it is that culture is an irreducible feature o f the 
society and  that it is a good.15 Moreover, culture is a good because it is an 
irreducible feature o f the society. He states that culture must be valued because it 
provides the indispensable background and structure to human action, where his 
favourite way o f making the point is by likening culture to language. Adopting 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s distinction, he speaks of the difference between parole, 
or speech act, and langue, or the totality of the linguistic system. It cannot be
14 Charles Taylor, “Irreducibly Social Goods,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 129.
15 Ibid., p. 138.
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denied that language perpetuates and recreates itself through individual speech 
acts, as external manifestations o f that language, but the important thing to note 
is that langue cannot be conceived as the lump sum o f all acts o f parole. The 
reason for this is that linguistic utterances cannot be created ex nihilo: they must 
themselves be modelled after the pre-existing structure of meaning provided by 
langue. Now, it might be thought that this claim’s reference to individuals 
ultimately subverts the whole irreducibility thesis. However, the fact that a 
linguistic code is analyzable into disparate words, propositions and speech acts, 
and that each speech act is attachable to an individual speaker does not in itself 
speak against Taylor. It does nothing to undermine the existence o f an irreducible 
backdrop which only gives parole meaning. Individual utterances are made 
possible by this abstract structure, which continues to hold even if  language must 
necessarily be affirmed in concrete situations, by concrete people. The same 
dialogical relationship, argues Taylor, exists between culture and the individual. 
Hence, since culture is as fundamental to action as langue is to speech, we must 
value culture if  we value agency.
With these claims in place, the depth o f Taylor’s disagreement with the 
analytical approach to identity can be more readily appreciated. Since he 
endorses the Hegelian idea o f the emerging self, he regards recognition in the 
public domain as essential to the development o f selfhood. This is a remarkably 
strong defence o f the value o f unhindered participation in the public life of a 
community. It is focused on a value that precedes and transcends the ideals and 
principles that liberal theorists usually invoke, such as liberty, or welfare, or 
human rights -  the value o f selfhood itself. However, Taylor does not regard 
selfhood in static terms, as something that can be had or lost once and for all. 
Rather, to be a person is to take part in the process o f becoming a determinate 
kind o f human being in dialogue with others. Furthermore, for Taylor this 
dialogical self-interpretation must be framed in terms, and draw on ideals, 
inherited from one’s culture. What is distinctive about Taylor’s position, 
however, is that self-interpretation must be conducted in view o f a special class 
o f goods, ones that cannot be reduced to a sum of goods for disparate individuals. 
Points of reference for individuals’ self-identification are objects and virtues that 
are good for the community.
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At the practical level, Taylor’s claims about identity have the potential o f 
representing one o f the strongest cases conceivable for the autonomy o f cultural 
groups. The core o f such a strongly communitarian defence would be the 
startlingly forceful claim that nothing less than moral subjectivity is at stake in 
debates about identity. This is because the emergence o f integral selfhood 
heavily depends on full and unobstructed participation in the community’s 
cultural interchange. Furthermore, the strong argument for cultural autonomy 
would deny that this can be achieved through partial accommodation o f cultural 
claims, for the essential feature of a cultural community is that it expresses itself 
in its political constitution. It collectively probes and answers the question about 
the human good and then builds institutions around it, where the important thing 
is that it does the searching and the regulating on its own. In this regard, Taylor 
may be seen as recommending a return to some insights o f the civic-humanistic 
tradition o f political theorizing.16 This tradition, which among others includes 
ancient writers, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville, places great 
emphasis on the civic virtue o f patriotism. It is a virtue which cannot be 
explained by appealing to the separate virtues o f individuals because it is not a 
property o f any o f the parts o f the polity but o f the whole. It embodies a common 
spirit o f devotion to the public good, stemming from the shared sense that 
participation in the political body forms part o f the good citizen’s dignity. 
Politics is, on this conception, not an instrument in the service of individual 
interests, but a fate that we are sharing, an enterprise that is truly ours and not 
mine, yours and the third person’s. As with Taylor’s irreducibly social goods, the 
meaning o f patriotism remains elusive if  one stubbornly persists with the idea of 
patriotic citizens where talking about common patriotic virtue is more 
appropriate.17
16 T he connection between Taylor’s normative views and the republican tradition is drawn 
especially in Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate.”
17 Michael Sandel offers an account o f  the se lf  that has similarly republican inclinations. (Michael 
J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pp. 79-103.) After considering N ozick’s objection to Rawls’ difference principle, Sandel 
argues that Rawls is only able to treat natural talents as a common societal asset at the expense o f  
violating his own principle o f  distinctness o f  persons. More specifically, what precludes Rawls
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In sum, Taylor’s arguments undermine individualist analyses of identity by 
making a case for the inclusion o f reference to essentially communal goods in the 
concept o f identity. Within this perspective, the central determinant o f an 
individual’s identity is not any decision or property of that individual, but the 
dialogical community o f which he is part. As Taylor puts it, “To understand our
predicament in terms o f finding or losing orientation in moral space is to take the
1 8space which our frameworks seek to define as ontologically basic.”
2.3. Human agency and culture
I have already noted that it is possible to understand Taylor’s position on 
identity, and the critique o f individualism that it involves, as an amalgam of two 
theses. One is the Hegelian thesis about the dynamic nature o f selfhood; the other 
is the Aristotelian thesis about the orientation o f practical reasoning towards the 
communal good. The notion that serves to connect these two disparate claims is 
that o f self-interpretation. For Taylor, individuals constitute themselves through 
the process o f self-interpretation, which stands in need o f validation by others. 
Self-interpretation is in turn always evaluative: we do not merely describe 
ourselves as a certain kind o f person, but ask whether we are doing well in being 
that kind o f person. One wonders whether she is a good mother, a good 
communist, and so on. And it answering such questions one must appeal to an 
essentially communal notion o f what constitutes a good life.
from taking that route is that individuation o f  persons is taken as a  p riori given, and includes the 
assumption o f  mutual disinterest. Sandel’s solution (in which he o f  course differs from Nozick) is 
to include such attributes as attachment to others in the definition o f  selfhood, as constitutive 
rather than merely accidental properties o f  the self. This Sandel’s positive conception o f  
intersubjectivity (for which he also finds support in Rawls’ idea o f  the social union) is sometimes 
overlooked in favour o f  his more widely cited negative critique o f  the “unencumbered s e l f ’. 
However, the republican disposition also carries over into his subsequent writings, with a more 
prominent role to play.
18 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, 29, emphasis added.
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A full assessment of Taylor’s critique of reductionism about identity would 
require an appraisal o f both theses that compose it. I will however focus on only 
one o f them, the Aristotelian claim about irreducibly social goods. This would be 
impossible if the two strands of his argument were inseparable, but this is not the 
case. One can be a Hegelian, o f a more orthodox type than Taylor, about 
recognition without thinking that recognition is primarily a matter o f self­
interpretation. Equally, it is possible to espouse a more conventional Aristotelian 
position that affirms the orientation o f practical reasoning towards communal 
good, but takes selfhood as fixed. The merger o f these two lines o f argument is a 
highly original and idiosyncratic feature of Taylor’s philosophy. That said, it is 
still necessary to justify the decision to omit further consideration o f the Hegelian 
element of Taylor’s position. Given that the Hegelian line of argument advocates 
the ontology o f fluid subjectivity, it is difficult to both present and assess in an 
entirely perspicuous fashion. Since it breaks down the conceptual separation of 
persons from their engagement with the world -  the subject-object relation, as it 
is sometimes called -  it cannot be done justice without abandoning the analytical 
style o f philosophizing. Since liberal political theory is mostly, if  not wholly, 
done in the analytical mode, it would need to be stretched considerably to 
properly confront the idea o f the emerging self.19 O f course, this is no argument 
against doing so. However this meta-theoretical enquiry would not only require 
much more space than I can afford here, it would also distract from my main 
topic o f practical identity. Therefore, I cannot further discuss the first part of 
Taylor’s critique.20
19 The need o f  the analytical method for fixed units o f  analysis is expressed well in Kukathas’s 
critique o f  Iris Marion Young’s Hegelian account o f  the self: “If w e are to theorize about the 
good for human beings (or about anything, for that matter), something must be kept constant. The 
suggestion in this work is that that constant is the individual, as the entity with whose good we 
must ultimately be concerned.” (Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 90.)
20 This restriction o f  my discussion should not be understood as an implicit concession to Taylor 
it does not rule out the possibility that the idea o f  the emerging se lf is implausible after all. 
H egel’s idea rests on a critique o f  the formality o f  Kant’s philosophy -  specifically, o f  Kant’s 
ambition in the Critique o f  Pure Reason  to uncover the necessary conditions o f  cognition itself, 
abstracted from any content o f  cognition. H egel’s charge is that this ambition, and the notion o f  a
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Instead, I wish to focus on the other part of Taylor’s rebuttal o f atomism about 
identity, his view o f irreducibly social goods as the basis for evaluative self­
interpretation. My suggestion is that this view should be rejected because the 
concept o f irreducibly social goods is unacceptable. It is unacceptable because its 
treatment o f the conditions o f human agency is arbitrary and hence illegitimate. 
My objection is thus different from the criticism that irreducibly social goods are 
not really irreducibly social. An exponent o f this latter charge is Chandran 
Kukathas. He argues that “the condition of human beings is, ultimately, one of 
solitariness; and the goods each knows he knows not in common with others but 
alone. The fact that human beings are social beings does nothing to alter this.”21 
What leads him to this conclusion is the difficulty in explaining the supposed 
intrinsicness o f communal goods. The only way in which the goodness o f culture 
and language can be understood, writes Kukathas, is if  they are ultimately good 
for individuals. Since all goods are consumed individually rather than 
collectively, they can only be goods for individuals.22
It is doubtful whether Kukathas’s critique succeeds. It is rooted in the 
uncontentious claim that “For something to be valuable it must, at some point, be 
valuable to someone for the value it gives som eone”23 From that claim Kukathas
critique o f  pure  reason, is incoherent. One cannot, he claims, investigate the necessary structure 
o f  cognition without a basis in some prior cognition. To claim otherwise is to make the mistake 
o f  “refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim”. (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
H eg el’s Logic: Being Part One o f  the Encyclopaedia o f  the Philosophical Sciences, trans. 
William Wallace, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 66 .) Yet, this objection is 
not obviously well-placed. For instance, Karl Ameriks has claimed that Hegel wrongly assumes 
that Kant aims to deliver a general criterion for knowledge. Instead, Ameriks contends, Kant 
starts by assuming that there are some warranted knowledge-claims, and then looks to answer 
which a priori principles would be required by them. (Karl Ameriks, “H egel’s Critique o f  Kant’s 
Theoretical Philosophy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46, no. 1 (1985).) On this 
construal, the criticism that forms the basis o f  H egel’s dynamic concept o f  the se lf  is misdirected. 
Although there is much to be said for this claim, 1 lack the space to do so here.
21 Kukathas, The L iberal Archipelago, p. 67.
22 Ibid., p. 69.
23 Ibid., p. 68, original emphases.
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moves on to a further claim: there cannot be intrinsically group goods because it 
is unclear how anything can be good for a group, as something that exists above 
and its members. Ultimately, only individuals have interests and concerns in 
virtue o f which something can be good for them. Since groups are composites of 
individuals, with no interests and concerns that are independent o f the interests 
and concerns o f their constituent members, all group goods are in fact reducible 
to goods for group members. However this objection misses its target because, as 
I noted earlier, Taylor is not a collectivist. In his opposition to justificatory 
individualism he does not contest the claim that goods can only be for 
individuals. His claim, which he calls value holist, is that there are some goods 
whose value for individuals cannot be understood if these individuals are studied 
in isolation from others. Aside from things that are valuable for me and  you, 
suggests Taylor, there are also things that are valuable for us,24 We are 
ontologically separate but can experience and enjoy certain goods only together, 
as a product o f our cultural interchange.
Taylor’s claims can be further explained by noting that he thinks of culture and 
language as background conditions o f human agency. Their value consists in the 
fact that they are indispensable for making any kind o f choices. His reasoning is 
that if  agency is taken to be a good, then that which is its necessary prerequisite 
must also be considered valuable. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
Taylor’s argument does not pick out culture and language as the causes of 
agency, but their conditions?s So, Taylor is not committed to the claim that 
shared norms and understandings are to be valued because they bring human 
action to existence. I f  this straightforward relation of determination existed, 
culture would destroy rather than promote agency. Instead, Taylor maintains that 
the level to which culture meshes with individual choices allows one to think that
24 Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” p. 189.
25 He zeroes in on “the way in which thoughts presuppose and require a background o f  meanings 
to be the particular kind o f  thoughts they are. But the term “presuppose” and “require” in the 
previous sentence point to a peculiarly strong relation. It is not a contingently causal one, which 
we could imagine a way around -  the kind w e invoke when we say that neolithic villages 
couldn’t have built pyramids because this requires and presupposes a larger labour force.” 
(Taylor, “Irreducibly Social Goods,” pp. 131-32.)
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action could not take place in the absence o f these norms and understandings. 
Despite the lack o f causal determination, it can be said that they carve out a niche 
in which being an agent presents itself as a possibility. Without them, thinking 
and acting would be inconceivable. The rationale then is clear and compelling for 
prizing culture as the enabling condition for engaging in any sort o f activity.
However Taylor’s defence of the value of culture as a background condition of 
human agency is, in the end, unpersuasive. It overlooks the fact that even if 
culture is a condition o f human agency, it cannot be regarded as the ultimate 
condition o f agency that is not itself conditioned. Taylor’s decision to arrest the 
enquiry into the conditions of agency at the level o f culture is arbitrary and 
philosophically unacceptable. To explain: throughout his discussion, Taylor 
assumes that the flip-side o f rejecting justificatory individualism is accepting the 
status o f  culture as a good. The negative claim o f value holism is its rejection of 
the study o f all goods in relation to lone individuals. Its positive claim, Taylor 
suggests, is that culture is a good and as such matters in political life. It is this 
assumption that underlies his practical normative prescriptions -  for example, his 
claim that a full appreciation o f holism entails granting some form o f autonomy 
to territorially demarcated and institutionalized cultural corpuses, such as 
Quebec. Only if  cultural autonomy is granted to them, suggests Taylor, can the 
Quebecois be reunited with the cultural core that informs, and is in turn informed 
by, their moral reasoning. He writes: “Where the nature o f the good requires that 
it be sought in common, this is the reason for its being a matter of public policy”, 
the policy in question being that of a distinct cultural community.26
But it is implausible to suppose that the rejection of justificatory individualism 
entails accepting the status o f culture as a good. What discredits this supposition 
is the possibility that even if  culture is the background condition o f agency, it is 
itself conditioned. In other words, the possibility is that there are /?re-cultural, or 
“brute”, facts and conditions that make the cultural interchange possible. If this is 
the case, rejecting justificatory individualism does not entail accepting the 
normative significance o f culture. Instead, it warrants accepting the normative
26 Taylor, “The Politics o f  Recognition,” p. 59.
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significance o f brute facts, which are the more fundamental condition o f human 
agency.
The objection I am advancing would be unavailable if  the following argument 
succeeds: the fact that all our concepts are mediated by culture means that there 
can be no meaningful talk o f anything outside cultural understandings. Culture 
accounts for all we know and can represent, which is why there are no other
things beside culture that constrain our behaviour. However this argument is
deeply problematic. In a passage representative o f the view I wish to counter 
Bhikhu Parekh writes:
Even something as basic and inevitable as death is viewed and 
experienced differently in different cultures. In some it is a brute 
fact o f life, like the falling o f leaves or the diurnal setting o f the 
sun, and arouses no strong emotions; in some others it is a release 
from the world o f sorrow and embraced with joy; in yet others it 
is a symbol o f human weakness, a constant reminder of 
inadequate human mastery over nature, and accepted with such
varied emotions as regret, puzzle, incomprehension and
bitterness.27
Parekh’s suggestion is that facts or events in the physical world, even those as 
drastic as death, do not affect us in themselves; what brings them to our attention 
and renders them an occasion for feelings o f stoic acceptance, or joy, or 
puzzlement and anguish is the cultural interpretation. Yet, this claim contains an 
exaggeration: it is certainly true that our reception o f physical facts is not 
immediate, but holding that they therefore do not impinge upon our concepts is 
simply far-fetched. They do because they constrain the scope o f cultural 
understandings. In other words, they are what the interpretation is about. Thus, at 
the most general level, there could be no concept o f death as release from 
worldly suffering if  there were not for the underscoring brute fact o f biological 
termination o f life. But moreover, it could also be argued that this specific way of
27 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism  (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 121.
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dealing with death finds its grounds in certain objective features -  o f the event 
itself which often comes after a period of painful physiological deterioration; or 
o f human life, which presents most people with innumerable adversities and 
frustrations; perhaps also o f the attestations o f the dying, who sometimes express 
profound placidity in the face o f imminent perishment. This is why we can, to 
some degree, understand how one can think o f death as merciful release.28
Now, there is no reason to deny that there may be great scope for interpretation 
in these matters. The underlying brute fact may be multifaceted (as most would 
seem) -  that is, such that we might regard plausible construing it in a number of 
ways: as salvation, ultimate defeat, or an ordinary part o f what it means to be 
human. But, again, there is something about death that accounts for these diverse 
imaginable attitudes. The crucial point then is that culture is not the terminus of 
conceptual explanation, and as such cannot be presented as the ultimate arena for 
holist interchange. Factors standing beyond it ensure that, as far as interpretations 
are concerned, not anything goes. Death cannot be thought of as “blue”, or 
“salty”, or “modest”, whether one is Amish, Burmese or Finnish. Seen in this 
light, the fact that the physical world only affects our concepts indirectly ceases 
to be as pivotal as Taylor and Parekh maintain. The important thing is that it does 
nonetheless.
The purpose o f discussing beliefs and attitudes surrounding death has been to 
point out that they cannot be merely the product o f what Taylor understands by 
culture -  o f the institutionalized corpus o f norms and understandings that is 
distinct from other such corpuses and attaches to some community o f people. 
These norms and understandings draw on an order of things that is external to 
them, and that constrains them. One can then say, to adopt Taylor’s terminology, 
that this external and pre-cultural order is a background condition o f the cultural 
fabric, just as the latter is the background condition o f human agency. If  this is
28 Thomas N agel’s The Last Word represents a careful and persuasive defence o f  the same point, 
considered on a wider scale -  that at the bottom o f  every justification, be it in the area o f  religion, 
ethics, or epistemology, there must be objective principles or facts which do not depend on our 
point o f  view. (Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).)
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so, it makes sense to criticize Taylor on the account that it is not included in the 
Saussurian circle that his multicultural recommendations are meant to sustain. 
So, when he argues that cultural communities are part o f the interactive 
relationship that makes agency possible, it is legitimate to remark that other 
things do too. Simply arresting the enquiry into the conditions o f agency at the 
level o f culture, as Taylor does, is arbitrary and illegitimate.
Moreover, Taylor’s arbitrary treatment o f the conditions of agency makes him 
vulnerable to the charge of parochialism. The charge is that Taylor’s advocacy of 
the normative significance o f culture is just an expression o f his partiality to the 
political programme o f securing the political autonomy o f particular cultural 
groups. It may just be down to the fact that Taylor thinks that some specific 
cultures (including, presumably, the Quebecois) need political protection. This 
criticism can be explained by recalling that Taylor presents culture as 
indispensable for any kind o f agency. However, closer inspection reveals that he 
does not actually make this point. His argument is not that shorn o f the cultural 
backdrop we cannot have the concept o f action in general -  but that without the 
backdrop there can be no concept o f an action that has some determinate 
character and falls under some specific linguistic description. His modest claim is 
that thoughts rely for being “the particular kind of thoughts they are” on the 
cultural framework. He writes:
Nothing could count as making the claim “she’s sophisticated” 
among neolithic farmers in upper Syria (if our surmises are right 
about their culture), in somewhat the same way as nothing could 
count as making the queen’s gambit in a checkers game. The 
move presupposes a background o f rules or, in the case of 
language, conditions o f possible validity; and in both these cases 
the background is missing.29
This line o f reasoning is bound to cause some worry about the scope of its 
conclusions. The proposition that the queen’s gambit is only possible within a
29 Taylor, “Irreducibly Social Goods,” p. 132.
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game the rules of which stipulate such movement o f the piece is not informative. 
It is perfectly expected and constitutive o f how we understand things that one 
cannot make that same move in checkers, or in water polo, cooking, upholstery, 
climbing, or tooth brushing. Chess moves only take place in chess, just as French 
can be spoken in Quebec only if there exists a francophone culture to spawn it. In 
other words, it does not seem a very deep point to say, as Taylor does, that 
culture-specific agency presupposes the cultural background. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to see how this claim can yield any universal conclusions. Since it does 
not concern agency in general, it can only throw up the following statement: if 
one values some particular type of human expression, one must also value the 
particular cultural corpus that fosters it. This is a conceptual truth not unlike 
saying that if  one takes pleasure in a certain type o f chess opening then one must 
also care for the system o f rules that enables it. To put it slightly differently, 
prizing Quebecois cultural products -  such as Quebecois nationalism, 
francophony and the tradition o f Roman Catholicism -  inevitably entails prizing 
the distinctness o f Quebecois culture. However, these words are plainly 
addressed to those already converted. It takes a prior conviction that the 
Quebecois way o f life has worth in all its specificity to agree that cultural 
autonomy is merited. Because it never reaches so deep as to ground this 
conviction and consequently has only conditional force, Taylor’s transcendental 
argument can be called parochial.
It is worth noting that Taylor can produce an elegant response to the parochiality 
objection that keeps in line with his Hegelian leanings. He might say that all 
concepts are necessarily “parochial”, in the sense that they are contaminated with 
lived practice and the beliefs stemming from it. As was remarked in relation to 
the Hegelian critique of Kant’s formalism, any self-knowledge is for him self­
description, and any moral ideal is the ideal o f some community. Therefore, it is 
no criticism to point out that a precept derives its plausibility from appealing to 
my particular situation -  one construed not in connection with some void 
category o f humanity, but the totality o f my presence in the world. There is 
simply no other way, Taylor will reply, a precept could exert force on me. I do 
not wish to weigh the merits o f the rejoinder, but merely to indicate that the 
challenge compels Taylor to employ the already discussed notion of “background
52
conditions o f human agency”. His claim is that I, as an active agent, am at one 
with the complex ongoing interchange that provides me with the means and the 
capacities for impressing myself on the world. Isolating the pure centre of 
consciousness from the full set o f factors contributing to the interchange is 
illegitimate, as it fails to explain the nature o f self-referencing and the value we 
attach to being ourselves. However if  Taylor does wish to resort to this line of 
defence against the parochiality objection, it is vital that he provides an 
appropriate depiction o f the Saussurian circle. This, as I suggested, is where his 
argument for culture-enclosed exchange misses the target.
It will be useful to quickly retrace my steps in this chapter. My aim has been to 
defend the viability o f enquiring into the identities o f individuals against Taylor. 
He claims, first, that the concept o f identity must be understood in relation to the 
totality o f exchanges within a community. Second, that totality cannot be 
reduced to the sum of individuals’ contributions and properties, in the same way 
that social goods cannot be regarded as aggregates o f what is good for lone 
individuals. Therefore, Taylor maintains, a strictly individualist concept of 
identity is fundamentally ill-conceived. I have not tried to contest this Taylor’s 
argument directly. Instead, I have merely maintained that the scope o f that 
argument is arbitrarily arrested. Taylor assumes that culture is the ultimate 
“undecomposable” factor that influences the choices of individuals, but it is 
difficult to see why this assumption should be accepted. If one thinks that 
individuals’ agency is not self-sufficient but depends on wider background 
conditions, there is no reason to simply equate those conditions with culture. 
Culture, I have suggested, is also conditioned -  by an underlying order o f brute, 
or natural, facts. Therefore culture cannot be thought o f as the highest, or the 
only, precondition of agency, or valued as such.
However my conclusions so far are insufficient to defend the possibility of 
individualism about identity. My discussion has only highlighted the inadequacy 
o f one, albeit very influential, version o f justificatory holism -  Taylor’s strongly 
“cultural” version. But it has not challenged the overall holist outlook. This 
concession, it seems, commits me to accepting that consistent and thoroughgoing 
holism, if  it can be developed, is the correct approach to identity. This would be
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the approach that takes full account of the embeddedness of individuals’ agency 
in a variety of natural and non-natural conditions. Here I want to distance myself 
more decisively from the holist perspective. My claim is that thorough holism is, 
in fact, not a viable option in the study o f identity, which indirectly vindicates the 
analytical approach. There are two considerations to support this view, both of 
which can be explained by speculating on why Taylor himself steers clear from 
full-blown holism. It is plausible to assume that at least a part o f his reason for 
doing so is practical: namely, that a wider concept o f the background conditions 
o f human agency precludes any cultural politics. Culture can be fitted into a 
system of normative claims, as is shown by Taylor’s activist advocacy of 
autonomous Quebec; it remains unclear however whether such arguments can 
find room for the foundational order o f brute facts. Consistent holism is just too 
impractical to stand as a political credo. Putting the point more generally: it is 
difficult to see how any kind o f normative claims can be derived from a 
perspective that regards as valuable all of the various preconditions for choice.
Taylor’s more philosophical rationale could be turning on a problem with 
justification in pluralistic societies. Aristotle’s moral philosophy can be called, 
uncontroversially, the archetypal example o f deep holism, insofar as it 
incorporates the category o f brute, culture-independent facts that determine 
cultural understandings. The treatment o f the gender distinction in Politics is a 
case in point. Aristotle maintains that “between male and female the former is by 
nature superior and ruler, the latter inferior and subject” .30 What deserves 
attention here is not Aristotle’s chauvinism, but that he neither aims for, nor 
attempts, a justification of the natural superiority thesis. The remark, as well as 
the more comprehensive discussion in De Generatione Animalium, merely 
explains or elucidates the thesis to an audience that already lives the truth o f it in 
everyday moral practice.31 Aristotle can start from a shared understanding which
30 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
1254b2, p. 68, emphasis added.
31 This clarificatory aspect o f  Aristotle’s approach comes out best in the famous passage from the 
Nicomachean E thics: “Presumably we have to begin from things known by us. This is why 
anyone who is going to be a competent student in the spheres o f  what is noble and what is just -
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he does not need to vindicate -  the assessment that men are better placed to fulfil 
their natural rational function than women. But Taylor can enjoy no such 
privilege. The basis o f shared understandings is precisely what is lacking in 
culturally divided societies, especially relating to such deep issues as the 
meaning o f brute inequalities, natural predilections o f human beings, matters of 
religion, and so on. Under radical pluralism, the thoroughgoing holist would have 
to persuade those coming from different systems of meaning, while holding onto 
some fixed yet uncontroversial idea o f how nature determines moral practice. 
This task seems altogether vexed.
In sum, not only is comprehensive holism unable to deliver normative political 
claims, it also requires a wide agreement on what qualifies as a natural 
precondition for choice, which is absent in contemporary societies. Although this 
finding does not amount to a direct defence o f the analytical approach to identity, 
it shows that a prominent objection to it is inconclusive. Individualism about 
identity, which is the approach I will favour, is hence still a possibility. I first 
turn to a line o f argument that links identities with reasons via the notion o f self- 
respect.
in a word, politics -  must be brought up well in his habits. For the first principle is the belief that 
something is the case, and i f  this is sufficiently clear, he will not need the reason why as w ell.” 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 1095b4-8, p. 6, original emphasis.)
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3. Identity and Rawlsian self-respect
3.1. Identities and impartiality
The typical contemporary state comprises diverse cultural groups that are, 
nonetheless, compelled to co-operate and share the burdens and benefits of 
common political life. At least some o f these groups uphold unique group- 
specific ideals and practices. Take, for instance, the case o f religious rituals. 
Observing Shabbat by praying and abstaining from the thirty-nine activities that 
were required for the building o f the Tabernacle is specific to the conservative 
and orthodox Jewish communities. This custom is not shared by other religious 
denominations or non-believers simply because they are not devout Jews. 
Another example is provided by minority linguistic groups, whose linguistic 
practices set them apart from the society at large.
Brian Barry has forcefully argued that the cultural diversity o f contemporary 
states invalidates demands for special cultural rights. The correct normative 
response to diversity is to withdraw cultural matters from politics, rather than 
politicize them. Anything else, Barry argues, would run counter to fairness and 
justice. His remarks about the fair treatment o f religion are illustrative o f his 
broader position:
What can be said about the liberal proposal for privatizing 
religion, then, is that it is the only way in which religions can be 
given equal treatment, and equal treatment is what in this context 
is fair. This contention is, o f course, open to dispute. But it cannot 
be proved wrong merely by observing that the kind o f settlement 
it recommends will be inimical to the beliefs o f some people. A 
fair distribution o f property will be inconvenient to those who
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have an unfairly large amount. Similarly, a fair way o f dealing 
with religions will incommode those who wish to make claims on 
behalf o f their own religion that cannot be accommodated within 
the constraints prescribed by fairness. There is nothing surprising 
in this.1
Some discomfort and inconvenience will certainly be inflicted upon orthodox 
Sikhs by a policy that disallows wearing a small dagger (kirpan) in public. 
However, argues Barry, the loss to their psychological well-being will be 
outweighed by the public gain in justice. This claim needs further clarification as 
it can easily be misunderstood. It may be thought that Barry’s idea is just that, 
given the cultural diversity o f contemporary societies, cultural rights lead to 
unequal treatment o f citizens. Under conditions o f diversity different individuals 
have different identities standing to be expressed, and require different liberties 
and amounts o f resources to attend to them. For instance, Millian individuals that 
are highly mobile and experimental with regard to their identities will have 
different demands o f the state than those persons that strongly identify with their 
cultural background and local community. Those unconcerned about their 
identities, preferring to focus on advancing their material comfort or on fulfilling 
their family duties, will demand to be treated in yet another way. Barry might be 
taken to argue that the described requirement for differential treatment o f citizens 
is incompatible with justice. The granting o f special liberties or resources to 
some individuals with regard to some matter disadvantages other individuals in 
that same matter. The right o f publicly wearing daggers stipulates an exception to 
the system o f uniform rights, as well as placing those enjoying it in a position of 
possible physical dominance over other citizens. Therefore, inconvenience 
through non-recognition is not only a perfectly expected outcome of neutral 
arrangements; it is also insufficient to warrant unjustly privileging some citizens 
over others.
However, while it is correct to say that equality lies at the root of Barry’s 
objection to cultural rights, his argument is not best understood as directed
1 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 28.
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against inequality of treatment. What is wrong with special identity-rights is not 
that they give some citizens certain privileges that others do not have. Barry is 
thus prepared to accept that citizens’ equality is not synonymous with their 
possession of the same rights and obligations, and that it may sometimes even 
demand treating them wrcequally. Ronald Dworkin expresses this point forcefully 
by saying that the principle of treating persons equally is subsidiary to the 
principle o f treating persons as equals}  In an example he gives, providing the 
same amount o f aid to flood-stricken areas that are equally populous but have 
suffered different levels o f devastation would be unfair. The appropriate response 
would be to differentiate the relief in accordance with the gravity o f damage.
Barry’s position can accommodate Dworkin’s point. His objection is not that 
identity-politics would result in inequality o f rights; instead, it concerns the kind 
o f justification that multiculturalists can provide for unequal cultural rights. His 
argument states that sectional privileges cannot be impartially justified -  that is, 
supported by arguments that would be acceptable to all citizens. The demand for 
impartial justifiability is, according to Barry, rooted in the classical liberal 
striving to protect the individual from the abuse o f political power.3 What makes 
this concern relevant in the context o f identity politics is that claims to state 
support o f essentially sectional activities cannot be expected to be welcomed by 
other communities. That some practice is “a part o f my culture”, writes Barry, 
cannot be enough to convince those from other cultures that the practice should 
be enforced by the state. I f  the state does enforce such a practice, it will do so 
without the consent o f some citizens -  those who have no interest in preserving 
the practice, or who might be inconvenienced by it. For Barry, this means that 
these citizens will be coerced. With regard to the right o f publicly wearing 
daggers, non-Sikhs may object that it places Sikhs in a position of possible 
physical dominance over other citizens. Granting and enforcing this right would
2 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in A M atter o f  Principle  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 
190-91.
3 As he notes, “liberalism is, both historically and logically, the result o f  generalizing the 
proposition that it is no business o f  the state to enforce the observance o f  the true religion -  
however and by whomever that is defined.” (Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 65.)
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then limit the lives of non-Sikhs without their consent. In effect, it would coerce 
them into accepting a constraint on their choices and actions. And this, argues 
Barry, is incompatible with the liberal principle o f ensuring that individuals have 
maximum freedom to design their own lives.4
Faced with Barry’s forceful objections, multiculturalists have to provide an 
impartial defence of special cultural rights. They need an argument for 
recognition o f particular identities that persons o f other identities, as well as 
those unconcerned about their identity, cannot reasonably contest. Parekh offers 
one such argument that draws on Dworkin’s idea that treating persons as equals 
sometimes requires treating them unequally. He argues that only a special right 
to wear weapons in public equalizes the position o f observant Sikhs with that of 
the rest o f society.5 This argument is parallel to the one Dworkin uses in his flood 
example, with culturally fostered disadvantages taking the place o f naturally 
caused ones: since Sikhs have to bear larger costs for preserving their culture in 
Western societies than non-Sikhs, equality requires that they be compensated in 
the form o f special cultural rights. However, Parekh’s equality-based argument is 
contentious and at odds with the liberal commitment to individualism. His 
account insists more on equality between groups than on interpersonal equality. 
Parekh’s reasoning rests on a strongly contextualized understanding of 
opportunity, according to which a person’s opportunities are relative to his 
cultural background.6 It is for this reason that cultures, as authors o f meaning and 
value, deserve equal standing in intercultural dialogue that is based on shared 
operative values.7
4 Barry thus writes that “the complaint made by liberals is not against the objective o f  remaining 
true to some ancestral culture but against the coercion o f  those who do not share that objective.” 
(Ibid., p. 66.) And further: “Liberals must stand up for the rights o f  those who wish to pursue 
individual goals o f  self-development.” Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 66.)
5 Bhikhu Parekh, “Equality in a Multiracial Society,” in Equality, ed. Jane Franklin (London: 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), p. 135.
6 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
7 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, pp. 264-94.
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A more plausible impartial argument for special cultural rights must avoid 
Parekh’s suspect relativization of agency. Barry maintains that multiculturalists 
typically do advance an argument o f this sort, and discusses a form o f it. The 
reasoning he considers is that non-recognizing identities, especially cultural 
identities, is unfair because persons cannot dissociate themselves from them. 
Insofar as persons are culturally embedded, the claim goes, there are certain 
beliefs and practices that they cannot do without. The problem with this thesis, as 
Barry readily points out, is that it is plainly implausible. There are simply no 
practices and beliefs to which individuals would be so organically attached that 
they could not step back from them. Culture-related beliefs and practices are no 
exception to this, which is to say that their being “a part of my culture” does not 
make them special in any way. A part o f what it is to belong to a culture is that 
one is disinclined to pursue activities that the culture forbids -  for instance, when 
a devout Muslim rejects meat from inappropriately slaughtered animals. 
Sometimes this disinclination is so strong that it blocks the person’s ability to see 
any value in culturally shunned practices: the Muslim might not even be tempted 
to eat meat from inappropriately slaughtered animals. But none o f this means that 
it is, strictly speaking, impossible for him to have the meat. In order to prove this 
the multiculturalist would have to liken the said constraints to the incapacitation 
o f physically disabled persons, which the latter would rightly find offensive.8
Barry’s rebuttal seems correct on the face of it: if the claim about the 
impossibility o f dissociation carries the entire weight o f justification, the 
multiculturalist argument must collapse. But it is also true that another, and more 
promising, impartial argument for recognition escapes Barry’s attention.9 The 
argument he considers states that persons necessarily have certain ends, 
principally to preserve their cultural identity. A more attractive argument, which 
I will examine in the rest of this chapter, is framed in terms of individuals’ 
reasons. Some prominent multiculturalists endorse Rawls’ justification of the 
worth o f self-respect, adding the further thesis that secure identification is
8 Barry, Culture and Equality, 37.
9 Although I cannot say more on this point here, it is also uncertain whether anyone really 
subscribes to the rather simple-minded ‘necessary tie’ argument that Barry discusses.
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indispensable for a stable sense o f self-respect. I f  this thesis is correct, all persons 
have a reason, related to the idea o f self-respect, to want to have their identities 
publicly affirmed and promoted. In what follows, I will first present some 
formulations o f the Rawls-inspired argument that links identities and reasons. I 
will then discuss the psychologists conception o f self-respect that is required for 
recognition to be presented as one o f Rawls’ “social bases of self-respect” . My 
final assessment will focus on the compatibility between Rawls’ own and 
multiculturalist understandings o f recognition.
3.2. Self-respect and its bases
Rawls’ claim that attracts the interest o f multiculturalists is that the highest 
function of a conception of justice is to protect citizens’ self-respect. Since 
parties behind the “veil of ignorance” do not know the particulars of their 
situation -  their natural characteristics, or the details o f their life-plan -  Rawls 
maintains they will choose conservatively. Uncertain whether they will turn out 
to be black or white, they will wish to safeguard fair equality of opportunity; not 
knowing whether they will be politically active or complacent, they will opt for 
maximal liberty o f expression, compatible with equal liberty for others; unsure of 
their gender, they will shelter gender equality, and so on. These primary goods 
would be rationally desired by individuals, argues Rawls, whatever their life- 
plan, because they are prerequisite to the success o f any life-plan.
What makes Rawls so appealing is his contention that one o f the pronouncements 
o f justice as fairness is the uncompromising worth o f self-respect:
When we feel that our plans are o f little value, we cannot pursue 
them with pleasure or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued 
by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavours. It is 
clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing 
may seem worth doing, or if  some things have value for us, we 
lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes 
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore
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the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost 
any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect.10
Nir Eyal advances a potentially dangerous objection to Rawls’ treatment of self- 
respect, claiming that it confuses self-respect with “confidence in one’s 
determinate plans and capacities”.11 According to Eyal, the conclusions o f 
Rawls’ argument are different to those he intended. Rawls believes, on Eyal’s 
interpretation, that parties in the original position would choose self-respect “ in 
the Kantian sense” -  belief in their dignity as ends in themselves -  as a primary 
good. However Rawls shows at most that they would wish to enhance the 
chances that, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, their projects will bear fruit.12 In 
Eyal’s example, a scientist will not undertake research on HIV unless he trusts 
the value o f his research plan and his own capabilities. This is a good incentive 
for him to place premium value on the state securing optimal conditions for the 
development o f his research potential and resources. All rational persons, it 
might be said, would similarly wish for guarantees that they will be well-placed 
to materialize their life-plans. But this rational desire to preserve confidence in 
one’s determinate plans and capabilities is not, argues Eyal, the kind of self- 
respect that Rawls has in mind. To understand this point, it is enough to consider 
that preserving one’s confidence in one’s determinate plans and capabilities may 
require a far greater threshold of guaranteed income and wealth than Rawls 
envisages. The self-confidence o f the HIV researcher may, for instance, require 
substantial financial investment into expensive equipment, supporting medical 
and administrative staff, and so on. Other individuals will have similar, or even 
higher, demands related to their life-plans, in which situation the state may insist,
10 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, Original ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005), p. 440.
11 Nir Eyal, ‘“ Perhaps the M ost Important Primary Good’: Self-Respect and Rawls’s Principles o f  
Justice,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 4, no. 2 (2005): p. 202.
12 A similar critique is also advanced in David Johnston, The Idea o f  a Liberal Theory: A Critique 
and Reconstruction  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 137-85. In broad 
agreement with multiculturalist reasoning, Johnston maintains that among the social bases o f  self- 
respect are status and recognition, which he illustrates with the example o f  the Black community 
in the USA.
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for practical purposes, on perfect equality in income and wealth.13 This is hardly 
the planned outcome of Rawls’ argument about self-respect.
One way of combating Eyal’s objection would be to highlight the conditions of 
radical ignorance that obtain in the original position. The defence might be that 
the self-respect of Rawls’ deliberators is independent of their success in practical 
pursuits because they do not now what these pursuits happen to be. They wish to 
preserve their belief in the value o f their own agency absent any knowledge of 
what goods they actually strive for. Under this radical ignorance, Rawls might be 
taken to argue, parties can at most ensure that the pursuit o f goods in general, 
rather than the enjoyment of unknown particular goods, is institutionally ensured. 
The social bases o f self-respect would then just be the conditions without which 
persons could not develop and further their moral powers, taken abstractly. 
However, this line o f defence is not persuasive. From the fact that parties do not 
know the specifics o f their life-plans, it does not follow that they will not wish 
for their chances o f success in their plans to be maximized. To recall, caution 
advises parties ignorant about their natural characteristics and conception of the 
good to conservatively opt for Rawls’ primary goods. Now, the parties equally 
cannot be certain that their life-plan is not too costly or too exotic to materialize. 
Nothing guarantees that in actuality they will not aspire to such largely 
inaccessible careers as that o f an astronaut or a high-fashion model. But sheer 
ignorance of the content of one’s plans does not rule out one’s concern about the 
success of one’s plans. The deliberators’ inability to ascertain whether or not 
they are in fact aspiring astronauts is not enough to produce their disinterest in 
the prospects for aspiring astronauts. They might still, once the veil is dropped, 
find themselves falling in that class, which might adversely affect their self- 
respect.14 Consistent with the precautionary principle that Rawls’ deliberators
13 Eyal, ‘“Perhaps the Most Important Primary Good’: Self-Respect and Rawls’s Principles o f  
Justice,” pp. 208-09. For a similar argument see also Norman Daniels, “Equal Liberty and 
Unequal Worth o f  Liberty,” in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels (N ew  York: Basic Books, 
1975).
14 Thomas Pogge makes a similar claim about natural talents, in relation to self-respect. He 
contends that since Rawls’ parties do not know whether or not they possess any outstanding 
natural talents, they will be inclined to ensure themselves against the possibility that they are
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otherwise follow, they might for that choose maximal guarantees that even the 
most exotic conception o f the good will be satisfied.
The just rehearsed defence o f Rawlsian self-respect is unsuccessful because it is 
empty: it says nothing about what self-respect is. It just puts forward the claim 
that self-respect does not rely on one’s success in practical pursuits -  a claim that 
is implausible without support from some positive account o f the proper bases of 
self-respect. Yet, Rawls is not committed to this vacant defence because he does 
have a substantive conception o f self-respect, one that holds significant appeal to 
multiculturalists. Rawls believes that the self-respect o f citizens has its basis in 
their mutual recognition o f equal worth. Rawls thus notes that “our self-respect 
normally depends upon the respect o f others. Unless we feel that our endeavours 
are honoured by them, it is difficult if  not impossible for us to maintain the 
conviction that our ends are worth advancing.” 15
The appeal of Rawls’ notion of recognition to multiculturalists can be readily 
identified. According to some prominent multiculturalist authors, there is but a 
short step between affirming the centrality o f equal recognition and demanding 
the state protection o f identities. On their view, secure identification can be 
understood as one of Rawls’s social bases of self-respect. Anna Elisabetta 
Galeotti thus presents her idea of toleration as recognition as an extension of “the 
line o f justification pointed out by John Rawls.” 16 Shame, self-hatred and other
talentless: “Would not one’s sense o f  self-worth be gravely damaged if  one realized all along that 
one’s limited natural talents give one no chance at being admitted to higher education (because 
admitting the less talented would reduce the lowest index position)? In fact, is not one’s self- 
respect damaged more when one is excluded from higher education on account o f  one’s lack o f  
intelligence than when one is excluded on account o f  one’s race or gender or the poverty o f  one’s 
family? Unless exclusion based on socia l factors can be shown to be substantially more 
damaging to individuals than exclusion based on natural factors, then the special injustice we see 
in restrictions o f  opportunity based on social factors cannot be reaffirmed within a contractualist 
framework.” (Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: H is Life and Theory o f  Justice , trans. M ichelle Kosch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 131-32, original emphasis.)
15 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 178.
16 Anna E. Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
p. 113.
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forms o f negative self-regard that are associated with non-recognition are, 
according to her, condemned by Rawls’ inclusion of self-esteem on the list of 
primary goods.17 For Will Kymlicka, “The relationship between cultural 
membership and self-respect gives the parties to the original position a strong 
incentive to give cultural membership status as a primary good.” 18 The loss of 
cultural membership is one condition that undermines self-respect, and that 
contractors behind the veil o f ignorance would wish to avoid at any cost. Daniel 
Weinstock similarly writes:
[I]f we accept that self-respect depends in part upon our ends 
being affirmed, or at least not demeaned, by our fellow citizens, 
then it will not be sufficient for the self-respect of those members 
o f society for whom community membership is fully constitutive 
o f their ends that their relation with their fellow citizens be 
mediated only through the two principles o f justice as Rawls 
articulates them... For such people, being respected by their 
fellow citizens will require not only that they be respected as 
isolated individuals, but also qua members o f the community 
which fully or partly constitutes their ends.19
17 Ibid., p. 9.
18 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p. 166.
19 Daniel M. Weinstock, “How Can Collective Rights and Liberalism Be Reconciled?,” in 
Blurred Boundaries, ed. Rainer Baubock and John F. Rundell (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 299. 
Laegaard argues in a similar fashion: “Provided a plausible causal connection between the 
location o f  public holidays and the self-respect o f  minority members can be established 
empirically, it seem s that a liberal theory o f  recognition based on a concern with the social bases 
o f  self-respect within the scope set by the publicity constraint is at least as good a justification for 
such proposals as theories demanding affirmation o f  the value o f  minority cultures or identities.” 
(Sune Laegaard, “On the Prospects for a Liberal Theory o f  Recognition,” Res Publica  11, no. 4
(2005): p. 344.) For a similar argument see also Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, “Autonomy, 
Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice,” in Autonomy and the Challenges o f  Liberalism: New  
Essays, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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3.3. The psychologistic conception of self-respect
In order to assess the presented impartial argument for recognition, it is 
important to spell out its central assumptions in more detail. To begin with, it 
relies on a claim that is a mainstay o f multiculturalist and national writing, the 
claim that individuals’ self-respect crucially depends on whether their identities 
are publicly affirmed and protected. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz thus write:
It may be no more than a brute fact that people’s sense o f their 
own identity is bound up with their sense of belonging to 
encompassing groups, and that their self-respect is affected by the 
esteem in which these groups are held. But these facts, too, have 
important consequences. They mean that individual dignity and 
self respect require that the groups membership of which 
contributes to one’s sense o f identity be generally respected and 
not be made a subject o f ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or 
persecution.20
The reader is assured that this last requirement is grounded in considerations of 
self-respect when Margalit and Raz declare it an “unexceptionable” premiss that 
“people’s membership o f encompassing groups is an important aspect o f their
91personality, and their well-being depends on giving it lull expression.” Yael 
Tamir is another author who strongly connects secure access to public self- 
identification with leading a good life:
Membership in a nation is a constitutive factor o f personal 
identity. The self-image o f individuals is highly affected by the 
status o f their national community. The ability o f individuals to 
lead a satisfying life and to attain the respect o f others is 
contingent on, although not assured by, the ability to view
20 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination,” The Journal o f  Philosophy 
87, no. 9 (1990): p. 449.
21 Ibid.: p. 451.
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themselves as active members o f a worthy community. A safe, 
dignified and flourishing national existence thus significantly 
contributes to their well-being.22
However, the claim that individuals’ self-respect depends on whether their 
identities are publicly recognized also needs clarification. In particular, it is 
important to note that it assumes a special understanding o f self-respect, which 
can be explained by returning to Margalit and Raz. They argue that that the 
public protection of persons’ identities is warranted by the fact that “their self- 
respect is affected by the esteem in which these groups are held”. Their thought 
is that whether, and how far, one is able to nurture one’s deepest attachments has 
a profound bearing on one’s s elf-regard, and consequently one’s self-respect. 
When a person lacks opportunities for publicly expressing his deepest
22 Yael Tamir, L iberal Nationalism  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 73. 
According to M ichelle Moody-Adams, three factors ensure that “the ability to have and affirm a 
robust sense o f  self-respect is greatly influenced by social circumstances”: “First, the vocabulary 
in which one learns to give expression to one’s self-conception, and even the concepts that 
initially shape that self-conception, are products o f  the linguistic conventions o f  a given 
comm unity... Second, a society’s normative expectations about emotion, thought, and action 
have an especially powerful influence on the development o f  self-respect. Every society  
gradually develops intricate patterns o f  normative expectations about what talents and abilities 
one ought to use in the service o f  self-preservation -  even about what really constitutes survival 
or self-preservation... Further, self-contained communities within complex societies sometimes 
produce their own self-contained expectations about selves and self-respect. The self-conceptions 
o f  those in such communities will overlap very little with the self-conceptions o f  those outside 
such groups.” (M ichele M. Moody-Adams, “Race, Class, and the Social Construction o f  Self- 
Respect,” in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (London: Routledge, 
1995), pp. 276-77.) Charles Taylor is even more ardent in condemning the negative effects o f  
non-recognition: “The demand for recognition in these latter cases is given urgency by the 
supposed links between recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like 
a person’s understanding o f  who they are, o f  their fundamental defining characteristics as a 
human being. The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the /^/^recognition o f  others, and so a person or group o f  people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, i f  the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture o f  themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
form o f  oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode o f  being.” 
(Taylor, “The Politics o f  Recognition,” p. 25, original emphasis.)
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attachments, he may be deprived o f an important means o f affirming his own 
worth because it may bar him from various activities which he regards as central 
to his self-understanding. Suppose, for instance, that the individual considers it 
constitutive o f his very personality that he is able to appeal to institutions o f 
communal Islamic law to settle his disputes. It is plausible to expect that a fully 
secular political arrangement that disallows the appeal would foster in the person 
a feeling o f estrangement from the society, and dissatisfaction with himself. The 
rejoinder that he is nonetheless free to attend to his projects privately gives rise to 
the objection that upholding a system o f law cannot be a private matter 
altogether.23 The psychological harm is even stronger in extreme cases where 
individuals are systematically and forcefully made to behave as if  things that 
matter to them are in fact worthless. The real danger is that, in these instances, 
persons will begin to think o f themselves as worthless; such duress radically 
thwarts their self-respect.24 Although the diagnosis is weaker with regard to most 
identity-blind political arrangements, it may still warrant regarding them as 
morally objectionable.
Margalit and Raz’s objection to strictly neutral arrangements is thus that persons 
under them are left with no room for self-respect, being deprived of the 
possibility o f engaging in projects they hold valuable.25 The understanding of 
self-respect that underpins their reasoning may be termed psychologistic, insofar
23 Margalit and Raz similarly note: “To the extent that a person’s well-being is bound up with his 
identity as a member o f  an encompassing group it has an important public dimension.” (Margalit 
and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” p. 452.)
24 David Middleton expresses the point by introducing the term “reflexive self-respect”, which is 
“the way in which others treatment o f  us affects the way we feel about ourselves. This can be 
very powerful and its effect on our well-being should not be underestimated. To be treated as 
worthless, as a means and not an end, as an object not a subject conveys powerful symbolic and 
material m essages.” (David Middleton, “Three Types o f  Self-Respect,” Res Publica  12, no. 1
(2006): pp. 65-66.)
25 Another interpretation o f  the objection, following David Sachs’s conceptualization, might be 
that liberal neutrality affects persons’ sense o f  their pride by suppressing some important 
activities, such as wearing one’s religious symbols in school, that make them proud. (David 
Sachs, “How  to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, 
no. 4 (1981).)
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as it relates the moral worth o f persons to their subjective appraisals of their 
moral worth. The psychologistic approach equates self-respect with one’s sense 
o f self-respect. As Stephen Massey notes, on this view “it is both necessary and 
sufficient for respecting oneself that one have a certain kind o f favourable self­
attitude, which can be adequately defined in psychological terms.”26 According 
to the psychologistic interpretation, one’s evaluation of one’s qualities, 
achievements, character traits and other personal attributes is fully constitutive of 
one’s self-respect. When the evaluation is positive, the person can be said to have 
self-respect; when it is negative, the person is lacking in self-respect. A more 
precise formulation of Margalit and Raz’s complaint is, therefore, that positive 
self-appraisal is impossible in a system that demotes the pursuit of all 
commitments to the private sphere.
Another explanation of the psychologistic approach to self-respect can be given 
with reference to Stephen Darwall’s well-known distinction between appraisal 
and recognition respect for persons.27 For Darwall, the two kinds o f respect stem 
from two kinds o f attitudes: while appraisal respect for persons is based on a 
favourable assessment o f their traits or achievements, recognition respect 
consists in an acknowledgement of some status that they have.28 Darwall further 
maintains that acknowledgment of persons’ moral status, associated with 
attaching certain rights and obligations to persons, is possible without having a 
positive view o f their personal characteristics. He believes such non-evaluative 
recognition o f free and equal standing to be the kind o f respect that is owed to 
persons as persons. His claim is also that self-respect is properly understood as a
26 Stephen J. Massey, “Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?,” Ethics 93, no. 2 
(1983): p. 247. A similar interpretation is that the psychologistic view  “treats self-respect as a 
psychological phenomenon that gains support from whatever behaviour one engages in that one 
happens to deem worthy o f  oneself. Although this psychological variant o f  self-respect requires 
fulfilling one’s plans and measuring up to one’s ideals, one’s plans and ideals are relative to 
individual beliefs and desires.” (Diana T. Meyers, “Self-Respect and Autonomy,” in Dignity, 
Character, and Self-Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 222-23.)
27 Stephen Darwall, “Two Kinds o f  Respect,” Ethics 88, no. 1 (1977).
28 Recognition respect ‘consists in giving appropriate consideration or recognition to some feature 
o f  its object in deliberating about what to do .’ (Ibid.: p. 38.)
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recognition of one’s place in the moral community. This acknowledgment of 
one’s own rightful status is secure because, being independent of one’s 
evaluative self-esteem, it is not susceptible to variances in self-esteem. Now, the 
psychologistic approach o f self-respect, favoured by multiculturalists and 
nationalist authors, reverses this last claim by completely sinking self-respect 
into self-esteem.29 Middleton writes along these lines that “Repeated injuries to 
our self-esteem will lead eventually to a loss o f self-respect.”30 Otherwise put, on 
the psychologistic view recognition self-respect is a function of one’s appraisal 
self-respect. Where persons are unable to regard themselves in a favourable light, 
due to institutional hindrances, their self-respect is impaired.
Rawls’ treatment of self-respect lends itself to the psychologistic interpretation. 
His definition explicitly equates self-respect with self-esteem, and portrays both
i
as one’s rational perception of one’s worth:
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two 
aspects. First of all... it includes a person’s sense of his own 
value, his secure conviction that his conception o f his good, his 
plan o f life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect
29 Self-esteem can be seen as the self-regarding equivalent to Darwall’s appraisal respect. Robin 
Dillon defines self-esteem as follows: ‘First, self-esteem has an evaluative dimension, which is 
identified as a favourable self-appraisal, as an attitude o f  self-approval, or as involving the belief 
that one is significant, worthy, capable, or successful... A second feature o f  self-esteem  is 
affectivity: it is or it influences how we feel about ourselves. The person who has self-esteem is 
said to feel good about herself, to like herself, to have feelings o f  personal worth... The affective 
dimension o f  self-esteem is widely regarded as what makes it valuable to individuals and 
motivationally primary.’ (Robin S. Dillon, “Introduction,” in Dignity, Character, and Self- 
Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 30-31.)
30 Middleton, “Three Types o f  Self-Respect,” p. 69.
31 “Rational” here means “supported by the thin theory o f  the good”. Even if  Rawls understands 
self-respect as one’s sense o f  self-respect, this sense is hence not a mere feeling. Rawls seems to 
conceive o f  self-respect as rational (in the above sense) appraisal o f  one’s moral worth: one’s 
reasons for respecting oneself are exhausted by one’s reasons for regarding oneself respect­
worthy. I discuss Rawls’s thin theory o f  the good, which grounds reasons o f  this sort, below.
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implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s 
power, to fulfil one’s intentions.32
It is therefore no surprise that Rawls is fairly commonly read as espousing the 
psychologistic view. Massey, for instance, explicitly attributes to Rawls the view 
(although his term for it is “subjectivist”).33 Sune Laegaard similarly argues that 
Rawls regards self-respect in purely descriptive terms, as a “subjective 
psychological state standing in causal relationships to the actions of persons.”34
Rawls’ putative psychologism about self-respect is thus a matter o f great 
importance for advocates o f a liberal theory of recognition. I f  Rawls endorses the 
psychologistic view, the notion o f identity can be neatly plugged into his 
argument about the social bases o f self-respect. The resulting claim is that 
recognition has uncompromising merit because it is a social condition of the 
primary good o f self-respect. If, however, Rawls does not espouse the 
psychologistic view o f self-respect, the prospects for a Rawlsian impartial 
defence o f recognition will be more uncertain.
3.4. The place of self-respect in Rawls’s theory
Rawls’ classification of the social bases of self-respect as one o f the primary 
goods is not without problems. He indicates that they occupy a special place 
within the category of primary goods by calling them “the most important” 
primary goods. However, I wish to claim that the social bases o f self-respect are 
in one important respect unlike other primary goods. It is that the argument for 
social conditions o f self-respect as a primary good does not impose any 
independent requirement on the distribution o f wealth and liberties. The unique
32 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 440.
33 Massey, “Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?,” p. 250.
34 Laegaard, “On the Prospects for a Liberal Theory o f  Recognition,” p. 339. For another 
psychologistic interpretation o f  Rawls on self-respect see Eyal, “‘Perhaps the M ost Important 
Primary Good’: Self-Respect and Rawls’s Principles o f  Justice.”
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nature o f the argument explains, or so I will maintain, why it cannot support 
multiculturalist claims for recognition.
Rawls believes that principles that define deliberative rationality, embodied in 
his “thin theory of the good” provide sufficient support for the choice of primary 
goods in the original position. To recall, the original position is seen by Rawls as 
a device o f representation, whose function is to model the conditions o f fair 
choice. In order for the contract argument to succeed, the restrictions o f the veil 
o f ignorance must not be so harsh as to make choice inconceivable. They must 
leave room for deliberation by permitting some criterion o f goodness to the 
contractors, albeit one that is severely conditioned by the purpose o f modelling 
fairness:
Since these assumptions [about the parties’ motives in the original 
position] must not jeopardize the prior place o f the concept of 
right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of 
justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good 
I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about 
primary goods required to arrive at the principles o f justice.35
Rawls’s idea is that the thin theory of the good is sufficient to justify the 
selection o f primary goods in the original position.36 In other words, the 
principles o f deliberative rationality -  to strive for deliberative consistency, to
35 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 396.
36 Samuel Freeman takes a different view , arguing that for Rawls primary goods are a component 
o f  the thin theory o f  the good, rather than its forced implication. Freeman distinguishes between 
the formal and the substantive aspects o f  the thin theoiy o f  the good, where the formal aspects 
include principles o f  rational choice, the idea o f  deliberative rationality, and the idea o f  a rational 
plan o f  life. The substantive aspects include the account o f  the parties’ higher-order interests, the 
primary goods, and the Aristotelian principle. (Freeman, Rawls, p. 147.) However, Freeman’s 
reading is in conflict with Rawls’ text, which for instance states that ‘we need what 1 have called 
the thin theory o f  the good to explain the rational preference fo r  prim ary goods and to explicate 
the notion o f  rationality underlying the choice o f  principles in the original position. This theory is 
necessary to support the requisite premises from which the principles o f  justice are derived. 
(Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 397, emphasis added.)
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rank one’s ends in an order of priority, not to prioritize one’s interests at any 
particular point in time, to prefer having more than less goods, and so on -  are 
alone meant to support the choice o f primary goods. For example, in 
circumstances o f radical uncertainty about one’s actual condition, the rational 
principle o f preferring more to fewer goods helps justify the focus on primary 
goods as the minimally required bundle o f resources. This is why Rawls calls his 
conception o f goodness under the veil of ignorance “goodness as rationality”.
Rawls’s focus on principles o f deliberative rationality is illuminating because it 
provides the basis for his argument about self-respect. That argument can be 
approached by considering Massey’s critical reception of it. Massey concedes 
that such goods as maximal basic rights and liberties, compatible with similar 
rights and liberties for others, or unconstrained access to all public offices, are 
necessary for the pursuit o f any conception o f the good. But the same reasoning 
does not seem to apply to the supposed primary good o f self-respect. It appears 
dubious to assume that without self-respect no other goods could be attained or 
enjoyed. Massey remarks:
Self-respect might be the most important primary good were it 
true that without it other goods have no value, or that one could 
enjoy nothing else without self-respect. Yet neither o f these 
claims is true. It is false that Rawls’s other primary goods, for 
example, income and opportunities, have no value for a person 
who has little or no self-respect. It is surely an excess of 
rationalism to claim that a person cannot enjoy going to the beach 
or to a baseball game unless he respects himself.37
The way for Rawls to counter Massey’s criticism is to maintain that the pursuit 
of ends, rather than their enjoyment, would be impossible without self-respect. 
So, while it is true that one could still derive satisfaction from watching a 
baseball game without respecting oneself, Rawls’ point runs deeper. It states that 
one would not bring oneself to go to the stadium in the absence o f the belief that
37 Massey, “Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?,” p. 259.
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one’s needs for entertainment and socializing deserve to be met. Engaging in any 
activity, Rawls plausibly claims, presupposes the agent’s conviction that acting is 
worthwhile -  or, since it is the agent that acts: it presupposes his conviction that 
he has worth. Without this conviction, “our sense of the value of accomplishing 
our aims,”38 there would be no reason to do anything. By self-respect Rawls thus 
refers to the contractors’ affirmation o f the value o f their practical reasoning.
This clarification also reveals a further point about Rawls’s concept of self- 
respect -  one that ultimately turns out to be rather disappointing for 
multiculturalists. It is that in Rawls’s usage that concept applies exclusively in 
the context o f the original position. It picks out a feature o f the contractors, 
stylized as they are, not ordinary persons in everyday situations. In this regard, 
Rawls uses the concept o f self-respect much in the same way as the concept of 
autonomy, another notion that commonly has wider application. Rawls thus 
writes:
The idea o f the initial situation is central to the whole theory and
other basic notions are defined in terms o f it. Thus acting
38 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 181.
39 The question o f  why parties rationally prefer practical reasoning to inactivity is unresolved in 
Rawls. In his contractarian framework, the value o f  self-respect must be constituted by the fact 
that it would be rationally affirmed by parties in the original position. But why is it rational for 
parties to protect the value o f  practical reasoning, rather than be content with passivity? The 
value o f  self-respect cannot be proven by appealing to standards o f  validity in deliberation -  that 
is, norms (transitivity, consistency, etc.) for the rational conduct o f  practical reasoning. The 
required answer would need to demonstrate the rationality o f  deliberation. It might be thought 
that the question is addressed by Rawls’ “Aristotelian Principle” which states: “Other things 
equal, human beings enjoy the exercise o f  their realized capacities (their innate or trained 
abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity. The intuitive idea here is that human beings take more pleasure in doing something 
as they become more proficient at it, and o f  two activities they do equally well, they prefer the 
one calling on a larger repertoire o f  more intricate and subtle discriminations.” (Ibid., p. 426.) 
However, the purpose o f  the principle is only to favour more complex over less complex life- 
plans. This is evident in Rawls’ use o f  the principle to suggest that parties in the original position 
would rationally prefer playing chess to playing checkers. The parties’ rational preference for 
doing something, be it chess or checkers, over doing nothing remains unexplained.
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autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to 
as free and equal rational beings, and that we are to understand in 
this way.40
This strictly contractarian definition o f autonomy runs counter to the more 
customary usage, in which the concept o f autonomy is a tool for describing and 
explaining an aspect o f the human condition. This is, for example, Raz’s usage 
when he speaks o f “the ideal of autonomy as a life freely chosen.”41 His 
definition aims to capture what self-mastery is generally. However this is not 
Rawls’s purpose when he invokes the concept o f autonomy -  and something 
quite similar can be said o f his treatment o f self-respect. For Rawls, self-respect 
is equally to be understood as a feature of appropriately situated persons in the 
original position. It is useful to think o f that concept as having a specific 
function, which rules out its application outside the original position. That 
function is purely constructive (rather than descriptive or explanatory): to play a 
part in the setup o f the situation that must yield certain principles o f justice. Its 
role is as part o f the conceptual framework that Rawls uses in deriving 
determinate norms of justice from a basic commitment to individuals’ freedom 
and equality. Specifically, it addresses the most fundamental question that 
Rawls’s contractarian theory faces: not why we can assume that persons, under 
certain constraints, would choose some specific conception o f justice, but why 
they would bother to do any choosing in the first place. Rawls’s answer is that 
they would so because they place supreme value on their capacity to design their 
lives according to their own choosing.
Rawls’s concept of self-respect must be understood in relation to its function in 
theory-construction. Now, since that function is essentially restricted to the 
original position, so is Rawls’s concept of self-respect. It is then misplaced to ask 
about the real-world social bases o f self-respect, as the multiculturalists do. This 
has implications for how one may understand the recognition that Rawls deems 
necessary for self-respect. In particular, Rawls’s claim that was so promising,
40 Ibid., p. 516.
41 Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, p. 371.
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that self-respect relies on the mutual recognition o f citizens, must also be 
interpreted in light o f the original position. The recognition that is at issue here is 
the mutual acknowledgement o f equal status by individuals behind the veil of 
ignorance. It is not a notion that is appropriate in speaking about flesh-and-blood 
citizens in everyday political circumstances. This helps explain why Rawls 
thinks that the recognition that is central to self-respect is sufficiently 
accomplished by common public adherence to his two principles of justice.42 
What this recognition based on justice delivers is the assurance of equal 
citizenship. The contractors’ self-regard is unrelated to cultural belonging 
because knowledge o f cultural identifications is ruled out from the original 
position. Therefore, the only"recognition that can be the source o f their self- 
respect is their mutual acknowledgement o f equal civic status. And this does not 
entail recognizing each other as Nigerians, Muslims, or Francophones. It means 
nothing more than affirming each other’s standing as a frill participant in the 
enterprise for mutual advantage that is the state.43
The breakdown o f the connection between the public affirmation o f cultural 
identities and Rawls’s argument about the social bases of self-respect is due to 
deep structural incompatibility. The link cannot be established without violating 
Rawls’ commitment to the priority of the right over the good, which leads him to 
banish cultural identifications from the original position. As a result, this 
particular version o f the argument that identities generate reasons grounded in 
self-respect fails. This does not mean that other versions o f that argument cannot
42 Samuel Freeman’s reading o f  Rawls emphasizes the same point: “Equal basic liberties, fair 
equal opportunities, and political and economic independence are primary among the bases o f  
self-respect in a democratic society.” (Freeman, R awls, pp. 186-87, original emphasis.) In 
Political Liberalism  Rawls writes: “The social bases o f  self-respect are explained by the structure 
and content o f  just institutions together with features o f  the public political culture, such as the 
public recognition and acceptance o f  the principles o f  justice.” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 
181.)
43 As Joshua Cohen notes, within Rawls’ framework others show me respect “by acknowledging 
and protecting my right to bring my sense o f  justice to bear on public affairs.” (Joshua Cohen, 
“For a Democratic Society,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 109.)
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work. However, the Rawlsian avenue for making this point, which is particularly 
promising as well as elaborated in multiculturalist writings, seems closed.
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4. Frankfurt’s volitional necessities
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will examine whether the idea o f constraints on what reasons 
persons can come to have can be supported by Harry Frankfurt’s argument about 
volitional necessities. That argument is made possible by the decisive role that 
Frankfurt attributes to the will in practical reasoning. For him, the will takes 
priority over the intellect in practical decision-making, in the sense that it 
sanctions the practical proposals of the intellect. This view amounts to a denial 
that reasons and reason itself, as the faculty that operates through the use of 
reasons, are essential to practical deliberation.1 It also opens up a possibility that 
is o f special interest here, the possibility that the will is unable to sanction any 
proposal o f the intellect. Frankfurt terms such limitations on the range o f reasons 
that a person can adopt volitional necessities. An essential aspect of the will’s 
constitution, he suggests, is that it is limited in this way. Our choices are always 
and necessarily constrained, not because there are always external impediments 
to our choice, but because there are certain options that we cannot bring 
ourselves to choose. Since volitional necessities are inescapable for us, they 
fixate our personal standards o f value:
The necessities of a person’s will guide and limit his agency. They 
determine what he may be willing to do, what he cannot help 
doing, and what he cannot bring himself to do. They determine as
1 Cf.: “The supposition that people cannot make decisions or perform actions except for a reason 
strikes me as belonging to an excessively rationalistic conception o f  human life -  a conception 
that is both theoretically gratuitous and false to the facts.” (Harry G. Frankfurt, “Reply to 
Eleonore Stump,” in The Contours o f  Agency, ed. Lee Overton and Sarah Buss (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2002), p. 89.
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well what he may be willing to accept as a reason for acting, what 
he cannot help considering to be a reason for acting, and what he 
cannot bring himself to count as a reason for acting. In these 
ways, they set the boundaries o f his practical life; and thus they 
fix his shape as an active being.2
Before examining Frankfurt’s argument for volitional necessities, I will clarify 
what he means by the “will”. An important question for understanding this 
argument is whether it rests on a conception of willing as a mode o f desiring, or a 
conception of willing as distinct from desiring. I will turn to discuss Frankfurt’s 
views about volitional necessities, in sections 4.3 and 4.4, only after this question 
is settled. I begin by examining the understanding o f the will as desiring, which 
is standardly attributed to Frankfurt.
4.2. Willing as desiring
Frankfurt’s oft-cited exploration of the concept of personhood starts with his 
observation that the central features o f personhood are to be sought not in the 
details o f our physical constitution, but in the operation o f our minds.3 Non­
human aliens with bodily features vastly different to ours, should they exist, may 
qualify as persons so long as they possess the right sort o f psychic arrangement. 
A necessary condition for this organization is the possession o f second-order 
desires, which serves to filter out non-human animals -  organisms that are 
capable o f desire-based purposeful behaviour4 but incapable o f evaluating their
2 Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons o f  Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 50.
3 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom o f  the Will and the Concept o f  a Person,” Journal o f  Philosophy 
68, no. 1 (1971).
4 Frankfurt goes so far as to maintain that humans are not unique in their capacity to act on 
reasons: “Insects have reasons, to which they respond, for their defensive scurrying about, as they 
do when someone comes after them with manifestly deadly intent. Their movements are neither 
random nor tropistic, they have alternatives, and they make mistakes. It is difficult to make sense 
o f  their behaviour without understanding it as in some way rational.” (Frankfurt, “Reply to 
Eleonore Stump,” pp. 61-62.)
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desires and acting on these evaluations. Insofar as they cannot discriminate 
between their wants but are merely thrown around by them, their behaviour falls 
short of the standards o f acting. However, although human beings possess the 
ability reflectively to detach themselves from their desires, this fact alone is not 
the basis o f our referring to them as persons. Some classes o f humans, such as 
very small children and the mentally ill, may on Frankfurt’s account fall outside 
the remit o f personhood if  their reasons and desires are not appropriately 
organized. The necessary and sufficient condition for calling some organism “a 
person” -  whether or not it belongs to the human species -  is that it has second- 
order volitions.5
An agent’s volition is, for Frankfurt, his effective desire -  a “desire that is 
motivating or moving A to do what he is actually doing or that A will in fact be 
moved by... (unless he changes his mind) when he acts.”6 A n  example that 
Frankfurt uses to illustrate this analysis involves a physician committed to 
helping his drug-addicted patients, and wishing to gain -  in the interest o f this 
cause -  a first-hand experience o f their addiction. His motive for taking the drug 
is not focused on the elating effects o f his consumption, as in his patients. 
Instead, it is related to his ambition to discover what it feels like to be addicted. 
This experience o f addiction is not in itself related to the sensations felt under the 
influence o f the narcotic. His endeavour to experience the addiction may, in 
principle, be fulfilled without his tasting the addictive substance. It is enough for 
this purpose that he feels the physical and psychological compulsion that 
torments his patients. In fact, the physician’s only reason for taking the drug may 
be just to get himself into the grip o f the addiction, after which the need for the 
drug, from his scientific standpoint, vanishes. Subsequent to this necessary 
initiation, argues Frankfurt, the doctor wants to have a desire for the drug without 
wanting this desire to be effective. He does not want the desire for the drug to 
constitute his will. Volition is on this account a “want to want to” do something 
(here: take the drug), which makes it impossible for there to be a volition without 
a desire it is directed at. It also allows that an agent can deem certain desires unfit
5 Frankfurt, “Freedom o f the W ill and the Concept o f  a Person,” p. 16.
6 Ibid.: p. 8.
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to govern his behaviour, and regard their grip on his actions -  when they do so 
invade him -  as usurpatory rather than rightful.7
Frankfurt’s picture of personhood, based as it is on a definition of willing as a 
mode of desiring, is less than satisfactory. Problems with it begin right from 
Frankfurt’s decision to explain agency in terms of a hierarchical ordering of 
desires. The hierarchical view o f deliberation seems attractive as it fits well with 
the appealing “belief -  desire” model of practical reasoning, sometimes 
associated with Hume. Consonant with this model, Frankfurt’s approach 
accounts for the intentional content o f practical reasoning with sole reference to 
desires about what there is to be.8 This makes his claims parsimonious and 
metaphysically inoffensive. It is also the case, however, that the coherence of 
Frankfurt’s picture of agency suffers as a result of this “desires-only” policy. To 
be noted, first, is that the regulative status o f volitions requires that they be in 
some way special with respect to the desires that they regulate. This special 
status manifestly cannot be a reflection o f any difference in kind, since volitions 
are themselves presumed to be desires. The required special character of 
volitions also cannot lie simply in the fact that they are o f a higher-order than the 
desires they govern. It is not at all clear why, say, a “desire to recycle” should be 
automatically overruled by the “desire not to desire to recycle”, nor why it should 
be automatically authenticated by “a desire to desire to recycle”. The governing 
relation o f volitions over desires is precisely what stands in need o f explanation, 
and is obfuscated by their alleged structural similarity. As Gary Watson remarks, 
the problem with higher-order volitions is
7 A special case is that o f  “wantons”, individuals who have second-order desires but are 
indifferent as to whether they will act on any o f  them, and as to which o f  these desires will end up 
determining their behaviour. Frankfurt’s wantons thus have no second-order volitions whatsoever 
corresponding to their second-order desires.
8 I do not wish to imply that Frankfurt’s account o f  personhood is in fact guided by the 
requirements o f  the belief-desire model, although Frankfurt is often read as a straightforward 
Humean. In fact, below I will argue that his position owes considerably more to Descartes than to 
Hume. Here I only suggest that a portion o f  the appeal o f  his position lies in its ability to 
accommodate the claims o f  the belief-desire model.
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simply that they are just, after all, desires, and nothing about their 
level gives them any special authority with respect to externality.
If they have that authority they are given it by something else. To 
have significance, the hierarchy must be grounded in something 
else that precludes externality.9
It is in anticipation o f this type of criticism that Frankfurt develops his notion of 
identification. Volitions have a special commanding position over our generic 
desires because they express our identification with some o f these desires. 
Although Frankfurt himself admits that this idea of identification is “mystifying”, 
it does denote something like accepting a desire as representative of oneself.10 
This fact o f acceptance alone accounts for their authority over other desires. It 
also “‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders,” 11 
meaning that it blocks the regress into desires o f an ever higher order. 
Identification is decisive, insofar as it conclusively settles the question o f what 
desires we care to act upon. Furthermore, Frankfurt regards the notion of 
identification as capturing the active aspect o f agency. By endorsing a want as 
authentically ours, and committing ourselves to be guided by it, we stamp the 
mark o f our authorship on our conduct. Identification moves one away from the 
status o f a passive receptacle for desires, into the role o f an active agent who 
“owns” his behaviour.
Frankfurt’s answer to Watson-type criticism is that what lends second-order 
volitions their special commanding authority is, indeed, not the mere fact that 
they are o f a higher-order. The authorizing fact about them is that they are 
grounded in the agent’s satisfaction with being ruled by them .12 However this 
answer too is contentious, principally because o f the way in which Frankfurt
9 Gary Watson, “Free Action and Free W ill,” M ind  96, no. 382 (1987): p. 149, original emphasis.
10 For this point, as well as the relationship between identification and practical activity, see also 
Harry G. Frankfurt, “Three Concepts o f  Free Action,” in The Importance o f  What We Care About 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
11 Frankfurt, “Freedom o f  the Will and the Concept o f  a Person,” p. 16.
12 See Harry G. Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” in Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 105.
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construes “satisfaction”. He conceives of it in purely negative terms, as the 
absence o f unsettlement about the prospect o f acting on some impulse. A desire 
that we identify with is just the one that we do not care to rebel against, one 
whose grip on our behaviour we have no inclination to loosen. The controversial 
conclusion that Frankfurt draws is that our behaviour stems from our practical 
activity when it is driven by desires that we submit to without resistance. 
Markedly absent from this account is any sort o f evaluation as a criterion for 
endorsement.13 Satisfaction that is at the basis o f practical reasoning is a purely 
natural, non-normative phenomenon; it is “a state of the entire psychic system” 14 
that is wholly analyzable by the disciplines of psychology and neurology.
However, Frankfurt’s naturalized account of agency must confront at least two 
serious objections. The first, advanced by Joseph Raz, states that the satisfaction 
that is presumed to stop the regress into desires o f an ever higher order itself 
cries out for explanation. If a play of desires is all that deliberation involves, the 
person’s state of non-resistance must also be rooted in the fulfilment o f some 
desire. Since there must always exist a desire that “authenticates the 
authenticator”, Frankfurt fails to avoid the trap of a dizzying infinite ascent to 
higher-order desires.15 The second potential criticism is that if the outcome of 
identification is a just another desire (in the form o f a volition) it is unclear why 
having higher-order volitions should be considered the mark o f personhood. 
After all, first-order desires are desires all the same, and equally eligible to be 
identified with. Frankfurt’s position thus seems to render reflexivity -  the 
detachment we have in relation to our impulses -  superfluous as far as agency is 
concerned.
13 Cf.: “[W]hat I have actually intended to convey by referring to “endorsement” is not that the 
agent approves o f  what he is said to endorse, or that he considers it to m erit his support, but 
nothing more than that the agent accepts it as his own. The sense in which he accepts it as his 
own is quite rudimentary. It is free o f  any suggestion concerning his basis for accepting it and, in 
particular, it does not imply that he thinks w ell o f  it.” (Frankfurt, “Reply to Eleonore Stump,” p. 
87, original emphasis.)
14 Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” p. 104.
15 See Joseph Raz, “When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive,” in Engaging Reason: 
On the Theory o f  Value and Action  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 18-21.
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4.3. Willing as a distinct mental faculty
If they are well-directed, the cited objections damage Frankfort’s conception of 
identification, as well as the resulting picture o f personhood. Fortunately, it is 
plausible to think that his argument regarding volitional necessities does not rest 
on the conception of willing as desiring. In contrast to most commentators, I 
wish to suggest that the argument in question is strongly informed by a Cartesian 
conception of willing as qualitatively different from desiring. For the purpose of 
elucidating Frankfort’s views on volitional necessities it will therefore be useful 
to examine how they link up with Descartes’s treatment o f the will. A convenient 
entry into the topic is through Frankfort’s discussion of moral responsibility.
4.3.1. Inability to do otherwise andfreedom of the will
In a much-discussed paper, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” 
Frankfort argues that moral responsibility is compatible with over-determination 
of the agent’s behaviour by external factors.16 The paper targets a principle that 
Frankfort thinks is held true by all parties in the long-standing debate on free will 
and determinism, the principle o f  alternate possibilities (PAP).17 According to 
this principle, a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he 
could have done otherwise.18 By extension, a person A is not morally responsible 
for an act X if he could not do other than X. Frankfort’s assessment of the claims 
presented by PAP moves through two stages: first, he analyses what it means to 
say that A “could not do otherwise” than X and looks for a paradigmatic situation 
to which the qualification applies. Second, he asks whether in the pure case of 
inability to do other than X the agent is exempt from responsibility for doing X.
16 Harry G. Frankftirt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal o f  Philosophy 
66, no. 23 (1969).
17 For a defence o f  PAP see Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds o f  Liberty (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 36-40.
18 Frankftirt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” p. 829.
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It would seem that coercion produces the clearest and most standard cases of 
inability to do otherwise. Suppose that a person A was presented with an 
irresistible threat -  say, o f being killed -  unless he performs an act X. When A 
performs X, should he be held responsible for it, and is our assessment 
influenced by the drastic curtailment o f his options? Sometimes but not always, 
answers Frankfurt. While it is true that A decides to do X in the presence o f the 
relevant threat, it is nonetheless incorrect to assume that he necessarily decides 
so because of that threat. It is o f course reasonable to expect that on some 
occasions this kind of external conditioning of the agent’s behaviour will occur -  
namely, that the threat will perform the dual role o f providing both the context 
and the reason for A’s decision to do X. In that case the agent’s deliberation will 
have been overpowered, or “stampeded”, by the coercive threat and we would 
rightly think that he should take no blame or praise for doing what he did.
However, Frankfurt urges us to consider two distinct cases in which A may have 
decided to perform X “for reasons of his own”, even if  he was threatened do X .19 
First, it may be that when making up his mind A was recklessly indifferent to the 
threat, refusing to acknowledge its potential consequences and stubbornly 
persisting with his original intention to do X. In this case the threat exerted no 
effective force on A, even if  only because A appears foolishly unreflective by 
most standards. Second, one may also imagine that A was fully aware o f the 
unsavoury prospect of dying and was reasonably impressed by it, but equally had 
a pre-existing intention to do X. He counts himself lucky for having to do what 
he always wanted to anyway. In both scenarios A’s behaviour stems from his 
own reasoning, and he should be held responsible for performing X. No doubt, it 
will be extremely difficult to ascertain whether A’s compliance with the threat is 
a result o f happy circumstance or the overpowering force o f the threat. On the 
one hand, this means that assigning responsibility will often be difficult, even in 
what appear to be the clearest cases o f coercion. However, it also means that 
such cases do not properly illuminate the inability to do otherwise, which is to
19 Ibid.: pp. 831-33.
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say that “the doctrine that coercion excludes moral responsibility is not a 
particularized version of the principle o f alternate possibilities.”20
A better illustration o f the inability to do otherwise, in Frankfurt’s view, is given 
by the following example: On a late evening, I see a man being robbed and 
beaten by several attackers right in front o f my house. My initial inclination is to 
call the police, but it soon gets superseded by my desire to avoid tedious police 
interrogation, possible retaliation by the attackers, or just losing sleep. And so I 
decide not to call the police. However, unbeknownst to me, the telephone system 
in my entire area has been out o f order, which means that I would not have been 
able to inform the police even if I had wanted to.21 Am I morally responsible for 
failing to reach the police? Regardless o f what my decision was, I would have 
ended up not reaching the police. The concealed element o f the telephone 
malfunction ensures that events can take only one turn. In other words, from a 
wider objective viewpoint, there is no alternative possibility to my failing to 
inform the police, since the possibility o f me reaching the police equals zero.
As far as the world is concerned there is only one way things will pan out, which 
leads van Inwagen to claim that I am not morally responsible for failing to reach 
the police. He calls the thesis underlying this claim the principle o f  possible 
action (PPA): “A person is morally responsible for failing to perform a given act 
only if he could have performed that act.”221 cannot be responsible for not
20 Ibid.: p. 833.
21 The example is Peter van Inwagen’s variation on Frankfurt’s original scenario. (Peter van 
Inwagen, “Ability and Responsibility,” Philosophical Review  87, no. 2 (1978): pp. 204-05.) 
Another variation on the same theme, featuring an electronic device secretly implanted in the 
agent’s brain, is found in John Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Self-Expression,” The Journal 
o f  Ethics 3, no. 4 (1999). Frankfurt’s original scenario runs as follows: Without Jones4’s 
knowledge, Black is capable o f  perfectly second-guessing the choices that Jones4 is about to 
make, and is prepared to effectively obstruct any o f  Jones4’s actions that do not please him. 
Whatever it is that he decides, Jones4 will thus always do what Black wants him to do. (Frankfurt, 
“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” pp. 835-36.) I present van Inwagen’s version 
o f  the same scenario because it forms the basis for his criticism o f  Frankfurt, which I discuss 
below.
22 van Inwagen, “Ability and Responsibility,” p. 204.
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causing some state o f the world (the police knowing about the assault) if causing 
it is impossible for me. The notion o f responsibility does not apply to my 
situation, just as it does not apply when I contemplate my “failure” to stop the 
Sun from rising this morning. Van Inwagen’s claims do not imply that I should 
be exempt from responsibility for having the mental states that I do. It may be 
that the inclinations that figured in my decision were altogether inappropriate, 
that I displayed an unacceptable degree o f inertness and inconsiderateness when 
witnessing blatant wrongdoing. However, failing to try (or to want to try) to 
contact the police is not the same as failing to cotitact the police. I may be 
considered guilty o f the former, but not o f the latter.
In his response to van Inwagen, Frankfurt argues that his account obscures the 
moral aspect o f responsibility.23 According to van Inwagen, argues Frankfurt, 
whether one describes a person as merely “trying to call the police” or “calling 
the police” depends solely on the condition of the telephone system. One and the 
same physical activity -  dialling the number -  will count as trying to call the 
police if  the telephones are out o f order, and calling the police if the system is 
functional. My liability to praise or blame thus entirely hinges on what is the 
appropriate description o f facts about the telephone network. Yet, Frankfurt 
observes, this position is inadequate because we aim to assess my responsibility, 
not that o f the telephone system. This essentially agent-referential character o f 
our moral assessments can only be retained if  they depend, at least in part, on 
facts about agents -  their intentions, motives, reasons and so on. In other words, 
the morally important aspect o f statements about responsibility is that they pick 
out a person that falls under them. Once every reference to the person is removed 
from such statements, they completely lose their moral dimension. Last night’s 
telephone malfunction would, after all, be morally uninteresting had it not 
coincided with my deliberation on how to respond to the perceived assault.24 
Therefore, contrary to van Inwagen, even the most correct and exhaustive
23 Harry G. Frankfurt, “What We Are Morally Responsible For,” in The Importance o f  What We 
Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
24 Or someone e lse’s mental happenings.
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description of relevant non-mental facts alone fails to capture the grounds for 
assigning moral responsibility.
However, Frankfurt’s most direct attack on the various versions of PAP is that a 
person’s inability to do otherwise does not annul his freedom. To explain, the 
conditions for holding someone responsible for (p-mg are dependent on the 
conditions for holding him free in ^-ing. In other words, we can only blame or 
praise a person for acting in a certain way if  he was free in so acting. The appeal 
o f PAP seems to lie in the fact that it captures one necessary condition o f this 
freedom that is required for responsibility. If  there was no way in which the 
world could have conformed with an agent’s intentions, then he could not have 
been free, or in turn responsible for what he did. Against this argument, Frankfurt 
claims that ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition o f freedom. 
Consequently, unlike van Inwagen, Frankfurt does not think that this inability 
annuls moral responsibility, even in its paradigmatic cases such as the robbery 
scenario. In support o f his view, Frankfurt points out that both coercion and 
overdetermination by external factors constrain the power of the agent’s will to 
initiate bodily movements. However, they do not infringe his freedom to choose 
a harsh punishment rather than obeying, or select the alternative that will turn out 
to be impracticable. As Frankfurt explains:
Given that the freedom of a person’s will is essentially a matter of 
whether it is up to him what he does, it is more a matter of 
whether it is up to him what bodily movements he makes than of 
what consequences he can bring about by his movements.25
These claims are clearly grounded in a particular understanding o f the freedom 
that is central to our assessment of an agent’s moral responsibility — on 
Frankfurt’s view, it is the freedom to will that certain states of affairs obtain. 
Importantly, the freedom in question is not the freedom to cause that the willed 
states o f affairs actually come into existence. Whether my willing that X can 
bring about X is irrelevant to the question o f whether I am free to will that X. To
25 Frankfurt, “What We Are Morally Responsible For,” p. 103.
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claim otherwise would be to confuse will’s freedom with will’s power.26 This 
non-causal analysis of freedom gives rise to a compatibilist position: even if it 
turns out that my lack of power renders me incapable o f actualizing anything that 
my will proposes, my will can still be free. By extension, even if every action 
that I set on performing gets frustrated by overwhelming coercive threats, subtle 
manipulation, or hidden facts about the natural world, I can still be held 
accountable for my behaviour.
Frankfurt’s conclusions up to this point are negative, consisting in a rejection of 
PAP for the purpose o f drawing moral assessments. Before moving on to discuss 
his positive account o f responsibility, a possible objection against Frankfurt’s 
treatment o f PAP is worth noting. It focuses on the peculiar understanding of 
practical reasoning that underlies his account, which regards the working of 
practical reason as a purely mental exercise, explicable without reference to its 
effects in the external world. As will be discussed further below, so long as the 
agent can act on “reasons of his own” he is free. This however runs counter to 
our strong intuition that practical deliberation does bring about outcomes outside 
our heads -  indeed, that seems to be the point o f reasoning practically. It seems 
therefore that an explanation o f free deliberation must answer rather than avoid 
the question o f how our mental activity spontaneously produces non-mental 
happenings. In order to identify Frankfurt’s resources for addressing this worry, 
one needs to appreciate the large debt that his practical philosophy owes to 
Descartes. His response to the problem of harmonizing the causal determination 
of nature with our spontaneous agency bears striking resemblance to Descartes’s. 
From Frankfurt’s perspective, the objection above is not too troubling as it is 
effective only against those who lay claim to, or hope for, a full understanding of 
human agency within the natural world. Frankfurt, however, has no such
26 Cf.: “When w e ask whether a person’s will is free w e are not asking whether he is in a position 
to translate his first-order desires into actions. That is the question o f  whether he is free to do as 
he pleases. The question o f  the freedom o f  his will does not concern the relation between what he 
does and what he wants to do. Rather, it concerns his desires themselves.” Frankfurt, “Freedom  
o f  the Will and the Concept o f  a Person,” p. 15.)
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pretensions. To understand his position, it is necessary to consider at some length 
its Cartesian roots.
Descartes acknowledges that every part o f the natural world is subject to causal 
necessitation. Since we initiate changes in the same world we must be capable of 
starting a new causal chain. Yet since we also belong to that world all our actions 
must themselves be caused. In conjunction, these last two claims render a full 
analysis o f human freedom within a causally determined world outstandingly 
difficult to provide. While recognizing the problem, Descartes is not too troubled 
by our poor understanding o f the place o f agency in the system of nature. The 
pursuit o f this understanding, he argues, is not o f primary philosophical 
importance, nor is its attainment the ultimate objective o f philosophical enquiry. 
The reason for this lies in the limited nature o f human cognition in the face of 
God’s omniscience. The full comprehension o f the link between our mental 
processes and natural causality is, for Descartes, God’s prerogative. Given the 
vast gulf between God’s cognitive capacities and our own, even hoping for such 
comprehension is arrogant as well as unreasonable.27
Descartes’s philosophizing does not begin by enquiring into metaphysical truths, 
precisely because he believes humans to be constitutionally ill-equipped for such 
an investigation. Our senses can, and indeed often do, deceive us. Sticks half­
submerged in water appear to us bent even though they are not, buildings seem to 
us unrealistically small when viewed from a great distance, and so on. From
27 Cf.: “But we shall get out o f  these difficulties i f  we remember that our mind is finite, while the 
power o f  God is infinite -  the power by which he not only knew from eternity whatever is or can 
be, but also willed it and preordained it. We may attain sufficient knowledge o f  this power to 
perceive clearly and distinctly that God possesses it; but we cannot ge t a  sufficient grasp o f  it to  
see how it leaves the free  actions o f  men undetermined. Nonetheless, we have such close 
awareness o f  the freedom and indifference which is in us, that there is nothing we can grasp more 
evidently or more perfectly. And it would be absurd, simply because w e do not grasp one thing, 
which we know must by its very nature be beyond our comprehension, to doubt something else o f  
which we have an intimate grasp and which we experience within ourselves.” (Rene Descartes, 
The Philosophical Writings o f  D escartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald 
Murdoch, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Prin. 1:41, p. 206, emphasis 
added.)
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these findings Descartes infers that no secure knowledge can be gained from the 
deliverances of the senses. So long as we remain in their hold, we are always 
liable to deception. Hence, he famously claims, bottom-rock certainty can only 
be had by provisionally denying, or bracketing, all that our experience has taught 
us about the world and ourselves.
Similarly to Descartes, Frankfurt opposes the speculatively metaphysical 
ambition to explain the fit between human agency and natural causation. Being 
free from Descartes’s religious commitments, Frankfurt does not surrender the 
striving for a fully integrated account o f human action. Quite modestly, however, 
he contends that the examination of the mind/world fit must start from that with 
which we are familiar -  namely, the content o f our mental states.28 Only through 
a solid explanation o f the psychic processes involved in agency can we hope to 
gain insights into how our agency causes changes in non-mental reality. As a 
result, Frankfurt maintains that his account o f freedom, which leaves the effects 
o f free agency unaddressed, is nonetheless not fatally vacuous. It merely reflects 
the fact that a much deeper understanding o f the psychic component of agency is 
needed before we can move on to discuss its external effects:
Determinism surely does not require us to think o f ourselves 
merely as locales in which various events are caused to occur. The 
trouble is that no good account of the difference between being 
passive and being active is available. We are agents, even if  it is a 
fact that everything in our lives is caused. But until it has been 
explained what being an agent means, the compatibility of 
determinism with our agency (and hence with our moral
28 It is, presumably, this attitude o f  modesty that lies behind Frankfurt’s claim that the aim o f  his 
enquiry into freedom is “primarily to locate the problem with which a person is most immediately 
concerned when he is concerned with the freedom o f  his w ill.” (Frankfurt, “Freedom o f  the Will 
and the Concept o f  a Person,” p. 19.) The metaphysics o f  agency is not only unclear, it is also o f  
secondary importance in the heat o f  action.
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responsibility) cannot be decisively established or fully 
understood.29
4.3.2. Volitional necessities
Frankfurt does not call on Descartes only to argue that his conception o f freedom 
need not explain the place o f freedom in the system of causation. He also 
explicitly uses some of Descartes’s findings in developing his positive account of 
practical deliberation. Frankfurt’s contention that his claims about the ground of 
practical normativity are intended as “significantly analogous to [Descartes’s]
30argument about the ground of theoretical reason” is instructive in this regard. 
Frankfurt’s views about agency are therefore best approached by assuming that 
he understands the will, in Cartesian fashion, as qualitatively distinct from 
desires.31 On the Cartesian conception, the will is a mental faculty that is 
independent from the intellect, and that governs the endorsement or rejection of 
beliefs (proposals of the intellect).32 The will thus takes priority over the intellect 
in judgment-formation.33 Now, Frankfurt explicitly professes his sympathies for 
Descartes’s concept of the limitless will.34 Noting this point is not useful just for 
the purpose o f lineage-tracing. It also importantly clarifies that Frankfurt takes
29 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Reply to John Martin Fischer,” in The Contours o f  Agency, ed. Lee 
Overton and Sarah Buss (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), p. 29.
30 Harry G. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously & G etting It Right, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 106n6.
31 Unfortunately perhaps, Frankfurt’s analysis o f  the concept o f  the person remains his most 
widely cited work.
32 “[T]he will simply consists in our ability to do or not to do something (that is, to affirm or 
deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts 
something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such 
that we do not feel we are determined by any external force.” (Rene Descartes, The Philosophical 
Writings o f  Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Med. IV, p. 40.)
33 On this point see John Cottingham, “Descartes and the Voluntariness o f  B elief,” Monist 85, no. 
3 (2002).
34 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Concerning the Freedom and Limits o f  the W ill,” in Necessity, Volition, 
and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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the freedom  o f the will to be boundless, whereas its power is (necessarily) 
constrained. These constraints on the power o f willing are just what he 
understands by volitional necessities.
The claim that wins Frankfurt’s approval is Descartes’s “breathtaking” 
contention, as Watson calls it,35 that there is no occasion whatsoever in which 
our will can be unffee. Descartes argues that our freedom of willing is as great as 
can possibly be imagined, “so much so that it is above all in virtue of the will that 
I [Descartes] understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of 
God.”36 Interestingly, as Frankfurt points out,37 for Descartes the freedom of the 
will is also as small as could ever be conceived. The reason for this is that the 
will is simple and indivisible, consisting as it does merely in assenting or not 
assenting to the propositions put forward by the intellect. The freedom of 
assenting or not assenting to these propositions therefore must be an all-or- 
nothing affair: where it is present nothing can be added to it or subtracted from it; 
where it is absent, it is absent completely. It is the very same reasoning that 
enables Frankfurt to maintain that, where it exists, the will is absolutely and 
perfectly active.38 It is, however, still possible for Descartes to claim that the 
unbounded freedom of the will comes with its lack o f perfect power. This is 
precisely the insight that Frankfurt lifts from Descartes in order to explain how 
persons deliberate practically. He writes: “The grip of volitional necessity may 
provide, in certain matters, an essential condition o f freedom; indeed, it may
39actually be in itself liberating.”
Frankfurt is able to adopt from Descartes the notion of limits to the will’s power 
because he advocates a non-metaphysical interpretation of Descartes’s objective 
in Meditations on First Philosophy. Although controversial as a reading of 
Descartes, this is an interpretation that Frankfurt has favoured since his earliest
35- Watson, “Free Action and Free W ill,” p. 163.
36 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings o f  D escartes, Med. IV, p. 40.
37 Frankfurt, “Concerning the Freedom and Limits o f  the W ill,” pp. 75-77.
38 Ibid., p. 79.
39 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Preface,” in Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. ix-x.
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work.40 It can be explained by first noting that Descartes uses systematic 
scepticism to arrive at some ideas that cannot, regardless o f our best efforts, be 
overturned by doubt. Once discovered, these unshakeable convictions can then 
be regarded as the one secure anchor in light o f which our other beliefs can be 
explained and assessed. The dominant reading o f Descartes sees him explaining 
immunity to doubt with reference to truth: if an idea is so entrenched within our 
minds that we cannot dissociate ourselves from it, it must be because it captures 
a slice o f reality. The objective o f the sceptical method is then what Bernard 
Williams called an absolute conception o f reality, which denotes “knowledge of 
a reality which exists independently o f that knowledge, and indeed (except for 
the special case where the reality known happens itself to be some psychological 
item) independently of any thought or experience.”41
On Frankfurt’s non-metaphysical reading, Descartes’s aim in the Meditations is 
nothing more than confidence in his properly examined beliefs. In particular, this 
confidence is not based on a correspondence between his beliefs and the world, 
but on the absence of valid grounds for doubting his beliefs. For Frankfurt, 
Descartes is “ indifferent to the question o f whether the certain corresponds or 
fails to correspond with the real.”42 Certainty itself is his “fundamental 
epistemological concept.”43 The criterion o f certainty is indubitability, which is 
to say that Descartes undertakes to accept as certain only those propositions that 
cannot be reasonably doubted. Although certainty o f this sort offers no 
assurances about objective reality, achieving it is nonetheless useful. It delivers
40 Harry G. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense o f  Reason in D escartes's 
M editations, 1st ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Some other works that 
espouse the non-metaphysical interpretation o f  Descartes are: Louis E. Loeb, “The Priority o f  
Reason in Descartes,” Philosophical Review  99, no. 1 (1990).; Jonathan Bennett, “Truth and 
Stability in Descartes’ Meditations,” Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy Supplementary vol. 16 
(1990).; Richard Smyth, “A Metaphysical Reading o f  the First Meditation,” Philosophical 
Q uarterly 36, no. 145 (1986).; Louis E. Loeb, “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On 
Securing Settled Doxastic States,” Nous 32, no. 2 (1998).
41 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project o f  Pure Enquiry (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 48.
42 Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense o f  Reason in D escartes’s 
M editations, p. 35.
43 Ibid., p. 36.
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the most confidence that humans, as limited in their cognitive powers as they are, 
can have about their mental states. And this confidence that is appropriate to the 
human condition attains the aim o f the Meditations, which is to establish a 
foundation for the sciences that is “stable and likely to last” .44
The non-metaphysical reading can be illustrated by considering Descartes’s 
argument for the indubitability o f his existence in the Second Meditation. Even if 
all o f his perceptions are the work o f a deceiving all-powerful demon, writes 
Descartes, the demon
will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I
am something. So after considering everything very carefully, I
must finally conclude that this proposition, I  am, I  exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in 
my mind.45
Descartes’s point can be explained by emphasising that his claim “I exist” is 
supposed to hold whenever he considers it. Whenever it is expressed, argues 
Descartes, the claim holds. This can be contrasted with the statement “I am in 
pain.” While we have a clear and distinct perception of that statement’s truth 
when expressing it, this indubitability is indexed to the time of our utterance. 
This just means that there may be occasions when my report o f pain will be false,
since it is possible for me to be pain-free. The statement “I am in pain” is
therefore inadequate as a general claim about me, since it is always vulnerable to 
reasonable doubt. But my statement that I exist is not inadequate in this way. As 
Frankfurt notes: “The certainty of beliefs concerning the content of 
consciousness is, as it were, contingent upon the occurrence o f those contents. 
But the certainty o f sum is not contingent in this way, since a person can never be 
aware that he does not exist.”46
44 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings o f  D escartes, Med. I, p. 12.)
45 Ibid., Med. II, p. 17.
46 Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense o f  Reason in D escartes's 
M editations, p. 146.
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Descartes conclusion is thus, argues Frankfurt, “a kind of necessary statement”.47 
Yet it does not express an analytic truth. I f  it did, its denial would amount to a 
self-contradiction, which it does not. Moreover, its aim is to advance our 
knowledge, to prove that something that is provisionally doubted is true, which 
would not be possible if  it were merely a piece o f analytic reasoning. What 
makes it necessary is that upon honest and thorough examination, it cannot be 
denied. In other words, Frankfurt takes Descartes to have discovered a necessity 
o f the will. This necessity is given by the fact that he cannot withhold assent 
from the proposition about his existence, that he quite literally cannot bring 
himself to think otherwise despite that proposition’s logical contingency. Such 
unshakeable conviction leaves “no further questions for us to ask: we have 
everything that we could reasonably want”; therefore it is “clearly the same as 
the most perfect certainty.”48 Descartes’s contemplation thus warrants his 
certainty regarding his existence, but it is a certainty that has to do with him, not 
the way things objectively are.
Frankfurt’s notion of volitional necessities is an application to practical 
philosophy of Descartes’s insight about the limited power o f the will. One of 
Frankfurt’s examples of volitional necessity concerns Luther’s well-known 
explanation that he persists in his denunciation o f the Catholic Church because 
he “can do no other”.49 Luther’s firm conviction does not, suggests Frankfurt, 
primarily have to do with the strength o f his reasons for breaking away from the 
governing religious institutions. We often find our reasons for performing some 
act, like donating to charity, quite incontrovertible yet fail to act on them 
nonetheless. To say that Luther had supremely good reasons for his actions does 
not properly account for his self-professed inability to do anything different. The 
only appropriate explanation o f this notion o f inability, according to Frankfurt, is 
a literal one. Luther’s unwavering commitment reveals nothing more than a 
psychological fact about him, the fact that he quite simply could not stand the
47 Ibid., p. 147.
48 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings o f  D escartes, Sec. Replies, p. 103.
49 Frankfurt, “Concerning the Freedom and Limits o f  the W ill,” pp. 80-81.
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unrest that came with staying in the Catholic fold. Despite his best efforts, he 
could not identify with the idea o f supporting the Pope, therefore the option o f so 
doing was for him not alive. Consenting to it was for him unthinkable.50 
Examples such as Luther’s lead Frankfurt to suggest as a constitutive 
characteristic o f our will that it is not able to consent to just any practical 
proposal of the intellect. He writes: “There is a mode of rationality that pertains 
to the will itself... Logical necessities define what it is impossible for us to 
conceive. The necessities o f the will concern what we are unable to bring 
ourselves to do.”51 And the guide to rationality of this sort is discovering what 
desires it is unthinkable for one to reject. Unthinkability is thus the practical 
counterpart of Descartes’s notion of indubitability.
4.4. Unthinkability as a purely psychological notion
The most direct and far-reaching objection to Frankfurt’s conception of volitional 
necessities would be to contest the dualism o f the will and intellect that he 
inherits from Descartes. As noted, his claims only succeed on the assumption that 
there is a distinct mental faculty, the will, that sanctions the proposals o f the 
intellect. Locke and Kant are just two of the numerous critics o f this reification 
of the will. Locke’s objection is a conceptual one, focusing on the inadequacy of 
speaking of “the will” as the source of “willing”. What we mean by willing, he 
argues, is an activity conducted by the person as a whole, not any distinct faculty 
that is supposedly in charge o f it -  just as we say that a person performs the 
action of walking, and not his walking faculty. No doubt there is a “power”, in 
Locke’s terms, in virtue of which the person is capable of performing this act, but
50 Yet, according to Frankftirt, this lack o f  power o f  the will did not entail any diminution o f  
freedom, since the source o f  it lay nowhere else than inside Luther’s own psychological 
constitution. Cf.: “The grip o f  volitional necessity may provide, in certain matters, an essential 
condition o f  freedom; indeed, it may actually be in itse lf liberating.” (Frankfurt, “Preface,” pp. ix- 
x.)
51 Harry G. Frankftirt, “Rationality and the Unthinkable,” in The Importance o f  What We Care 
About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 190.
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it is not the power that performs it but the person.52 Kant’s objection is more 
substantive in that he contests the entire metaphysical framework that stands 
behind the will/intellect dualism. For him there is no role for the will in practical 
reasoning because the will just is practical reason.
Objections to the will as a distinct faculty would need to be considered in greater 
detail for the purpose o f criticizing Frankfiirt. It is not my aim to do this, but to 
determine whether Frankfurt’s claims about volitional necessities can support the 
idea that there are limits to what reasons persons can come to have. I wish to 
suggest that they cannot. For the purpose o f making this point it is not necessary 
to question the Cartesian conception o f willing.
I have suggested that Frankfurt intends unthinkability to be understood as the 
practical analogue of Descartes’s indubitability. Both concepts refer to certain 
constraints on the power o f willing, and both are intended as guides to certainty. 
In Descartes certainty is the reasoned confidence in one’s properly examined 
beliefs, which serves to put the claims of the natural sciences on a secure footing. 
Frankfurt equally aims at reasoned confidence, although o f a different sort. The 
purpose of looking for desires whose rejection is unthinkable is not to found a 
science o f psychological functioning, but to establish a firm starting point for 
identification. To recall, Frankfurt holds persons responsible for their actions if 
and when they act on reasons o f their own -  even when no alternative to their 
action was available. To accept (in the non-evaluative sense) a reason or a desire 
as one’s own is to identify with that reason or desire. Now, the problem that 
unthinkability addresses for Frankfurt is that, ultimately, there must be some raw
52 Cf.: “And so far as any one can, by preferring any Action to its not being, or Rest to any 
Action, produce that Action or Rest, so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring o f  
Action to its absence, is the willing  o f  i t . . .” (John Locke, An E ssay Concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. Peter Harold Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), II, XXI, 21, p. 244.) 
And especially: “Concerning a Man’s Liberty there yet therefore is raised this farther Question, 
Whether a Man be free  to will', which, I think, is what is meant, when it is disputed, Whether the 
w ill be free.” (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, XXI, 22, p. 244-45.)
53 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork o f  the Metaphysic o f  M orals, trans. H. J. Paton (London: 
Routledge, 2005), II: p. 87 (412).
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psychic material that persons draw on in deciding what desires to identify with. 
The brute fact that there are certain things we cannot bring ourselves to do is that 
ultimate anchor for identification. Limits to what a person can bring himself to 
do give him “volitional substance” without which “no choice he makes can be 
regarded as originating in a nature that is genuinely his.”54
The question about the anchor for identification is important, maintains 
Frankfurt, because without it persons would be pulled apart by their competing 
desires. The reflexivity o f our consciousness -  our ability to know that we want 
certain things, in addition to wanting them -  sets us a problem. The variety of 
desires making claims on our action puts us at risk to “inner fragmentation, 
dissonance, and disorder”.55 The difficulty must be solved by deciding what 
desires we can count as genuinely ours, which involves separating those impulses 
that are genuinely expressive o f us from those whose hold on us is usurpatory or 
compulsive. To be able to make such decisions, argues Frankfurt, persons need 
confidence in their powers o f discrimination. Discovering what desires they 
cannot shun despite their best efforts gives them confidence o f this sort, since it 
tells them what must be true of them. Identification is thus grounded in 
acquiescence with how we must be, which “reestablishes the wholeness that was 
undermined by our elementary constitutive manoeuvres o f division and 
distancing [from our desires].”56
Frankfurt’s case for practical volitional necessities is strikingly original and 
commendable for its reliance on the philosophical tradition. However its claim 
that identities set limits to the individuals’ power of willing, and thereby their 
reasons, is implausible. The point can be explained by noting an important 
discontinuity between indubitability and unthinkability. Descartes’s volitional 
constraints are, in contrast to the ones that exercise Frankfurt, not merely a
54 Frankfurt, “Rationality and the Unthinkable,” p. 178.
55 Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right, p. 18.
56 Ibid.
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matter of psychological inability. Instead, they are grounded in logic.57 There is a 
reason why he cannot withhold assent from the statement that he exists: it is that 
it is inconceivable for a non-existing entity to proclaim his existence. To say, as 
Frankfurt does in his non-exegetical work, that Descartes bases his anti-sceptical 
arguments on limitations on the will is hence only partially correct. He bases 
them on a very particular constraint on the power o f willing, the inability o f the 
will to reject propositions mandated by logic. There is, o f course, no guarantee 
that such propositions correspond to objective reality. God and the all-powerful 
demon can make the inconceivable happen. Nonetheless, since we cannot 
understand how that can be, trusting logic is the reasonable thing to do. There is 
however no deeper explanation of Frankfurt’s unthinkability than psychological 
inability: “What people cannot help caring about... is not mandated by logic. It is 
not primarily a constraint upon belief. It is a volitional necessity, which consists 
essentially in a limitation of the will.”58
One implication o f the fact that Frankfurt’s unthinkability is a freestanding 
psychological notion is that the idea o f volitional necessities cannot support the 
claim that there are reasons we cannot commit ourselves to. This is not primarily 
because that task would require taking on board a contentious conception of the 
will. Even if this conception is granted, Frankfurt’s arguments cannot serve to 
show that the range o f individuals’ possible reasons is limited. To begin with, 
Frankfurt’s psychological slant leaves him open to the criticism that he never 
establishes any real inability of the will. He makes much of Luther’s profession 
that he can do no other than to rebel against the Pope. But since Frankfurt offers 
no reason why it really is inability that Luther runs up against, why should this 
assertion be taken at face value? It is equally justified to say that Luther finds it 
very difficult to obey Catholic dictates, not that he finds it impossible to do so.
57 As Frankfurt him self notes, “Descartes requires a foundation that can never be subject to 
doubt. He must have statements for which reasonable grounds for doubt are logically 
impossible.” Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense o f  Reason in D escartes's 
M editations, p. 146, original emphasis.)
58 Frankfurt, The Reasons o f  Love, p. 46, emphasis added.
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As Watson notes, the “difference between being unable to bring oneself to act 
and simply giving up in the face of great difficulty... is obscure.”59
There is also a deeper reason why unthinkability provides no evidence of 
constraints on the range of personal reasons. It is that statements about 
unthinkability express no necessity. This point holds even if one assumes, 
ignoring the argument I have just presented, that Frankfurt discovers a genuine 
inability o f the will. Even on this generous assumption, the inability to reject 
certain desires remains only a psychological fact about us. Since there is nothing 
more to it than a feeling of supreme aversion, it does not prove that we could 
never reject these desires. In this regard, one’s report of what is unthinkable for 
him resembles one’s report of pain. The truth of the statement “I am in pain” is 
indexed to the time o f its formulation, since it is possible to conceive o f me in a 
pain-free state. Equally, the truth o f my discovery o f limits to what I can will is 
tied to the here and now. I may feel very assured that there are ends I cannot 
bring myself to pursue. However, if  Frankfurt is correct in dismissing human 
pretensions to access metaphysical truths, this does not mean that I really cannot 
pursue them. More modestly, my discovery o f volitional limits also cannot 
ground my reasoned confidence; in other words, I cannot take them as the secure 
anchor for identification. To recall, Descartes arrives at reasoned confidence 
about his beliefs by learning that there cannot be a proclamation of existence 
without there being someone to formulate it. Attaining confidence about one’s 
desires would require a parallel argument, which is missing in Frankfurt. This 
would be an argument showing that a person cannot express any desire without 
acknowledging some particular limits to what he is able to desire. But that 
argument would rely on logic, which Frankfurt expressly rejects as a ground of 
practical normativity.
Frankfurt’s complex and sophisticated account of action turns out to be incapable 
o f bearing out the claim that there are constraints to what persons may come to 
will. Some o f my remarks about it may also raise doubts about the plausibility of
59 Gary Watson, “Volitional N ecessities,” in The Contours o f  Agency, ed. Lee Overton and Sarah 
Buss (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 134.
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Frankfurt’s wider account of practical reasoning. They may suggest a mistake in 
thinking that finding one’s volitional constraints puts an end to the battle of one’s 
desires. But the plausibility o f this suggestion cannot be explored here. T he 
important point here is that psychological inability is too weak a notion to ground 
a person’s reasons. The claim that one has a reason to refrain from doing what he 
is unable to do might be plausible if  it referred to necessary inability. But there is 
no necessity to be found in merely psychological facts about persons: a course of 
action that looks quite unthinkable at one point can, at another time, be a realistic 
option. Therefore, the connection that Frankfurt draws between identities and 
reasons is implausible.
My claim that statements about what we can bring ourselves to do express no 
necessity is inspired by one of the central theses in Kant’s (as well as Hume’s) 
philosophy: that experience, whether in the theoretical or the practical domain, 
cannot provide any insight into how things must be. In the next chapter I will 
examine Korsgaard’s approach to identity, which ultimately aims to disprove this 
thesis but nonetheless claims Kantian ancestry. On the one hand, she construes 
identity as a psychological fact about an agent but, on the other hand, she also 
thinks that there is and identity that all persons must have: that o f a Citizen o f the 
Kingdom of Ends. Whether Korsgaard’s derivation of necessity from the basis of 
empirical facts can, in the end, succeed is an interesting question, but I will not 
discuss it. My focus will be on the preliminary part of Korsgaard’s argument -  
her account of identity as a person’s evaluative self-description that is the “root” 
of a person’s reasons. Although this account serves only a preparatory function 
in Korsgaard’s overall project, it is nonetheless attractive in its own right. I f  it is 
plausible, it provides resources for an agreeable revision of Kant’s purely formal 
-  and supposedly empty -  conception o f practical reasoning.
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5. Identity as the criterion of maxim-adoption
5.1. The normative problem and reflective endorsement
Korsgaard’s concept of practical identity emerges as a part of her answer to the 
problem of justifying the normativity o f morality. Moral concepts are normative 
in that they make demands on us: they prescribe what type o f conduct is morally 
correct and ask us to behave accordingly. Korsgaard writes:
[Ethical standards] do not merely describe a way in which we in 
fact regulate our conduct. They make claims on us; they 
command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or, at least, when we 
invoke them, we make claims on one another. When I say that an 
action is right I am saying that you ought to do it; when I say that 
something is good I am recommending it as worthy o f your 
choice... And it is the force of these normative claims -  the right 
o f these concepts to give laws to us -  that we want to understand.1
The problem with the normativity o f moral requirements, according to 
Korsgaard, is that it is possible to regard injunctions to keep one’s promises, 
repay one’s debts, care for one’s parents in older age and so on, as nothing more 
than arbitrary dictates. The philosophical foundation o f morality that Korsgaard 
seeks is a defence o f the right o f these injunctions to govern our lives. Her focus 
thus considerably differs from Plato’s and Hobbes’s, who aim to ward off the 
radically disaffected sceptic -  one who cannot even hear the voice o f morality,
1 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  N ormativity, pp. 8-9, original emphases.
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thinking it is self-interest in disguise speaking.2 Korsgaard seeks the conditions 
under which moral claims can be justified to the one who recognizes certain 
prescriptions as distinctly moral, but does not see them as normative.
Yet these statements only roughly reveal the nature of Korsgaard’s approach to 
the problem with the normativity of morality. More precisely, the challenge that 
she confronts is that ethical considerations may fail to constitute reasons for 
action.3 They may be requirements that persons meant to be governed by them 
have no reason to follow. It is this claim that leads Korsgaard to develop a 
general theory o f reasons. The logic behind her foray into an examination of 
reasons can be presented as follows: Korsgaard’s principal interest is in the 
question o f whether there are any moral requirements that are normative for us. 
However, she also claims that for a moral demand upon some person to be valid, 
that person must have a reason to follow it. In order to determine whether any 
moral demands are valid, it must therefore be seen what would make them 
reason-giving. And to answer that question, it must first be explained what makes 
any consideration, moral or non-moral, reason-giving. Once the general 
conditions for the existence of reasons are clarified, it will then be possible to 
return to the issue o f what moral norms can be supported by reasons.
One condition in particular is at the centre of Korsgaard’s discussion, which is 
that no consideration can constitute a reason without being capable o f addressing 
the person in question.4 The basic idea here is that if  a normative claim is to have 
any hold over a person it must be connected to him, the agent deliberating from 
the first-person perspective, in some special way. It must be directed at him, so 
that he feels that its command is issued to him and not anyone else, or no-one in 
particular. The requirement o f address is therefore that for an injunction (of any 
sort) to be a reason for someone, that person must regard himself as a subject to
2 Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee, 2nd revised ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 
47.; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, student revised ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), especially pp. 86-129.
3 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 9-10.
4 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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whom that injunction applies. The importance o f that requirement should 
however not be overstated: it expresses a condition o f the possibility o f reasons, 
but not a sufficient condition for the existence o f reasons. Even if some 
normative demand adequately addresses a person, the question still remains 
whether that person should obey it. Nonetheless, Korsgaard’s point is that 
without this address, the question of the validity o f the demand cannot even be 
raised. This is similar to the way in which the fact o f political membership 
renders citizens liable to certain obligations, such as paying taxes, but is not 
enough to justify those obligations. Citizens may, for example, have good reason 
to challenge their obligation to fund their state’s aggressive war. Yet they are 
only in a position to do so because they regard themselves as subjects o f that 
state.
The requirement o f address plays a central role in Korsgaard’s assessment of the 
traditional approaches to normativity. Her objection to the meta-ethical theories 
o f voluntarism and realism is precisely that they fail to yield moral norms that 
can address persons. The voluntarist position traces the validity o f norms to the 
legislative authority of their maker: the fact that they issue from some suitable 
legislator’s will is sufficient to justify the demands they make upon persons. In 
religious accounts, for instance, the place o f the authoritative will is often taken 
by God. However, argues Korsgaard, the voluntarist position begs the question of 
why agents should regard themselves as the addressees of the legislator’s 
commands. Even if  a certain rule is God-made it does not automatically follow 
that we should obey it: we still need an explanation o f why divine rules should 
concern us. The realist view in ethics, on the other hand, seems to leave 
implausibly little room for practical judgement, with its portrayal o f deliberation 
as an exercise o f discerning and comparing facts. The curious nature of 
inherently normative facts -  for example, the fact o f the wrongness o f murder -  
is also sufficient to raise suspicion about ethical realism.5 However Korsgaard’s 
principal objection to the realist view, and one that stamps a strong mark on her
5 It is however questionable whether the realist model can be outright refuted on account o f  its 
adherence to “queer” facts. For a famous argument that it can see J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing 
Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).
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project, is the same one that applies to voluntarism. Although the realist holds off 
the sceptical charge by positing a class o f considerations that are normative in 
themselves, and thus not susceptible to further questioning, it lacks an 
explanation of how and why facts engage persons. Facts cannot determine 
agents’ actions directly but only insofar as agents take them as normatively 
important. The claim that murder is intrinsically wrong then does not settle the 
issue of individuals’ reasons. For that to happen, those individuals still need to 
view themselves as subjects who take the wrongness o f murder as normatively 
important.6
Korsgaard’s treatment of the “reflective endorsement” approach to normativity, 
espoused by David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Bernard Williams, merits a more 
detailed discussion here. That approach seems well-suited to answer the question 
of how considerations address persons, due to its insight that “normativity is a 
problem for human beings because o f our reflective nature”.7 By “reflexivity” 
Korsgaard means persons’ ability to question the validity of their own beliefs and 
motives. According to Korsgaard, realism and voluntarism fail to account for the 
fact o f reflexivity at the very basic level, since they are not at all concerned with 
the subjective experience of moral requirements. For both approaches, how 
persons regard normative claims has nothing to do with the validity o f these 
claims. The commands o f an authoritative lawgiver are thus supposed to be 
normative regardless o f whether and how individuals perceive them. Equally, 
intrinsically normative facts are meant to issue reasons irrespective o f whether 
we are aware of them. This neglect o f reflexivity results in failure to address: it is 
difficult to see how norms that are wholly extraneous to the agent’s 
consciousness can be accepted by that agent as directed at him. Reflective 
endorsement theorists deal with this issue rather better. For them, the principal
6 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  N orm ativity, pp. 37-40. A position which escapes Korsgaard’s 
criticism is procedu ral moral rea lism -th e  belief that there are correct and incorrect moral views, 
where the standard for making this judgement is not conformity with any objectively existing  
normative facts in the world but adherence to a correct procedure for arriving at moral views. 
Korsgaard herself ends up as a procedural moral realist, although with incorporated elements 
from several o f  the moral doctrines she criticizes.
7 Ibid., p. 49.
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question that an account of normativity must answer is the first-personal one -  
whether moral demands can survive the agents’ own critical scrutiny. However 
Korsgaard claims that the reflective endorsement explanation o f  normativity also 
founders on the requirement o f address. Although this claim is very important for 
understanding her ideas about practical identity as the source o f reasons, her 
arguments in support o f it are complex and often not very perspicacious. It is 
therefore useful to examine them more closely. Korsgaard’s treatment of the 
reflective endorsement theory can be illustrated by looking at her appraisal o f 
Hume, and especially Hume’s discussion of justice.
The pivotal aspect o f Hume’s conception o f justice is that justice is an artificial 
virtue, and as such opposed to natural virtues such as benevolence or 
compassion. The motives that guide us in beneficent or compassionate actions 
are natural inclinations and desires, those that belong to unadulterated human 
constitution as we would find it in the crude condition prior to society and 
political authority. These “passions” are the motives that we need not combat, 
reflect upon, or obey -  they are the spontaneous workings o f the animalist part o f 
our personality. 8 Controversially, Hume thinks that passions are the only 
possible source o f motivation. There can be no human action that is not, at some 
point in the chain o f practical reasoning, traceable to original passions. So when 
we contemplate an action that can produce pain or pleasure, we are guided by an 
emotion o f aversion or propensity towards the prospective outcome.9 Since for
8 A passion is an original existence, which within Hume’s empiricist framework means that it is 
not a representation o f  anything outside itself. For example, the idea o f  anger is not a mental copy 
o f  any object or another idea; to be angry is just to be, irreducibly, in a certain state: “possessed” 
by anger. (David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human N ature , ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), II.iii.3, p. 415.)
9 ‘“Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect o f  pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a 
consequent emotion o f  aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what w ill give 
us this uneasiness or satisfaction. ‘Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making 
us cast our view  on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one 
by the relation o f  cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation ; and 
according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But ‘tis evident in 
this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it.” (Ibid., II.iii.3, p. 
414.)
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Hume reason cannot alone produce passions but consists merely in the discovery 
o f relations between ideas, it cannot be sufficient to determine action.
However, our motives for adhering to norms o f justice -  principally, the laws of 
the contract -  are not directly natural. Our reasons for not stealing and not 
defaulting on mortgage payments do not derive from any o f the original pre­
social passions and inclinations. This point means, on the one hand, that some 
requirements o f justice cannot be explained in terms o f natural motives. In many 
cases the requirements o f justice do not perfectly align with our natural 
sentiments, such as compassion and beneficence. For example, one is required to 
pay back a debt even if  the lender is wastefully rich and repulsively arrogant. 
Moreover, what justice demands can sometimes go against our natural motives. 
For instance, respecting others’ property sometimes obviously goes against our 
selfish desires, such as to live a comfortable existence without being accountable 
to others. Therefore the motive to act justly must have its source in something 
other than natural inclinations. Hume locates this source in the “sympathy with 
public interest”,10 which on Korsgaard’s construal amounts to something like 
enlightened self-interest. Individuals have an incentive to obey the system of 
justice even when its particular edicts pain them because the existence o f the 
system is justifiable in view of their long-term well-being. To begin with, 
historically the system came into existence with the purpose of facilitating 
economic activity and advancing well-being, which provides an incentive for 
upholding it. Moreover, the system also fosters pleasures o f its own -  for 
instance, the agreeable feeling that comes with being recognized as the law- 
abiding member o f the society, available only through observance o f received 
norms. On Hume’s account, the motive to be just is thus rooted in self-interest; as 
such it is not reducible to motivating passions, although it retains a connection 
with them.11
10 Ibid., III.ii.2, pp. 498-501.
11 Cf.: “Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment o f  justice: but a  sympathy 
with public interest is the source o f  the moral approbation, which attends that virtue. (Ibid., 
III.ii.2, pp. 499-500.)
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Agents in the Humean scheme acknowledge the authority o f demands placed on 
them by the impartial system o f justice, and act on them for the non-natural 
motive o f sympathy with public interest. However, situations may occur in which 
the motive to be just comes into conflict with residual natural inclinations: this is 
the source o f the “sensible knave” problem.12 The sensible knave has a certain 
distance from his reasons insofar as he feels the impartial force of particular 
moral injunctions, but also recognizes the true basis of morality in self-interest.13 
This enlightened stance presents him with a deliberative difficulty when he needs 
to endorse or reject a course o f action which would promote his own interests 
without threatening to bring down the system o f justice. Suppose that he is in a 
panic rush to catch an airplane and is tempted to get his newspaper from the self- 
service stand without stopping to leave the change. He is well aware that the 
action would be wrong from the moral point o f view, but he also knows that the 
ultimate justification o f the moral viewpoint is that it promotes the satisfaction of 
natural desires. Furthermore, it is certain that his offence will pass unnoticed -  
which means that the person will not have to suffer the disapprobating attitude of 
others -  and, being minor, will not shake the foundations o f moral norms and 
habits. The question is whether the knave might think, in light o f all this, that 
taking off without paying is justified.
12 The sensible knave illustration appears in David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
o f  M orals, ed. Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), LX.ii, pp. 282-84.
13 This is a peculiarly Korsgaardian reading o f  the sensible knave problem, which relies on an 
individualist view  o f  Hume’s self. Since my interest is in how Korsgaard develops the idea o f  
personal identity, I am here not questioning whether that reading o f  Hume is correct. However, 
there is room for doubting the plausibility o f  Korsgaard’s individualist interpretation o f  Hume’s 
self. A number o f  authors have argued that, for Hume, sympathy for others is a constitutive 
feature o f  persons, rather than just a constraint on their narrowly individualist pursuits. See for 
example Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, “‘Pride Produces the Idea o f  S e l f : Hume on Moral Agency,” 
Australasian Journal o f  Philosophy 68, no. 3 (1990).; Annette Baier, A Progress o f  Sentiments: 
Reflections on Hume's Treatise (London: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 6.; Pauline 
Chazan, The M oral S e lf  (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1.; Christopher J. Finlay, H um e’s  
Social Philosophy: Human Nature and Comm ercial Sociability in a Treatise o f  Human Nature 
(London: Continuum, 2007).
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The aspect of Hume’s theory that interests Korsgaard is not so much that it 
leaves open the possibility for the knave to decide that stealing is justified. She 
focuses rather on the knave’s resources for deciding what to do. Hume’s 
ambition, as we saw, is to portray the motive to act justly as a non-natural 
motive: it is an inclination that arises from one’s consideration of the 
contribution of the system of justice to one’s long-term wellbeing. And yet the 
knave in our example cannot be guided by such an inclination because he 
realizes that his wellbeing will not suffer as a result of his knavishness. No-one 
will see him steal the paper, and social life will go on as usual. Self-interest, 
which Hume regards as the proper, non-natural source o f moral obligations, thus 
has no bearing on his decision. The knave will therefore have to arrive at his 
decision, whether it is to steal or to pay, by consulting some consideration other 
than his enlightened self-interest. One alternative is that he will decide by 
considering the utility o f the particular act o f taking the paper without leaving the 
change. However this response would attribute to Hume the kind o f act- 
utilitarianism that is incompatible with his insistence on the benefits o f the 
system o f justice, and not of particular just acts. Another response, which is the 
one that Hume seems to take, is that the knave will make up his mind by 
choosing in line with his deepest dispositions o f character. If  he is a virtuous man 
he will be generally disposed to act justly, in which case he will also be disposed 
to do so in this particular situation. If, on the other hand, he lacks the virtue that 
results from proper social habituation, he will act on the desire for maximum 
comfort with minimum hassle.
Korsgaard’s objection to Hume’s virtue-centred response to the knave problem 
can be approached by saying that it arbitrarily stops the project of accounting for 
normativity in terms o f the reflexivity o f human consciousness. Its failure is that 
it does not explain why the knave ought to act in one way or another in terms of 
his assessment of his own motives. As such, it does not “push reflection as far as 
it will go”.14 The knave will not determine what he should do by critically 
examining himself but by surrendering to aspects o f his psychic life that are 
independent o f his reflection: desires and inculcated dispositions. If he is
14 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, p. 89.
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virtuous, the knave will not need reasoning to confirm that he ought to do what 
his good habits incline him to. If  he lacks moral virtue, critical reasoning will 
again play no part in his decision-making: on the one hand, his reasoning cannot 
bring him to want to act justly; proper habituation is required for that. On the 
other hand, if  he has a natural desire to act unjustly, he will not need 
confirmation from reason to know that he should satisfy it (since the system of 
justice is not in danger). Against its proclaimed intentions, Hume’s reflective 
endorsement model thus bases normativity on self-discovery rather than self­
appraisal. However, writes Korsgaard, “If  the reflective endorsement of our 
dispositions is what establishes the normativity o f those dispositions, then what 
we need in order to establish the normativity o f our more particular motives and 
inclinations is the reflective endorsement of those.” 15
In The Sources o f  Normativity Korsgaard’s objection to Hume stops there. There 
she seems content to maintain only that Hume cannot show how normative 
claims can survive agents’ own critical reflection all the way through. This 
critique remains squarely within the confines of Hume’s philosophical 
framework: the only trouble with the reflective endorsement model is that it is 
not fully consistent. However it is misleading o f Korsgaard to limit herself to an 
internal critique o f that model, as it misrepresents the extent o f her disagreement 
with Hume, Williams, and Mill. Her other works provide ample resources for 
developing an objection to the reflective endorsement model that is both stronger 
and in line with her assessment of other meta-ethical positions. That deeper 
objection is, once again, that Hume’s conception does not explain how normative 
claims address persons. At first blush, this claim seems out o f place. One o f the 
strengths of Hume’s approach is that it offers an explanation o f how normative 
claims relate to persons: they do so by engaging their passions. It is this 
involvement o f passions that sparks the activity o f critical reflection: the person 
first finds himself naturally drawn towards certain courses o f action, but cannot 
escape the question of whether his inclinations are worth satisfying. A successful 
normative claim will just be that call of his passions that he can accept upon 
reflection. Since the involvement of agents’ passions is what initially triggers
15 tbid.
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practical reasoning, any normative claims that a person considers are always 
intimately related to him.
However, Korsgaard has argued that this view o f the relation between persons 
and normative claims is unsatisfactory. It explains how a person can be 
motivated to comply with normative demands, but a theory o f normativity must 
explain something else. It must answer how it is that a person can be motivated 
to comply with normative demands in virtue o f  their normativity.16 This point 
can be approached by noting that the fact that a normative demand moves a 
person to act cannot be taken as proof that the demand truly engaged the person. 
There is still the possibility that the motivation was unrelated to the demand 
itself. For example, one can behave morally not because it is the right thing but 
because it pleases him. And then it will not be correct to say that that person was 
moved by his obligation -  the thought that there is something that he morally 
ought to do -  but by the anticipation o f pleasure. It just so happens that he is 
motivated to obey the moral requirement, perhaps because he needs a boost to his 
own self-image, or for some other reason. But there is nothing to say that he will 
always and necessarily be motivated to obey it -  for instance when he regards 
himself in a more positive light. His motivation is thus only contingently 
associated with the moral requirement, dependent not on the content o f that 
requirement but on factors extraneous to it. The trouble with Hume’s account is 
that it leaves open the possibility o f contingent motivation to follow normative 
demands. If  so, it also allows that persons who are moved to comply with certain 
requirements may in fact not be addressed by those requirements. For all that 
Hume says, their passions may be incited by something else entirely. Explaining
16 Korsgaard thus writes that in having reasons persons are “inspired to do things by the 
normativity o f  the reasons they have for doing them, by their awareness that som e consideration 
makes a claim on them.” (Christine M. Korsgaard, “Acting for a Reason,” in The Constitution o f  
Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and M oral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 209.) And further: “to have a reason is to be motivated by the consciousness o f  the 
appropriateness o f  your own motivation.” (Korsgaard, “Acting for a Reason,” p. 215.) Reasons 
are not only motivating but “normatively motivating”.
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motivation is thus of little help in understanding how normative claims address 
persons.17
Hume does not only leave open the possibility o f contingent motivation to follow 
normative demands. He also seems committed to saying that in some cases, 
including the sensible knave’s, persons must be so extrinsically motivated.18 If  
Hume’s knave decides to do what justice requires, it will not be because it is 
what justice requires. To be sure, the requirement o f justice elicits a certain 
response from him, by connecting with one o f his dispositions of character. And 
yet that connection does not amount to an address. A person that is properly 
addressed by a normative claim understands that the claim is directed at him -  
that he, and not anyone else or no-one in particular, should do what that norm 
asks of him. He regards himself as subject to its demands. However the reflection
17 This line o f  reasoning can be regarded as an extension o f  Korsgaard’s earlier critique o f  
Williams’s “sub-Humean” model o f  practical reasoning, especially the “intemalism requirement” 
that she attributes to Williams. That requirement states that “Practical-reason claims, i f  they are 
really to present us with reasons for action, must be capable o f  motivating rational persons.” 
(Christine M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” Journal o f  Philosophy 83, no. 1 
(1986): p. 11.) Williams argues that this principle can serve as a grounding for a theoiy o f  
practical reasons, and especially to rule out those conceptions o f  reasons, such as the Kantian, 
that fail to honour it. The requirement is meant to place “independent constraints, based solely on 
motivational considerations, on what might count as a principle o f  practical reason”. (Korsgaard, 
“Skepticism About Practical Reason,” p. 8.) However Korsgaard maintains that the intemalism 
requirement cannot play this critical function, as it assumes a separation between the motivational 
and the normative aspects o f  a reason. Defending this separation in turn requires, she suggests, a 
more substantial backing than W illiams’s thin “motivational scepticism” about practical reason. 
It requires one to endorse a particular view  o f  what reason it and how  it operates -  as, for 
example, Hume him self does. The plausibility o f  the intemalism requirement will then depend on 
the plausibility o f  the underlying understanding o f  what reason is. Korsgaard’s aforementioned 
two objections to Hume -  that his conception is inconsistent, and that it fails to explain how  
normative claims address persons -  can be seen as completing her critique o f  the intemalism  
requirement. They reveal that the requirement cannot be salvaged because Hume’s thick 
understanding o f  reason that supports it is implausible.
18 If Hume is indeed committed to this claim he qualifies as a motivational externalist, meaning 
that he accepts that an explanation o f  why some consideration moves a person to act can be 
distinct from an explanation o f  why that person ought to act on that consideration.
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of the would-be knave leads him to quit regarding himself in this way: once he 
realizes that the source o f the validity of moral obligations is self-interest, and 
that his self-interest will not be harmed by defaulting on payment, the 
requirement to pay for bought goods stops speaking to him. With this new 
knowledge, that requirement does not concern him anymore. It will concern 
those who think that all moral norms are always in one’s self-interest. But he is 
no longer one of those persons. Hume’s account thus ultimately does not explain 
what it takes for a person to be addressed by a normative claim. When pushed to 
its limits, it states that persons can sometimes be zmaddressed by normative 
demands but be motivated to act on them all the same. However, explaining how 
they can be so motivated is irrelevant to the question o f address: what is 
important, this explanation leaves out.
5.2. Freedom and maxims
Since Korsgaard’s argues (or might be taken to argue) that the traditional 
conceptions o f normativity founder on the requirement of address, her own 
conception is built around it. Its seeks to explain normativity starting from the 
question o f what it takes for persons to regard themselves as subjects to 
normative demands. Her answer, as will be seen, is that in order to properly 
address a person a norm must appeal to his practical self-conception, or identity. 
That conception borrows aspects o f Kant, but also contains some important 
departures from Kant’s ethical theory.
Korsgaard makes a turn towards Kant by reframing the issue o f reflexive 
endorsement in terms of human freedom.19 In order to explain her strategy it is 
useful to briefly retrace her discussion. She argues that persons confront a 
normative problem insofar as they are able to question the validity o f any 
normative claim that they experience. The reflective endorsement approach seeks 
to answer how persons can deem any normative claim justified by consulting 
their first-person perspective -  by asking which o f the claims they experience
19 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 94-97.
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they can regard as justified. Korsgaard accepts this recourse to the reflexivity of 
human consciousness. However she also maintains, unlike Hume for example, 
that reflexivity raises the issue o f freedom. In making this claim she, first, 
follows Hume in maintaining that the initial candidates for reasons are desires 
and inclinations. Once we reflect upon our own mental states we find that we are 
already, prior to reflection, drawn to various courses o f action. Korsgaard writes:
I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I 
back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain 
distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a 
problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act?20
It is at the point of deciding whether we can accept our desires as reasons that, 
for Korsgaard, the issue o f freedom arises. What enables Korsgaard to make this 
claim is her endorsement of a particular view o f desires, and a particular view of 
freedom. She conceives o f desires as essentially foreign to the mind that 
contemplates them -  as “biddings from outside” the consciousness.21 
Korsgaard’s guiding idea here is that all desires are affections; as Kant puts it, 
they are modifications of the “receptivity belonging to inner sense”.22 In other 
words, we are “struck” by desires and play no part in their production. It is due to 
their alien nature, and to their unmediated grip on our psyche, that desires may 
turn out to be invasive: unless the person makes a conscious intervention into 
their hold on him, they will determine his behaviour without his active 
participation. The person would then be prevented from acting freely by being 
prevented from acting at all. If  he surrenders to his desires, the movements o f his
20 Ibid., p. 93, original emphasis.
21 Ibid., p. 94. Cf. also: “Anything outside o f  the w ill counts as an alien cause, including the 
desires and inclinations o f  the person.” (Korsgaard, The Sources o f  N orm ativity, p. 97.)
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 5: 58, p. 51. I will return, in chapters 6 and 7, to the issue o f  whether 
Kant can indeed be taken to be claiming that all desires are affections.
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body will not have their source in him, but in overpowering impulses that are 
foreign to him. The things he does will then just be things that happen to him.23
Although the potentially invasive force of desires present a real threat to human 
agency, and thereby human freedom, Korsgaard argues that they nonetheless do 
not rule out the possibility o f free agency. This claim is part of her broader 
compatibilist argument against the idea that external determination of human 
behaviour annuls freedom. On her view, it is possible for individuals’ choices to 
be conditioned by factors outside those individuals’ control -  such as 
evolutionary natural selection, an all-powerful God, or incursive desires -  and 
still be free. She presents her argument for this view as Kantian, which is 
reinforced by her insistence on approaching the problem of freedom in practical 
rather than theoretical terms. The problem, she says, is not to establish from a 
speculative point o f view whether we are free. What the speculative approach 
misses out on is an essential feature of human life: that the question about 
freedom arises for persons looking to decide how to conduct themselves. This is 
not to say that one cannot philosophize about freedom from outside the first- 
person practical perspective; only that a theory o f freedom must take account of 
the human practical interest in deciding what to do.24 With this change of 
viewpoint, Korsgaard suggests, the question about freedom becomes the question 
o f whether we, as persons who must decide how to act, can regard ourselves as 
free.
Her answer is that, as practical agents, we must view ourselves as free, which 
means that we must also view ourselves as free from invasive desires. This 
statement is supported by a claim about the ineliminability o f reflexive 
consciousness. Even if all our choices were somehow determined from outside
23 Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 18.
24 Cf.: “But that doesn’t mean that I am claiming that our experience o f  our freedom is 
scientifically inexplicable. I am claiming that it is to be explained in terms o f  the structure o f  
reflective consciousness, not as the (possibly delusory) perception  o f  a theoretical or 
metaphysical property o f  the self.” (Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 96-97, original 
emphasis.)
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our consciousness, Korsgaard suggests, this would not remove our need to make 
up our minds on what to do. The “simple inexorable fact of the human condition” 
would remain: we would still need to choose and act.25 This means that we 
cannot imagine ourselves fully invaded by desires, because although desires 
affect us from the outside, they cannot conquer us without our being conscious of 
it. Once we do become conscious of their hold on us, we cannot sink back into 
the position of the unreflective spectator. Even if  impulses come to dominate us, 
the reflective structure o f our consciousness still gives us a choice -  whether to 
accept their rule over us, or not. One of these options asserts our subjectivity, 
while the other resigns us to passive submission. However, and this is 
Korsgaard’s point, this submission is not complete because we still get to choose 
it. Whatever it is that we consciously decide, argues Korsgaard, we exercise our 
agency in the act o f deciding. This has an implication for her view about 
freedom. We are agents because we are reflexively conscious and reflexive 
consciousness is tied up with the necessity o f acting. However it is impossible to 
be an agent without thinking o f oneself as a free agent. The conception of 
freedom that underlies this Korsgaard’s claim is one in which freedom is the 
absence of external determinants of one’s practical deliberation. Once freedom 
and agency are understood in the way that Korsgaard proposes, it is clear that we 
cannot simultaneously be agents and unfree. To act just is to act freely: it is to 
assert oneself over and above foreign influences on the mind, by choosing 
whether to follow or reject them. Since this choosing is something that we must 
do, we must also be free.
Korsgaard’s view that all persons are free in the described sense shapes her 
theory o f normativity by steering her towards a particular understanding of 
normative claims. For ethical realists, the considerations that are meant to 
possess normativity are facts, or states o f affairs; for voluntarists, these 
considerations are commands o f some external lawgiver, like God; for reflective 
endorsement theorists, they are one’s endorsed desires. For Korsgaard, however, 
the considerations that enter practical deliberation are maxims, or “subjective
25 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, pp. 1-2.
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principles of action”.26 Maxims can be understood as first-person, law-like 
precepts, such as “I will work extra hours to get a promotion” or “I will drink 
less coffee”. Their content is universal, in the sense that they do not recommend 
some particular action (like “working late today") as worth doing. Rather, they 
pick out a class of actions (“working late generally”) as normative. Particular 
actions are then justified for an agent by their falling under the class o f actions 
for which he has adopted a maxim. Within Korsgaard’s picture o f practical 
reason all action is principled in this way. On the face o f it, this claim sounds 
highly counter-intuitive as a description o f the phenomenology o f decision­
making.27 Nonetheless, Korsgaard maintains that we are required to accept it if 
we are committed to regarding persons as free. Only if  all action stems from 
maxims is there room for freedom of the will. It is the freedom that comes with 
our ability to resist our natural impulses by bringing them under a principle. This 
notion o f self-legislation allows us to see how it is possible for agents to have 
reflective distance from their motives: desires, or passions, or impulses can never 
provide sufficient ground for acting. They can only be incorporated into maxims;
98but by then “although we may do what desire bids us, we do it freely”.
5.3. Identities as grounds for maxim-adoption
Understanding practical reasoning as a matter o f considering and adopting 
maxims leaves room for persons’ freedom from their desires. However it also 
reactivates the problem of address. I f  normative claims are maxims, in virtue of
26 Kant, Groundwork o f  the Metaphysic o f  M orals, II: 51 (421).
27 However, the claim is not without contemporary advocates. For Scanlon, for example, maxims 
provide the general framework that enables persons to figure out which considerations are 
relevant to a given decision. They are “principles specifying the adequacy or inadequacy o f  
various considerations as reasons for one or another judgment-sensitive attitude” (Scanlon, What 
We Owe to Each Other, p. 53.)
28 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, p. 94. This view o f  the relationship between desires 
and maxims -  commonly known as the “Incorporation Thesis” -  is widely cited in discussion o f  
Kantian practical reason. Henry Allison has called it “the centrepiece o f  Kant’s conception o f  
rational agency”. (Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory o f  Freedom  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 189.)
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what do maxims appeal to persons? What makes this question difficult is the 
assumption of individuals’ perfect detachment from their attachments and 
projects. Free agents can only be guided by some attachment or project if and 
when they choose to endorse a maxim that incorporates it. In this sense, they are 
contingently and not constitutively tied to all o f their concerns. But if persons 
stand so aloof from all o f their attachments, what grounds do they have for 
choosing any maxim? Stated in terms o f the requirement o f address, the question 
is: in virtue o f what can any maxim, enjoining the person to perform or refrain 
from specific actions, address a free chooser? The solution, according to 
Korsgaard, is to be found in the standpoint from which we deliberate practically, 
the standpoint o f our identities.
Korsgaard’s treatment of identity can be introduced by considering how the idea 
of identity emerges in the course of Korsgaard’s response to Hegel’s “empty 
formalism” objection to Kant.29 In short, that objection states that moral 
prescriptions cannot be derived from a justificatory procedure that frilly abstracts 
from the content o f moral reasoning. Purely formal principles o f morality are 
indeterminate, in that they do not elect any actions as morally correct. Korsgaard 
approaches this objection by focusing on the categorical imperative, a normative
29 See Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, 
trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 162-63. The best- 
known contemporary version o f  the objection is Rawls’s criticism that Kant’s “Categorical 
Imperative procedure” cannot yield determinate assessments o f  the moral probity o f  maxims. 
(John Rawls, Lectures on the H istory o f  M oral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 172-75.) On Rawls’s reading o f  Kant, whether a 
maxim is to be regarded as right or wrong is answered by considering the hypothetical world in 
which each person acts on that same maxim. If this “corrected social world”, governed by one’s 
initially particular rationale as a universal rule for all, can be willed consistently then this 
rationale is morally appropriate; i f  not, it is morally improper. In the Groundwork Kant thus 
claims that that hypothetical social world which has no place for acts o f  compassion and mutual 
assistance cannot be willed because unsympathetic acts o f  others will sometimes go against what 
Kant calls our self-love. However, Rawls thinks that the Cl-procedure fails to authorize not only 
the world which universalizes acts o f  mutual disinterest, but also the world in which sympathetic 
acts are the norm. On his view, the procedure lacks a substantial standard that would sanction any 
course o f  action.
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requirement that, following Kant, she regards as entailed by freedom. On 
Korsgaard’s interpretation, that requirement states that if  we view ourselves as 
free creators of maxims, we must accept that we ought to only create maxims 
that are universalizable. Both Kant’s argument for this claim and Korsgaard’s 
rendition o f that argument are complicated and controversial, but they need not 
be discussed here. What is important is that Korsgaard accepts the categorical 
imperative as “the law of a free will... It describes what a free will must do in 
order to be what it is. It must choose a maxim it can regard as a law.”30 This 
demand is purely formal as it imposes no limits on what we must choose in order 
to be free, only on how we must do the choosing. Nonetheless, Korsgaard also 
admits that the categorical imperative is too abstract to serve as a guide for 
determining the moral probity of maxims. Its flaw is that it “doesn’t settle the 
question o f the domain over which the law o f the free will must range.”31 Persons 
may adopt all sorts o f maxims that can be both conceived and consistently willed 
as universal laws, but that are nonetheless incompatible with morality. For 
instance, they may undertake to act on the principle of acting on whatever desire 
has the strongest grip on them at the time o f decision-making. Their behaviour 
will then hardly be labelled as moral, especially when they happen to be gripped 
by jealousy, or lust, or hatred.
For Korsgaard the categorical imperative, with its absence of restrictions on the 
content o f maxims, is insufficient as a test of morality. The objective o f her 
revision o f Kant is, first, to import some such substantive constraints into the 
categorical imperative. Second, she aims to do so without compromising the idea 
that agents’ choosing must be regarded as free from external determinants, 
including desires. This latter qualification rules out one quick and easy fix for the 
indeterminacy problem. That fix would be to simply add a reference to some 
determinate desires or projects to the universalizability requirement: in other 
words, to say that maxims must not only be capable o f  being laws but also
30 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, p. 98.
31 Ibid., p. 99, original emphasis.
120
further some specific interests, or exclude some others.32 For instance, one could 
stipulate that universalizable maxims must not promote only the agent’s own 
well-being. However, for Korsgaard such a solution is unacceptable because it 
clashes with the assumption of agent’s freedom. If persons are free, then their 
choosing cannot be constrained by external factors -  including the categorical 
imperative. If  there are certain maxims that they must not have, that just means 
they are not free after all: they are not free to choose those maxims.
Korsgaard’s response to the indeterminacy problem is to supplement the 
categorical imperative with another requirement, what she calls the “moral 
law”.33 Since the moral law is substantive, it can remedy the empty formalism of 
the categorical imperative. The moral law states that in order to qualify as moral, 
maxims must be such that all rational beings (in what Kant calls the “Kingdom of 
Ends”) could agree to be governed by them. Unlike the categorical imperative, 
the moral law has content: it is “a substantive command as long as we have some
32 This is Rawls’s strategy o f  adding substantive constraints to the categorical imperative. He 
writes: “First, we must give more content to the will o f  ideal agents in deciding whether they can 
will an adjusted social world... Second, we must specify further the point o f  view from which 
these decisions about social worlds are m ade...” (Rawls, Lectures on the H istory o f  M oral 
Philosophy, p. 173.) The idea that accomplishes both tasks, and for which Rawls claims support 
from Kant’s Metaphysics o f  M orals, is that o f  “true human needs”. The notion is not elaborated 
very thoroughly but it does state that the fulfilment o f  certain requisite conditions is necessary if  
persons are to lead fully satisfactory lives. True human needs constitute the standpoint from 
which the validity o f  maxims can be assessed, insofar as these maxims further or frustrate their 
satisfaction. (Rawls, Lectures on the History o f  M oral Philosophy, p. 174.)
33 Kant does not distinguish between the categorical imperative and the moral law in the way that 
Korsgaard does. For him, the two principles that Korsgaard discusses are two formulations o f  the 
same principle that governs all sensible beings possessed o f  reason. It is that underlying principle 
that Kant calls the categorical imperative, rather than just the requirement o f  universalizability. 
Because it governs sensible beings possessed o f  reason, whose sensible nature may pull them 
away from obeying reason itself, the categorical imperative takes the form o f  a command. By 
contrast, the moral law governs reason considered in abstraction from sensible affection -  for 
example, we can imagine it applying to God. Since the moral law is the law o f  the “holy” will, it 
is not expressed in imperatival form. (Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, II: 36-39  
(412-14).)
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way of determining what those laws [for the Kingdom of Ends] would be.”34 
This Korsgaard’s claim is unclear and unduly compressed. However, one can 
venture an explanation of what Korsgaard means by it. The moral law is 
presumably substantive insofar as it appeals to the notion o f rationality, which in 
turn requires the presence of substantive motives and projects. To call a person 
rational is to say something about his relation to his motives or projects -  
something about the way in which he manages, or pursues, or combats them. 
Without the existence o f such substantive concerns, the concept o f rationality 
finds no application. With this interpretation o f rationality in place, it can be seen 
why Korsgaard thinks that the moral law has content. The command to adopt 
only maxims that can serve as laws in the republic o f rational beings mandates a 
class o f acceptable maxims: those maxims that we can all rationally will given 
our underlying cares and concerns. However that command is open-ended, as it 
does not specify which those underlying cares and concerns must be. It only 
requires that there must be some.
Following Korsgaard’s identification of the moral law as a suitable solution to 
the empty formalism objection, she needs to show how it can be appended to the 
categorical imperative. The two requirements are not obviously linked, and “the 
argument that shows that we are bound by the categorical imperative does not 
show that we are bound by the moral law.”35 Hence a further argument is needed 
that connects the two requirements. Korsgaard’s argument to this effect is that 
free agents must regard and value themselves as rational agents.36 As she puts it, 
they must have the identity o f Citizens of the Kingdom o f Ends. This necessary 
self-conception o f free agents brings a restriction on the content o f maxims 
allowed by the categorical imperative. Given that they must regard themselves as 
rational, free persons must accept that their universalizable maxims must be such 
that all persons can rationally will them given their underlying cares and 
concerns. The moral law is, in this sense, implicit in the categorical imperative. 
The plausibility o f this amendment o f Kant depends on the plausibility o f the
34 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, p. 100, original emphasis.
35 Ibid., p. 100.
36 Ibid.
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thesis that we must regard and value ourselves as rational agents. Korsgaard 
defends this thesis by means of a transcendental argument from the conditions of 
the possibility o f any practical self-conception.37 However, it is not important 
here whether that argument succeeds. Within the context o f my discussion, the 
interesting aspect of Korsgaard’s revision is that it relies on a claim about 
identities as the “sources of our reasons”.38
Korsgaard maintains that free agents, detached as they are from their 
inclinations, nonetheless have a basis for evaluating their maxims. This basis is 
their evaluative self-conception, “a description under which you value yourself, a 
description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to 
be worth undertaking”.39 Korsgaard’s point here must be understood in the 
context o f her claims about the reflexivity o f human consciousness. Since we are 
beings that are able to reflect on our natural motives, we must decide whether to 
accept or reject those motives. Once confronted with impulses that incline us 
towards some courses o f action we cannot shrink away, but must determine 
whether to follow them. Since we are free, we must make that determination by 
assessing maxims that include those impulses. This will in turn be possible only 
if we have some fixed standard for assessing our maxims -  some criterion 
against which maxims can be weighed. This standard must be capable o f yielding 
a conclusive assessment of maxims, which is to say that it must be able to stop 
the regress o f questions about justificatory grounds. In other words, it must equip 
persons to make decisive appraisals of maxims. For example, if the maxim is “I 
will quit smoking” my justification for adopting it may be “Because it is 
expensive”, which meets with the subsequent question “Why should I care about 
money?” If I can figure out why money is important to me — say, because it gives 
me leisure time -  this further justification can also be questioned, and so on 
infinitely. This kind o f infinite regress would be paralyzing. By swamping the 
agent with never-ceasing questions about justification, it would sever practical 
reflection from its action-guiding objective.
37 This argument is given, and explicitly termed “transcendental”, in Ibid., pp. 120-25.
38 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, p. 21.
39 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, p. 101.
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But we cannot escape acting, suggests Korsgaard, which means that we do have 
means o f stopping the regress. Those means are provided by my evaluative self­
conception, understood as the way in which I value myself. Persons do not 
wonder whether to accept a maxim simpliciter; what they need to know is 
whether to accept a maxim given their particular identity. Here, finally, is 
Korsgaard’s answer to the question of what condition normative claims must 
satisfy in order to address persons: they must appeal to their evaluative self­
conception. The real practical question for the smoker is “Should I make it my 
maxim to quit smoking given that I think o f myself as a marathon runner -  or a 
rock star, or a Buddhist, a soldier, or anything else?” That maxim will be 
acceptable to me -  which means that it will become my prima facie  reason -  if it 
is appropriately related to the description under which I value myself: for 
example, since quitting would be beneficial to my stamina. Finally, identity- 
based endorsement o f maxims is conclusive as it leaves no justificatory questions 
to be asked. The answer to the question “Why should I care about my lung 
capacity?” is contained in the standpoint from which I deliberate, that of a 
dedicated athlete.
5.4. Two problems with Korsgaard’s account
Korsgaard’s account of identity-based normativity is bold and ambitious. Not 
only does it show how a certain view o f freedom leaves agents with resources for 
practical deliberation, it also lays the foundation for an agreeable revision o f 
Kant’s moral philosophy. However, that account is not without problems. To 
begin with, Korsgaard espouses what some, including Kant, would regard as an 
unacceptably “psychological” conception o f human freedom. She defines 
freedom with sole reference to the contents of one’s consciousness, as the ability 
of the subject to exert control over his mental states. It is the freedom to will 
what one wants to will. This position is meant to draw on Kant’s idea that we 
must act under the Idea o f freedom since “we cannot possibly conceive of a
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reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements”.40 
However, in Kant, the concept of freedom refers to spontaneity that is absolute, 
and not just relative to one’s psychological states. This is the ability to start a 
new intelligible chain o f events outside the conditions o f space and time, 
achieved by acting on the law o f pure practical reason, or the categorical 
imperative. Without this absolute spontaneity, Kant claims, freedom would be 
“nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, 
also accomplishes its movements of itself.”41
The criticism that Korsgaard’s view of freedom is psychological will not be 
universally accepted. Kant’s own attempts to show that we are free in the 
absolute sense have not met with much approval. In particular, the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism that grounds these attempts has been criticized for being 
too close to the straightforward idealism that it seeks to dislodge. Even with this 
concession, however, Korsgaard’s account o f identity-based cannot be 
considered successfiil. The unsatisfactory aspect of it is Korsgaard’s explanation 
o f how we come to have identities. In the Sources o f  Normativity Korsgaard 
understands identities in a naturalistic way, as unchosen self-descriptions that we 
simply find ourselves having. This can be seen in her claim that one’s reasons 
express one’s “nature”,42 and even more clearly in her admission that her 
argument “grounds normativity in certain natural -  that is, psychological and 
biological -  facts” 43 However, this thread o f naturalism is in tension with a 
central part o f her Kantian outlook, her focus on maxims as the staple o f practical 
reasoning. It is appropriate to think that all action is maxim-based because 
principled action allows freedom. Exacting a maxim that incorporates thirst- 
satisfaction differs from simply responding to the sensation o f thirst. By doing 
the former a person stamps his authorship on his behaviour; doing the latter 
lowers him to the level o f a mere respondent to physiological influences and 
conditioning. By the same token, the claim that identities directly deliver reasons
40 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, III: 101 (448).
41 Ibid.
42 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  N ormativity, p. 101.
43 Ibid., p. 160.
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denies the possibility o f persons having any distance from their contingent 
designations and memberships. What Simon Blackburn intended as a criticism o f 
Korsgaard is then, after all, an accurate description o f her position: we can only 
accept or reject their inclinations on the basis o f yet other inclinations.44 On this 
view, an agent’s identities and not the agent himself determine the grounds of his 
actions.45
In her most recent work Korsgaard appears to give a different account o f how we 
come to have identities, perhaps in an attempt to distance herself from the 
objectionable naturalism of the Sources. She now maintains that persons create 
all o f their identities, as this is their only way of dealing with the “human plight” 
-  the necessity o f choosing that comes with reflexivity. She writes:
We must act, and we need reasons in order to act. And unless 
there are some principles with which we identify we will have no 
reasons to act. Every human being must make himself into 
someone in particular, in order to have reasons to act and to live.
Carving out a personal identity for which we are responsible is 
one of the inescapable tasks o f human life.46
Our identities do not consist in any facts that we must accept, but are generated 
through our self-definition. As Korsgaard writes, “in the relevant sense there is
44 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 252.
45 It can be argued that by espousing this view Korsgaard once again parts company with Kant. 
As Timmerman notes, for Kant “a person’s character is not entirely a matter o f  naturalistic 
formation. Nature herself is thought to be within our control as far as our actions are concerned. 
We are thus fully responsible even for our character; our freedom consists in being able to act on 
maxims that are both firm and rational.” (Jens Timmerman, “Kant’s Puzzling Ethic o f  Maxims,” 
H arvard Philosophy Review  8 (2000): p. 43.) Contrast this with Korsgaard’s statement that “A 
view  o f  what you ought to do is a view  o f  who you are.” (Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Norm ativity, 
p. 117.)
46 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, pp. 23-24, original emphasis.
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no you  prior to your choices and actions, because your identity is in quite a literal 
way constituted by your choices and actions.”47
However the view o f identities as the product o f the necessity o f choice brings 
back the concern about justificatory grounds: what basis do we have for selecting 
some specific identity for ourselves? Note that the question concerns the 
substantive criterion for opting for some particular self-conception over others. 
It is the question o f what can justify our thinking that some distinct and unique 
self-description is more acceptable to us than others. What is needed is an 
explanation o f what gives us reasons to settle upon some specific identity, in 
contrast to indiscriminately plumping fo r any identity. Why choose to regard 
oneself exactly as a “Buddhist” rather than anything else: “chess player”, 
“procrastinator”, “lover”, “samurai”, “smoker”, and so on? This is a question that 
Korsgaard never adequately answers. She comes closest to addressing it in her 
discussion of what she calls the “paradox of self-constitution”.48 This paradox 
states that one cannot constitute oneself unless one already exists; but if  one 
exists, there is no need for self-constitution. Her way out o f the paradox is to 
claim that it rests on a misconception about the practical self as a fixed entity.49 
Instead o f being a finished product, Korsgaard maintains, the self is an ongoing 
project that consists in continuous self-integration -  in continuously choosing 
identities for oneself and living up to the standards they impose. Following a 
long and complicated argument, she then also claims that this ongoing self­
constitution is not lawless, but must conform to Kantian principles of practical 
reason.
Yet this argument still does not answer the question about the grounds for 
choosing particular identities. Even if  it is true that in our efforts to integrate 
ourselves we must obey Kantian principles, those principles do not tell us which 
specific identities to adopt, or why. By Korsgaard’s own admission, “The 
Kantian imperatives are principles that instruct us in how to formulate our
47 Ibid., p. 19, original emphases.
48 Ibid., p. 20.
49 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
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maxims; autonomy and efficacy set standards for the form of our maxims.”50 In 
the context o f self-integration, this point means that these principles govern how 
we should go about choosing our identities, but do not inform us why any 
particular identity is worth choosing. The criteria for individuals’ reasoned 
choice o f their identities still remain unexplained. One may worry whether this 
point is not unfair to Korsgaard, especially given that she thinks that Kantian 
moral imperatives are substantive. The objective o f her revision o f the 
categorical imperative is to establish this very point. I f  the principles o f self­
integration are substantive then perhaps they do warrant choosing some 
particular identities and steering clear o f others. Unfortunately, this defence 
cannot be accepted. As noted earlier, for Korsgaard the moral law is not only 
substantive, it is also in an important sense open-ended. It commands us to adopt 
those maxims that we can all jointly and rationally will given our underlying 
cares and concerns. However it does not specify which those underlying cares 
and concerns must be; it only requires that there must be some. By extension, all 
that the moral law can tell us about choosing our identities is that we ought to 
choose ones that we could all will jointly and rationally. But that norm also 
assumes that we have some identities already. And the question then is, what 
grounds can we have for choosing those?
In sum, even if Korsgaard’s conception of identity can be made compatible with 
her account o f freedom, it does not illuminate the reasoned basis for deciding 
upon specific identities. This shortcoming is evident in Korsgaard’s explanation 
o f what warrants her self-identification as an American:
Someone might say to me: okay, sure, I see that you must do that 
insofar as you identify yourself as an American citizen, but why 
must you take that way o f identifying yourself so seriously? It is 
only an accident that you were born in America. And here part of 
the answer is that I must take some ways o f identifying myself 
seriously, or I won’t have any reasons at all.51
50 Ibid., p. 131, original emphasis.
51 Ibid., p. 24, original emphasis.
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The trouble with Korsgaard’s explanation is that it does not address the issue. 
The question is what justifies her valuing herself under the description 
“American”, not what justifies her valuing herself under some description. Since 
the Kantian principles that supposedly govern the choice o f identities cannot help 
in settling that question either, it must be concluded that she cannot answer it. 
For that reason, Korsgaard’s view of identity should be resisted.
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6. Universality of reasons
6.1. Introduction
My discussion in chapters 3-5 has shown that some o f the most prominent 
current attempts to show that persons’ identities play a part in determining their 
reasons fail. In the rest o f this thesis I will discuss an alternative argument to this 
effect. The concept I have in mind is tied to a particular view o f what reasons are, 
which I attribute to Kant. The justification for adopting this view o f reasons is 
not that it is plausible tout court but that it suitably coheres with, and extends, the 
theoretical framework o f reasons-based justification. Specifically, its strong point 
is that it accommodates the idea of the universality o f reasons, required by the 
project o f reasons-based justification, better than rival accounts o f reasons. I will 
discuss Kant’s understanding o f reasons in this chapter, and the novel conception 
o f identity that can be derived from it in the next chapter.
As I discussed in chapter 1, in reasons-based liberal theories reasons are 
understood in the normative sense, as considerations that count in favour of 
doing something. From this perspective, when we ask about someone’s reasons 
for doing something we are asking about what makes that action sensible or 
worth doing -  we are asking about the justification for his behaviour, not an 
explanation of why he acted as he did. A shipwreck survivor’s act of drinking 
saltwater can be explained by describing his distressed psychological state -  by 
saying, for example, that this desperate act is a result o f his prolonged solitude 
and a lack o f hope in rescue. But we may still want to now whether there was 
anything about his situation that made the choice to drink saltwater the proper 
one in the circumstances. This is the question about normative reasons.
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The reason-based justification o f political principles is that citizens have reason 
to accept certain normative principles. An important aspect o f this justification is 
the breadth o f its scope. It does not single out, or discriminate against, any 
specific persons: all citizens, rather than just some particular ones, are meant to 
have reason to endorse the relevant norms. This has a direct implication for the 
kind o f reason, or reasons, that can be given in support of political principles. 
Since they have to hold for all citizens, they cannot be particular in the sense of 
being valid only for some specified citizen or group o f citizens. Rather, they 
must have universal validity.1 However, it should be noted that contemporary 
liberals commonly understand reasons-universality with reference to the 
members o f a bounded political society, rather than humanity at large. The liberal 
requirement is typically not that reasons behind political norms must be strictly 
universal, in the sense o f having absolutely no restriction o f scope. They must 
apply to all members o f the political society, not to all persons without 
qualification. One way o f showing that they are valid for all citizens is indeed to 
show that they are valid for all persons, but this is not an argumentative route that 
liberals must, or typically do, take. More commonly, the universality they require 
o f public reasons is confined to the domain of the relevant citizen body. For 
example, Rawls notes that “the correct regulative principle for anything depends 
on the nature o f that thing.”2 Since the “thing” that his principles of justice aim to 
govern is a determinate society that regards persons as free and equal, and not the 
world, their justification needs to be valid only for all members of that society.
I will begin this chapter by examining two ways in which contemporary liberals 
aim to achieve the universality o f reasons that support their normative
1 It is in light o f  this condition o f  universality that Rawls requires o f  principles o f  justice to be 
“general”, in the sense that “it must be possible to formulate them without the use o f  what would 
be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions. Thus the predicates 
used in their statement should express general properties and relations.” (Rawls, A Theory o f  
Justice, p. 131.)
2 Ibid., p. 25. For an interesting argument that criticizes attempts to extend liberal accounts o f  
justice to the global domain based on this Rawls’s principle see Thomas Nagel, “The Problem o f  
Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005).
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principles.3 One of them, associated with Rawls and O’Neill, is to purge these 
reasons o f partiality. The other, espoused by Scanlon and Nagel, is to define 
reason-judgements in such a way that all reason-judgements are necessarily 
universal. I will then turn to Kant’s account of reasons-universality, which will 
serve as the basis for the transcendental concept o f practical identity to be 
developed in the next chapter.
6.2. Impartiality and universality
One liberal approach to reasons-universality starts from the assumption that non- 
empirical speculation offers no satisfactory way of arriving at universal 
justifications. This conviction is exemplified by Rawls, when he remarks that 
“The analysis o f moral concepts and the a priori, however traditionally 
understood, is too slender a basis. Moral theory must be free to use contingent 
assumptions and general facts as it pleases.”4 As he suggests in his discussion of 
Kant, prescriptions that would arise from such pure enquiry would be “purely 
transcendent and lacking explicable connections with human conduct” .5 In order 
for a normative theory to be “realistic”, it needs to “ start from men as they are”.6 
A consequence o f this repudiation o f non-empirical metaphysics is that universal 
justifications cannot be derived from a pure enquiry into the concept o f reasons- 
universality. Rather, the initial point in devising such justifications must be 
partial reasons that favour the interests and projects of individuals whose reasons 
they are. As will be seen shortly, there is a connection between partial and 
particular reasons, in light of which a move towards impartiality can be regarded 
as a move towards universality. This move towards impartiality is made, and 
universal justification “constructed”, through imposing a set o f carefully selected
3 In the further text I will use “universal” to refer to reasons valid for all members o f  the relevant 
society, and the term “particular” to refer to reasons that are valid for any individual or group o f  
individuals short o f  the whole citizen body.
4 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 51.
5 Ibid., p. 256.
6 John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.
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constraints on individuals’ reasons. The expected outcome is a suitably universal 
conception o f justice that is nonetheless sufficiently realistic.
Before explaining how partiality and particularity may be connected, it is first 
necessary to distinguish them. The notion o f particularity says something about 
fo r  whom reasons justify certain actions, whereas the notion of partiality says 
something about how reasons justify certain actions. So, a reason is particular if 
it is valid only for some person or persons. A reason is, on the other hand, partial 
if it justifies the pursuit o f certain interests and concerns at least partly on the 
basis o f their being the interests and concerns o f some particular person or 
persons. For instance, it is constitutive o f friendship that friends not only put the 
interests o f their mutual relationship before their relations with strangers, they do 
so at least partly because the friendship is theirs, not because it has cosmic 
significance or value. Such (partly) subjective grounding o f not only this, but 
various other reasons -  to care for one’s parents more than for other elderly 
people, to cheer for one’s own country in the football World Cup, to send more 
help to one’s compatriots in the wake of an earthquake than to other victims -  is 
not usually found objectionable. A person’s entirely contingent relations to other 
people and things are thought to play a legitimate part in determining his reasons. 
Moreover, it is thought that these contingent relations can sometimes fully 
determine a person’s reasons without help from further, less subjective 
considerations. This is one o f the points that Bernard Williams makes in his 
discussion o f the husband deciding whether to save his life from deathly peril.7 
The thought that it is his wife that is in danger, Williams argues, is enough to 
make it sensible for the husband to rescue her. No additional, bias-free principles 
or facts (such as, for example, that one ought to help drowning people generally) 
are needed for him to have this reason.
Since partiality and particularity refer to different aspects o f reasons, it is not 
conceptually necessary for partial reasons to be particular. The way in which 
these two notions are defined leaves open the possibility o f reasons that contain
7 Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” in M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 17-18.
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an irreducibly subjective component but are nonetheless universally valid. 
However, contemporary liberals are committed to a further principle that closes 
this possibility. According to this principle, a part o f what makes political 
justifications valid for all citizens is that they are acceptable to all citizens. 
Universal acceptability is a necessary condition o f the universality of reasons, 
and any justification that could not be endorsed by all members of the society 
does not really apply to them.
The source o f the demand for universal acceptability o f political justifications is 
what may be termed the perspectival approach to reasons, according to which 
reasons are to be defined starting from the first-person perspective of reasoning 
agents. The claim here is that a person cannot have a reason to do something 
without having some appropriate conscious state: for example, unless he has 
some desire and a belief about how to satisfy that desire, or unless he has 
internalized a principle that warrants acting in that particular way. Facts or 
considerations play a part in determining his reasons but they do so indirectly, by 
eliciting some appropriate conscious states in him. It is in virtue of the person’s 
states o f this sort that he has what can be called his reasons. Without this 
grounding in the person’s own point of view, so the argument goes, his reasons 
would be implausibly detached from him. Jeremy Waldron expresses the point 
well when he says that
intelligible justifications in social and political life must be 
available in principle for everyone, for society is to be understood 
by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense of a 
community... If  there is some individual to whom a justification 
cannot be given, then so far as he is concerned the social order 
had better be replaced by other arrangements, for the status quo 
has made out no claim to his allegiance.8
8 Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations o f  Liberalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 
147 (1987): p. 135, original emphases.
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A political justification that does not make a claim to some citizens’ allegiance is 
problematic in light o f the link between justified norms and constraints on 
individuals’ freedom. The link is that if  there is a valid universal reason for 
adopting certain principles o f political organization, then there is also a reason 
for enforcing those principles. As we saw in chapter 3, Barry argues that to limit 
a person’s freedom on the basis of reasons that he cannot accept is to coerce him. 
It is to constrain the person’s choices illegitimately, without a basis in his 
(possible) consent. It then follows that if  state actions are to be more than bare 
coercion, they must be rooted in reasons that are acceptable to all citizens. The 
demand for universal acceptability can thus be regarded as a legitimacy-based 
constraint on what kind o f justifications can be admitted as publicly normative 
reasons.9 Individuals may, and most often do, appeal to justifications that fall 
short o f this standard in their private, everyday lives. However, in matters that 
involve the exercise of state power such justifications are improper.
The requirement o f universal acceptability precludes partial reasons from having 
universal validity. A justification that is not only given from some person’s 
standpoint but also essentially bound to that standpoint will have trouble 
persuading those who occupy other standpoints. Suppose that a person X 
proposes a conception in which justice consists o f promoting certain human 
interests, but justifies that conception on the basis that these interests are 
important to him . This justification is partial because it gives preference to X’s 
own point o f view for no other reason than that point o f view is his. This 
reasoning will be insufficiently compelling to others, who inhabit other points of 
view and may not see any special significance in the fact that some interest is 
important to X. For some persons, like X’s friends and family, this fact may 
indeed be especially significant, and for them X ’s reasoning will be acceptable. 
As an extension of their affection for X, they will be prepared to think that X’s 
concerns, merely in virtue of being his, are worth promoting. However it cannot
9 The liberal criterion o f  legitimacy, as Rawls calls it, allows only those uses o f  state power that 
are “in accordance with a constitution the essentials o f  which all citizens may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light o f  principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational.” (Rawls, P olitical Liberalism, p. 217.)
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be expected that this affection for X will be shared by all citizens, or that those 
who do not share it will see anything especially valuable in X’s point of view. 
The same, as we saw in the earlier discussion o f Barry, holds for justifying the 
public protection of a cultural practice by saying simply “It is a part o f my 
culture”. In both cases, partial reasons leave some citizens unengaged.
In order to be publicly acceptable reasons need to be impartial, which means that 
they must justify certain actions without privileging the position or point o f view 
o f any particular persons. This is not to say that impartial reasons cannot include 
a reference to some particular person or persons. However, the justification that 
includes that reference must not rely on the special status o f any specific 
individual. For example, one can have an impartial reason to support one’s 
national football team: that it plays the most beautiful football. That reason picks 
out a specific national team as worth supporting, but nonetheless remains 
impartial because it justifies its selection by a principle that does not favour any 
team, but the beautiful game itself. Similarly, one can advocate the public 
recognition of one’s own cultural practices on impartial grounds. As I suggested 
in chapter 3, one can claim that the self-respect of all individuals depends on the 
survival and flourishing o f their culture. This claim would then warrant 
protecting any given person’s particular culture, but on the basis of a principle 
that does not privilege any culture over others.
Rawls’s defence of his two principles o f justice in A Theory o f  Justice is a good 
example o f the liberal striving to purge political justifications of partiality. He 
attempts to ensure the impartial grounding for his norms at two levels: at the 
level o f the design of the original position, and at the higher-order level of 
achieving reflective equilibrium. At the former level, Rawls presents his two 
principles o f justice as the outcome of rational choice, in which each party is 
interested in maximizing his own interests. The tendency o f the parties to 
privilege certain projects and attachments just because they are theirs is assumed. 
However, Rawls expunges this element o f partiality by radically restricting the 
range o f information available to the contractors. The veil o f ignorance, brought 
down upon the contractors, “excludes the knowledge of those contingencies that
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set men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices”.10 Its function 
is to “nullify the effects o f specific contingencies which... tempt them to exploit 
social and natural circumstances to their own advantage”11 In other words, it can 
be said that the veil disables the parties’ tendency toward favouring their own 
projects by depriving them o f any knowledge o f what interests and concerns 
really are theirs. Without this necessary condition of partiality, the parties are 
forced to choose without special regard for their own point o f view. As a result, 
reasons that guide each contractor are not valid only for him, but for all members 
o f the society.
At the level o f the reflective equilibrium, the impartiality o f Rawls’s justification 
is ensured by the way in which he understands considered convictions about 
justice. To recall, Rawls thinks that principles yielded by the original position 
must be set against the citizens’ stable pre-theoretical judgements about what is 
just. The ultimate justification o f his two principles is that they cohere with such 
judgements, where the coherence is understood in the “Socratic” way. This 
means that the principles and the considered convictions influence each other, 
and each element is open to revision in light o f the other until agreement between 
them is reached. What is important in this context is that the content o f pre- 
theoretical judgements about justice is not entirely undetermined, since they 
embody the requirement o f impartiality. They represent our best current (albeit 
intuitive) understanding o f what would be just from an impartial standpoint.12 
The original position and considered convictions thus equally aim at answering 
what would be impartially just. This is why Rawls can say that justice as fairness 
is “the hypothesis that the principles which would be chosen in the original 
position are identical with those that match our considered judgments and so
10 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 17.
11 Ibid., p. 118.
12 As Peri Roberts notes, “We can think o f  our considered convictions as those in which w e are 
currently most confident o f  their objectivity. If w e regarded them as obviously wrong or as 
merely selfish or biased, then we would not find them convincing. This does not mean that they 
directly express moral facts or principles but rather that they are those we currently think are best 
justified and could therefore underpin reasons for everyone.” (Roberts, P olitical Constructivism,
p. 28.)
137
1 ^these principles describe our sense of justice.” Since discrepancies between 
principles and pre-theoretical judgements will inevitably exist, both elements will 
have to be modified in search for the reflective equilibrium.
What guarantees the universality of Rawls’s justification is that it is the closest 
we can come, given the most plausible theory o f justice and our stable intuitions 
about justice, to an impartial conception o f justice. However, there are several 
problems with this claim. One is that our best effort at devising an impartial 
justification still does not amount to an impartial justification. This point is not at 
all trivial. The idea behind providing a reason to accept a certain conception of 
justice is that all citizens are supposed to have that reason. If  it cannot be shown 
with certainty that the best justification that can be produced really does apply to 
all citizens, the whole enterprise is under threat. And Rawls really does not show 
that about his reasoning. To call a justification our best shot at an impartial 
conception is to concede the possibility that the justification is not impartial after 
all -  or, by extension, universal. With this concession, the reason-based approach 
to justification fails to live up to its own standards o f validity. It strives to ground 
a conception o f justice in reasons that hold for all citizens, but delivers only a 
conception for which we cannot be sure whether it is grounded in reasons that 
hold for all. That this conception represents our best effort at impartiality is 
beside the point. Even if it is the best effort that we can muster, trying one’s best 
is no guarantee o f success: the impartial perspective may still be beyond us, and 
that is what matters. And the same is true if  the elimination o f partiality is the 
only viable method o f justification, as Rawls suggests in the wake o f his critique 
of “empty” metaphysical speculation. The point is still that we cannot be sure 
that Rawls’s approach really does eliminate partiality.
But the main failing of Rawls’s approach to universality lies deeper, in the 
implausible idea that to ensure the impartiality o f a political justification is to 
ensure its universality. To prevent misunderstanding, I am not suggesting that 
impartiality is not enough for universality, as if  something more is needed from 
an impartial reason to make it universal. Rather, my point is a conceptual one. It
13 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 48.
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starts from the thought, mentioned earlier, that the notions o f impartiality and 
universality are distinct, where one refers to the method o f justification and the 
other to its scope. Striving for impartiality therefore yields one class of reasons 
(those derived in a certain way), and striving for universality yields another class 
o f reasons (those with a certain scope). Now, my point is that there are no logical 
grounds for thinking that these two classes necessarily coincide. What gives the 
false impression that they do is the negative relation between partiality and 
universality: the fact that partial reasons cannot have universal validity because 
they cannot be accepted by all citizens. On account o f the requirement of 
acceptability, the class o f partial reasons falls outside the class o f universal 
reasons. But it does not follow from this fact that all impartial reasons fall within 
the class o f universal reasons, or that there is an exact correspondence between 
the two classes. Logic leaves open the possibility that reasons that do not 
privilege anyone’s point of view nonetheless do not hold for all. Therefore, 
fixing the partiality o f political justification, in the way that Rawls does, is 
inadequate for ensuring its universality.
6.3. Universality of reason-judgements
The second approach to reasons-universality, exemplified by Thomas Scanlon, 
concentrates on what it is to make a judgement about reasons, or to “take 
something as a reason”. A necessary feature of such judgements, argues Scanlon, 
is universality o f scope, so that one cannot take a consideration to count as a 
reason for him only. He must concede that his judgement expresses a claim that 
applies for everyone. Reasons are “the sort o f things, picked out by ‘that’ clauses, 
that are the contents o f beliefs”,14 where these “that” clauses can be true or false. 
For instance, I may be correct or incorrect in thinking that I have reason to buy 
new running shoes. Whether or not I am correct in so thinking, the same will 
hold for all reasoners, so that if  I have reason to buy shoes in my circumstances 
then so would everyone else, and if  I do not then no-one else would. By 
proclaiming something to be a reason we are thus referring to a domain that is
14 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 56.
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independent o f our judgement, and that exists equally for all reasoners. 
According to Scanlon, we do not need to appeal to mysterious metaphysical 
entities or natural facts to account for this domain. The possibility of ascribing 
truth-value to reason-judgements is enough to convince us o f the existence o f an 
objective practical reality. This claim makes Scanlon’s approach to universality 
rather different from Rawls’s. For Rawls, as we saw, universality must be 
constructed from reasons that are initially particular (because they are partial). In 
Scanlon, by contrast, universality is presumed at the outset: any claim about what 
there is reason to do is a claim about what anyone would have reason to do in 
relevantly similar circumstances.
In order to appreciate Scanlon’s position, it is necessary to notice that the thesis 
o f universality refers to reason-judgements, not to reasons themselves. Although 
Scanlon defines reasons merely as considerations that count in favour o f acting, 
it is clear that these considerations have at least something to do with natural 
facts. For example, as he notes in relation to one’s reason for buying a pink hat, 
“what is relevant is something about the hat, not about my state o f mind”.15 It 
appears therefore that Scanlon does not subscribe to the perspectival view of 
reasons, which we saw characterizes Rawls. However, Scanlon also advances 
another claim that restores the first-personal element o f practical reasoning, the 
claim that we never act on reasons themselves but only on what we take to be 
reasons. To understand this point, consider again the shipwreck survivor scenario 
from the beginning of this chapter. What consideration can justify his drinking 
saltwater (as opposed to explaining what caused the movements o f his body)? 
One such consideration may be that the island he is stranded on is controlled by 
vicious and sadistic bandits, who threaten to kill him unless he drinks saltwater. 
For Scanlon, the survivor’s reason for obeying is then given by this fact about his 
circumstances, a fact about the world that is independent o f his perspective on 
the world. This is his real reason.
15 Ibid.
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However, the survivor can only act on what he understands to be his reason: on 
what Scanlon calls his operative reason.16 This distinction between real reasons 
and operative reasons, between what is sensible for an agent to do and what the 
agent believes is sensible for him to do, makes possible a discrepancy. Suppose 
that what our survivor thought were guns in the hands o f the bandits were 
actually water guns. If  so, his decision to drink saltwater in order to preserve 
himself was not backed by a reason -  simply because the toys did not endanger 
his life. He was mistaken about his reasons, and should not have engaged in the 
behaviour that he did. Otherwise put, his operative reason failed to correspond to 
his real reason, which was to desist. A person’s operative reasons thus fit the bill 
o f reasons only inasmuch as they reflect the reality that is outside his mind. The 
possibility o f a gap between what a person regards as sensible and what is 
sensible from outside his perspective nonetheless remains. On the one hand, this 
gap appears easily explicable: it is a simple and unremarkable consequence of 
flawed perception o f the physical reality. Our survivor yielded to bandits waving 
guns; but had he looked better he would have realized that they are really toys. 
On the other hand, however, the gap is problematic because it is not clear how 
subjective representations can connect with real reasons. The question is, how 
can individuals’ judgements about reasons be the sort of thing that reflect real 
reasons? How is it that first-personal practical reasoning can be about the world 
rather than being about the subject?
Scanlon’s resolves this problem with a special understanding of subjective 
judgements about reasons. If  Scanlon were to admit just any evaluative attitudes 
into the class o f reason-judgments, then the relation between reason-judgments 
and the world would be obscure. Spurious reason-judgements that are 
unsubstantiated by anything in the real world would then be entirely possible. 
For example, Jane could then decide that helping her neighbour to shovel snow 
off his driveway is warranted by the fact that Magellan first circumnavigated the 
Earth. This justifications is clearly ludicrous, but Scanlon wishes to be able to 
explain why it is ludicrous. His explanation comes down to an especially 
qualified definition o f reason-judgments: they are not any evaluative attitudes but
16 Ibid., p. 19.
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attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to have 
whenever that person judged there to be sufficient reasons for 
them and that would, in an ideally rational person, “extinguish” 
when that person judged them not to be supported by reasons of 
the appropriate kind.17
The view that Magellan’s voyage justifies helping out a snowed-under neighbour 
would not be held by an ideally rational person. The restrictive definition of 
reason-judgments thus rules out judgements that do not aim at the real world. 
Subjective views o f reasons are just representations o f the perspective of the 
ideally rational person: they are “concerned with what an individual takes to be 
reasons in this primary sense”.18
Furthermore, this definition o f reason-judgements also grounds Scanlon’s claim 
that reasons-judgements are universal. Returning to the snow-shovelling 
example, let G signify the set o f facts in virtue o f which Jane takes herself to 
have reason to help her neighbour. According to Scanlon, accepting that G 
warrants helping the neighbour commits Jane to accepting that anyone presented 
with G has a reason to help a neighbour in need.19 To put it differently, Scanlon 
thinks that Jane holds the judgement that she should help her neighbour because 
a certain abstract condition is satisfied. For example, that condition may be that 
her neighbour is an elderly person that cannot maintain his house on his own. 
Scanlon’s claim is that if Jane affirms that her neighbour’s falling under this 
description gives her a reason to help him, she is then also affirming that anyone 
falling under it is entitled to help. The abstract condition grounds a reason- 
judgement whenever it is met. Whenever we make judgments about our own, we 
thus consider what an ideally rational person would have reason to do. As a 
result, “there is fundamentally no question o f why we should be concerned with
17 Ibid., p. 20.
18 Ibid., p. 19.
19 Ibid., p. 73.
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the reasons that other people have.”20 The universality o f reason judgements is a 
straightforward “formal consequence”21 o f the way in which Scanlon defines 
reason judgements.
Scanlon’s idea of the universality of reason-judgements is conceptually tied to 
his view o f how persons deliberate -  that is, how they form opinions about their 
reasons. One might object that this view is phenomenologically misguided. It 
states that when deliberating what to do, we ask ourselves what an ideal reasoner 
would regard as sensible in our circumstances. However, this looks like an 
implausible picture of what happens when persons deliberate. Persons do not 
make up their minds by second-guessing, as it were, the perspective o f the 
ideally rational agent. They wonder about what they, situated as they are, should 
do. They do not try to jump out o f their skins and place themselves in the shoes 
o f the all-seeing observer. In other words, our reasons are not what remains after 
we correct our views for perspectival error. The perspective that would be so 
filtered out is the only practical perspective we can have. So, it would have been 
pointless for the survivor from the example above to wonder whether or not 
complying with the threats would make sense from some external standpoint that 
takes all the relevant facts into account. That is not, and cannot be, his 
standpoint, and so is irrelevant to him. He had to decide “from the inside”, 
judging by the facts that he could access.
I appreciate that some will not find the criticism from the phenomenology of 
practical deliberation persuasive. The thought that persons form judgements 
about their reasons by transcending their own perspective is a well-reputed one, 
and may be difficult to resist.22 However, Scanlon’s view of how persons 
deliberate, which grounds his account o f universality, is also liable to another, 
less controversial objection. That objection is internal to the context o f the
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 74.
22 For example, it is advocated by Thomas Nagel in numerous works including Thomas Nagel, 
The Possibility o f  Altruism  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).; and Thomas Nagel, The View from  
Nowhere (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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reasons-based approach to justification, and states that Scanlon’s account defeats 
the purpose o f offering other persons reasons to accept normative principles. The 
source of the problem lies in Scanlon’s preoccupation with reason-judgements at 
the expense of reasons themselves. His claim, which sets him apart from Rawls, 
is that we do not act on reasons but on what seem to us as reasons. Initially, this 
shift o f focus appears appealing because it allows Scanlon to defend universality 
in the sphere o f practical reasoning, while accommodating the diversity of 
individuals’ circumstances. People find themselves in various contexts and 
therefore have different reasons; yet their claims about their own reasons have 
universal validity.
However, maintaining that practical deliberation deals with what seem to be 
reasons, rather than reasons themselves, has an important consequence. It 
commits Scanlon to denying that reason-judgements arp in themselves action- 
guiding. He concedes as much when he divides the activity o f practical reasoning 
into three successive stages: seeming, assessing, and opting.23 At the first of 
these stages, individuals are confronted with considerations that appear to them 
to be reasons. The person then needs to determine, in the stage of assessing, 
whether he accepts to take them as reasons. Finally, he still has to decide, or opt, 
to act on the consideration he takes as reason-giving. A striking fact about this 
three-stage sequence is that taking something as a reason is not enough to move 
an agent to action. On this view, as Watson usefully puts it,
practical deliberation involves making up my mind twice. Making 
up my mind about what is best to do is coming to a judgement: 
deciding that such and such is the thing to do. Making up my 
mind about what to do is forming an intention: deciding to do 
such and such.24
23 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Reasons and Passions,” in The Contours o f  Agency, ed. Lee Overton and 
Sarah Buss (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), p. 169.
24 Gary Watson, “The Work o f  the W ill,” in Weakness o f  Will and Practical Irrationality, ed. 
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 176, original emphases. 
Wallace similarly remarks: “The question o f  what action we are going to perform is not
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It is difficult to see how Scanlon could argue anything else than that reason- 
judgements do not issue in action. To recall, he thinks that we form reason- 
judgements by asking whether or not a consideration would be regarded as a 
reason by an ideally rational agent. Even if  the answer is affirmative, it is still 
only a statement o f fact: the fact that our subjective opinion conforms with the 
ideally rational perspective. Something extra needs to be postulated to explain 
how reasoning translates into doing. For Scanlon, that something extra is a 
further act o f the will, a decision on the part o f the agent to be guided by the 
consideration he can accept as a reason. Now, the troubling aspect o f this further 
decision is that it cannot be made in the same way as the prior decision (that a 
consideration can be taken as a reason).25 The criterion o f the ideally rational 
perspective has already been applied, and the consideration has passed it. It is not 
altogether clear what criterion guides “opting”. What can be said is that 
Scanlon’s view undermines a key aspect of the reasons-based approach to 
justification: its ambition to get people to accept a certain normative conception. 
Surely, the point o f showing that some principles o f justice have a valid 
grounding is for people to embrace them. Its intended aim, in Watson’s terms, is 
a decision to act in accordance with those principles, not a decision that acting in 
accordance with them is the thing to do. However, on Scanlon’s view this aim 
cannot be achieved. The “decision to” must be based on reasons that are distinct 
from the grounds for the “decision that” -  reasons that are, moreover, quite 
unclear. All this would make the reasons-based approach to justification radically 
incomplete. Hence, the underlying conceptions o f practical deliberation and 
universality must, from the standpoint o f that approach, be deemed unacceptable.
necessarily answered by our having determined to our own satisfaction what it would be best to 
do.” (R. Jay Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” in N ormativity and  
the Will: Selected Papers on M oral Psychology and Practical Reason  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006), p. 94.)
25 In Albritton’s poignant formulation, “It isn’t for reasons, in the end, that we act for reasons.” 
(Rogers Albritton, “Freedom o f  Will and Freedom o f  Action,” Proceedings and Addresses o f  the 
American Philosophical Association  59, no. 2 (1985): p. 248, original emphasis.)
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6.4. Practical universality in Kant
Rawls’s and Scanlon’s treatment o f practical universality are, for different 
reasons, unsuited to the enterprise of reasons-based justification. Rawls’s 
approach fails to show that his putatively impartial principles also have universal 
scope. Scanlon’s account, on the other hand, is unacceptable because it renders 
the reasons-based justifications radically incomplete. I would like to suggest that 
Kant’s conception of reasons-universality succeeds where the discussed views 
fail: in explaining how it is possible to offer universally valid reasons to accept 
certain normative principles. This will require a detailed investigation into Kant’s 
view o f reasons, which departs some way from most current treatments of 
reasons. I will not try to argue that this view o f reasons is the most convincing 
without qualification -  only that it allows a plausible conception o f reasons- 
universality, required for the project o f reasons-based justification. As such, it 
provides a plausible platform for devising a reasons-based account o f identity, 
which is a task I will take up in the next chapter.
One obstacle in investigating practical universality in Kant is that Kant does not 
use the terminology of “reasons”. It is therefore important to identify which 
concept plays a role comparable to that of “reasons” in his philosophical system. 
On a well-established interpretation, for Kant a person’s reasons are given by his 
maxims. More precisely, reasons are maxims that the person endorses in 
accordance with certain “objective” second-order requirements, but they are 
maxims nonetheless. Barbara Herman thus writes:
In the most basic kind of voluntary action, a rational agent 
determines a course o f action appropriate to promote or bring 
about a state o f affairs she has adopted as an end. In so acting we 
say the agent acts for reasons; Kant says the agent has a maxim of 
action.26
26 Barbara Herman, “Leaving Deontology Behind,” in The Practice o f  M oral Judgment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 217.
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For Rawls, a Kantian maxim “reflects the agent’s actual reasons (as the agent 
would truthfully describe them) for the intended action.”27 Rudiger Bittner 
clearly has maxims in mind when he states that in Kant “a reason for which one 
does something is a principle on which one acts. Thus it says that reason and 
action are so related that the latter is a case of the agent’s complying with the 
former.”28 Noell Birondo similarly remarks that the standard interpretation has it 
that “the concept Kant employs when he appeals to the notion o f a maxim is 
precisely the concept o f an agent’s reason for action.”29 I would like to argue 
against the standard reading that identifies reasons as maxims selected in 
accordance with certain second-order requirements. An alternative understanding 
of reasons in Kant that I will propose explains, unlike the standard reading, how 
reasons can be universal.
The issue can be approached by supplementing the remarks on Kant’s view of 
agency that were given in chapter 5. There I discussed an influential 
interpretation -  endorsed by Allison and Korsgaard, among others -  of Kant on 
practical agency. On that interpretation, Kant takes rational agency to consist in 
an agent’s incorporating their inclinations into their own principles o f acting, or 
maxims. This reading begins with the observation that for Kant an inclination or 
desire is insufficient to count as reason giving.30 Desires rationally 
under determine action because for any o f our desires we may ask whether it is 
worth satisfying. This is what Korsgaard and Frankfurt refer to as the reflexivity 
o f our consciousness. Now, the question about the worth o f a desire cannot be
27 John Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in K ant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. 
Eckart Forster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 83.
28 Rudiger Bittner, D oing Things fo r  Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 43.
29 N oell Birondo, “Kantian Reasons for Reasons,” Ratio  2 0 ,  no. 3 (2007): p. 266. Richard 
McCarty notes that “Most English-language interpreters o f  Kant’s moral theory regard maxims as 
principles or policies expressing the reasons upon which rational agents act.” (Richard McCarty, 
“Maxims in Kant’s Practical Philosophy,” Journal o f  the H istory o f  Philosophy 44, no. 1 (2006): 
p. 65.) For Roger Sullivan, “an agent’s maxim normally could be stated by that agent i f  he or she 
were asked to set out the reason for acting in a particular way.” (Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel 
K a n t’s M oral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 28.)
30 Allison, K ant's Theory o f  Freedom, p. 40.
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answered by stating something about that desire because our reasoning takes the 
form of judgements. One may not, for instance, decide whether to yield to one’s 
desire for a vacation solely by considering that it overpowers all other desires. 
Citing the strength o f the desire already traces the grounds for its-satisfaction to 
something outside the desire -  something like the intrinsic goodness of 
overpowering desires, or a principle that one should always act on one’s 
strongest desire. Also, the question about the worth o f a desire cannot be 
answered by stating something about other desires, because satisfying those 
needs to be justified as well. However, argues Allison, Kant’s system allows 
inclinations to become reasons for acting. They do so “with reference to a rule or 
principle of action, which dictates that we ought to pursue the satisfaction o f that 
inclination or desire.”31 And that rule or principle o f action, as Allison suggests, 
is an agent’s self-imposed maxim.32
This view o f practical deliberation, as we saw, has the considerable merit o f 
allowing room for the agent’s freedom. It offers a picture of persons free of the 
grip o f their desires, no matter how strong that grip is, by the creation o f their 
own maxims. They thus become self-governing, a law unto themselves, 
regardless o f their affection by sensuous motives.33 However, the presence of an 
agent’s maxim that calls for (p-m% is only a necessary condition o f the agent 
having a reason to <p. Having that maxim is not enough to give the person a 
reason to (p\ as Kant says in various places, practical principles are not “mere 
maxims”.34 What he means is that the activity o f practical deliberation is 
governed not only by individual’s maxims, but also by certain requirements that 
have their basis outside his perspective. For Kant, thus, practical reasoning is 
guided by two kinds o f principles, distinguishable by the different grounds of 
their validity. On the one hand there are maxims, which are subjective in that the 
basis for their validity is the individual’s own choice. That is to say, a person’s
31 Ibid.
32 See especially Ibid., p. 86.
33 A s Allison puts it, practical reason creates an “order o f  ends or ought-to-bes”; and it is 
spontaneous in so doing because by framing it in terms o f  maxims “it goes beyond what is 
dictated by the sensible data”. (Ibid., p. 40.)
34 See for example Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 19, p. 17.
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maxims govern his deliberation because he imposes them upon himself. On the 
other hand there are principles that also apply to his reasoning but are objective, 
in that the basis for their validity is independent o f his choosing. They govern his 
deliberation regardless o f his decision or, more generally, o f his perspective. 
Kant writes:
A maxim is a subjective principle o f action and must be 
distinguished from an objective principle -  namely, a practical 
law. The former contains a practical rule determined by reason in 
accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance 
or again his inclinations): it is thus a principle on which the 
subject acts. A law, on the other hand, is an objective principle 
valid for every rational being; and it is a principle on which he 
ought to act -  that is, an imperative.35
The idea o f objective principles o f practical deliberation can be explained by 
noting that, for Kant, all practical deliberation is done “under the guise of 
good” .36 This means that maxims are sanctioned or rejected in view of their 
goodness: “we will nothing under the direction o f reason except insofar as we 
hold it to be good or evil”.37 For this to be possible, it is necessary to have 
standards for making determinations about the goodness o f maxims. Crucially, 
these standards for assessing the goodness of maxims cannot themselves be 
(higher-order) maxims. The reason for this is that as Kant explains, maxims do 
not have the required fixity to serve as any kind o f standard.38 The precepts we 
make to determine our conduct may be comprehensive and versatile, and our
35 Kant, G roundwork o f  the Metaphysic o f  M orals, II: 51 (421), original emphases.
36 The phrase is borrowed from J. David Velleman. (J. David Velleman, “The Guise o f  the 
Good,” Nous 26, no. 1 (1992).)
37 Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 60, p. 52.
38 “[T]he principles that one makes for oneself are not yet laws to which one is unavoidably 
subject, because reason, in the practical, has to do with the subject, namely with his faculty o f  
desire, which by its special constitution can make various adjustments to the rule.” (Ibid., 5: 20, 
pp. 17-18.)
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commitment to them may be deep, but none of this guarantees that we will not * 
break them. They are vulnerable to the vagaries o f our moods, the appeal o f other 
projects, our forgetfulness or carelessness, weakness o f the will, and so on. We 
can never truly bind ourselves to our own laws, as we imagine that an apple is 
bound to obey the law of gravity. Since there is always the possibility of 
deviating from a self-imposed principle, criteria for maxim-selection must be 
independent of my making. For example, if  there is a reason for me to go on 
holidays this December, this cannot be the outcome o f my undertaking to only 
take vacations in December, joined with my desire for time off this year. A part 
o f my reason -  the part that explains the goodness of my holidaying this year -  
must be some principle that I have not made for myself, a principle under which 
my maxim falls stably and reliably. This principle is the objective ground of my 
practical reasoning.
Kant goes on to make an even stronger point. Not only must my maxims fall 
under objective evaluative principles stably and reliably, they must do so 
necessarily: “Every practical law represents a possible action as good and 
therefore as necessary for a subject whose actions are determined by reason.”39 
In other words, if I deem one o f my maxims as worth pursuing, it must be 
impossible for me to deem it not worth pursuing. There is no room for ambiguity 
when it comes to assessing maxims: I can only call a maxim good if, in my 
situation, it must be called good and nothing else. This looks like a forbiddingly 
rigoristic view o f practical reasoning, but it is not. It ties in well with the 
commonplace idea that if  I think that my circumstances give me a reason to do 
something, then I am not free to also think that those same circumstances do not 
give me that reason. They either do or they do not, but not both. O f course, I can 
come to see my situation differently, which may lead me to conclude that I was 
initially mistaken about my reasons. But this is not tantamount to claiming that 
something both is and is not a reason. It is just a sign that I have discovered new 
facts, which warrant a different judgement about my reasons. Had my situation, 
or my perception o f it, remained the same, my reason would necessarily have 
stayed the same, too.
39 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, H: 39-40 (414), emphasis added.
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According to Kant, the only evaluative principles that maxims can fall under 
necessarily are rules o f  reason, which include rules o f skill, those o f prudence, 
and those of pure reason.40 Unlike with self-imposed evaluative principles, if a 
maxim satisfies any o f these rules, it is impossible to conceive o f it not being 
good. Rules of reason necessarily govern the goodness o f maxims.41 However, 
this necessary relationship between rules and maxims comes in two sorts. In 
rules o f skill and o f prudence this relationship is necessary a posteriori, which 
means that the necessary connection depends on practical experience -  
specifically, the presence of an agent’s ends. Both types of rules specify the 
rationally correct way o f pursuing ends. Rules o f skill govern the goodness of 
maxims pursuing known, or determinate ends -  for example, they govern a 
stonemason’s deciding on the most efficient way to carve a granite slab. Rules of 
prudence govern maxims that pursue unknown, or indeterminate ends -  
principally happiness, the concept o f which includes the satisfaction o f all 
desires. Although all humans naturally pursue happiness, argues Kant, they are 
unable to determine how to realize it because their desires conflict with one 
another. Striving to be happy therefore requires prudence rather than skill. 
Nonetheless, the commands of skill and prudence are alike in that both reduce 
analytically to the requirement to do whatever is needed for the attainment of the 
chosen end. It is this means-end principle that explains the irrationality o f a 
stonemason who chooses an inefficient way o f cutting stone, and a wanton who 
disregards what might make him happy.
Finally for Kant there is also a rule o f pure reason, the moral law. This law 
governs the goodness o f maxims entirely a priori -  independently of agents’ 
experience, and as a precondition o f that experience. The fact that the moral law
40 Ibid., 11:41-43 (415-16).
41 As Allison notes, there is a helpful analogy with Kant’s claims about the conditions o f the 
possibility o f  theoretical cognition: “the relationship between maxims and objective practical 
principles is analogous to the relationship in the theoretical realm between empirical concepts as 
first-order rules for the unification o f  the sensible manifold and the pure concepts or categories as 
second-order rules governing the formation o f  empirical concepts.” (A llison, K ant's Theory o f  
Freedom , p. 88.)
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applies to agents’ willing regardless of any willed ends makes it unsuitable for 
analytical investigation, as “we do not enjoy the advantage o f having its reality 
given in experience and so of being obliged merely to explain, and not to 
establish, its possibility.”42 The existence o f the moral law must be proven 
synthetically, by means o f a metaphysical argument. Kant approaches this task in 
more than one way, and the success o f his arguments is debatable. It is however 
clear that the commands of the moral law are embodied in the categorical 
imperative, expressed variously in the Formula o f the Law o f Nature, the 
Formula o f the End in Itself, the Formula o f Autonomy, and the Formula o f the 
Kingdom of Ends.
As we have seen, for Kant there are thus two kinds o f requirements of practical 
reasoning, the subjective (maxims) and the objective (rules o f reason). An 
important matter that still needs to be explained is how rules o f reason figure in 
deliberation about the good. It is clear how maxims determine practical 
reasoning: persons first represent an action or desire as good, and then design a 
principle that regulates the pursuit o f that action or desire. But rules o f reason 
hold independently of the person’s choosing or perspective. Therefore, it makes 
sense to wonder how they come to bear on first-person deliberation, and what is 
their connection with the agent’s self-imposed maxims. On a widely held view, 
rules of reason are “second-order principles that specify the norms for maxim 
selection and action.”43 Whereas maxims are to be regarded as first-order 
requirements that govern the person’s inclinations, rules of reason are 
requirements o f a higher order that govern the final endorsement o f maxims. I 
may, for example, choose to regulate my present desire for a vacation by making 
it my maxim to only holiday in December. However, my maxim is not enough to 
give me a reason to wait until December to take a vacation because the maxim 
itself needs to be validated, or confirmed. This validation is ensured by passing 
the maxim through a special objectivity-yielding procedure. For example, Rawls 
has influentially argued that the moral probity o f maxims in Kant is tested by
42 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, II: 49 (420).
43 Allison, Kant ’s Theory o f  Freedom, p. 88.
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running them through a “Categorical Imperative procedure”.44 Whether a maxim 
is to be regarded as right or wrong is answered by considering the hypothetical 
world in which each person acts on that same maxim. If  this “corrected social 
world” could be willed consistently by rational and reasonable persons then this 
rationale is morally appropriate; if not it is morally improper.
However my interpretation of rules o f reason, if  correct, rules out regarding them 
as second-order principles for maxim-selection. On the accepted view, maxims 
acquire the status of reasons upon passing a special test, such as Rawls’s CI- 
procedure. The assumption is that prior to that test, maxims need not be (and 
most often are not) governed by objective principles such as the rules o f pure 
reason. Maxims enter the procedure as purely subjective, and objectivity is 
implanted into them by judging them against objective principles. In this respect, 
there is a sharp divide between the nature of maxims and higher evaluative 
requirements. On the reading I have proposed there is no such divide: all maxims 
are formed on the basis of a representation o f some action or desire as good, 
which representation can only be made with reference to rules o f reason. This 
means not only that without objective rules no action or desire could be called 
good, without which no maxims could exist. Rules o f reason give maxims their 
distinctive character by providing indispensable reference points for evaluative 
judgement. Therefore, purportedly subjective maxims cannot as much as be 
thought without recourse to objective requirements. Kant thus remarks that
instead o f the concept o f the good as an object determining and 
making possible the moral law, it is on the contrary the moral law 
that first determines and makes possible the concept o f the good, 
insofar as it deserves this name absolutely.45
Although Kant is here talking about the moral law, his point applies to all rules 
o f reason. They can all serve as the conditions o f the possibility o f maxims
44 Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” pp. 82-90.
45 Kant, C ritique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 64, p. 55.
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because they are all necessary standards o f goodness.46 The only difference is 
that the moral law holds a priori, regardless o f what ends are pursued and 
whether they are determinate or not. Rules o f skill and prudence have more 
limited application, depending on the kinds o f ends picked out by the relevant 
maxims. As a result, the moral law governs all possible maxims and no person 
can beg off from it by saying that he does not value some particular end. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that, for Kant, only moral reasons 
exist. It just means that the moral law is basic in the sense that its validity does 
not depend on empirical conditions. Being basic in this way, it overrides other 
practical rules in cases o f conflict. In all other cases, however, technical and 
prudential principles find legitimate application, presenting valid claims to guide 
action.
If rules o f reason are the conditions o f the possibility o f maxims, viewing them 
as second-order principles for maxim-selection is implausible. That view is 
founded upon what turns out to be an unacceptable assumption, that maxims are 
entirely subjective. If  they are not, but make essential reference to rules of 
reason, subjecting them to a special objectivity-yielding test is out o f place. 
Objective principles figure in first-person deliberation not as second-order 
constraints on maxims, but as their inescapable components. If so, it must be 
possible to define the notion of a reason without appealing to the notion of 
maxim-validation. This can be done by considering what it is to form a maxim. 
Adopting a maxim involves proclaiming some action as good, which is nothing 
else than proclaiming that the action conforms with one or more rules o f reason. 
Each maxim thus advances a claim about the goodness o f its object. For 
example, by undertaking to only holiday in December I am implicitly 
maintaining that it is worth for me to take winter holidays. Given this implicit 
claim, the criterion o f the correctness o f my reasoning is contained in my very
46 For example, when discussing the prudential precept o f  saving for old age Kant says: “Reason, 
from which alone can arise any rule that is to contain necessity, does indeed put necessity even 
into this precept (for otherwise it would not be an imperative), though it is only a subjectively 
conditioned necessity and cannot be presupposed in the same degree in all subjects.” (Ibid., 5: 20-
21, p. 18.)
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maxim: that criterion is whether my claim about goodness is indeed true. Since, 
for Kant, an action can be good only if  it agrees with one or more objective 
principles o f goodness, we arrive at the following definition o f reasons: an 
agent’s reason consists in the conformity o f his maxim with one or more rules of 
reason. In the case o f ends-directed maxims, such as the holidaying maxim, the 
demand is for conformity with the requirement o f maximum expediency. 
Additionally, there is also a further condition o f objectivity that all maxims must 
satisfy regardless o f whether they aim at end-satisfaction, and that is abidance 
with the categorical imperative.
With this definition in hand, it is possible to enquire whether reasons in Kant 
have universal scope. Regarding this question, it is useful to notice the way in 
which my interpretation o f reasons in Kant differs from the standard view. To 
recall, the accepted reading identifies reasons as maxims -  specifically, those 
maxims that satisfy second-order objective requirements. In Rawls, for example, 
a person’s (moral) reasons are those of his maxims that pass the Cl-procedure. 
By contrast, I am proposing a thoroughly formalistic understanding of reasons, in 
which reasons are given by the f i t  between maxims and rules o f reason. Having a 
reason is not a matter of the content of practical reasoning: it does not depend on 
what actions a maxim enjoins the person to do, and whether those actions could 
be universalized in some “corrected social world” . Rather, it consists in the 
appropriate relation between one’s maxim, whatever it is, and objective 
principles. It is this kind o f formality that Kant has in mind when he writes that 
reason must be supposed to be practical “of itself and alone”, which means that it 
is
able to determine the will by the mere form o f a practical rule 
without presupposing any feeling and hence without any 
representation o f the agreeable or disagreeable as the matter of the 
faculty o f desire, which is always an empirical condition of 
principles.47
47 Ibid., 5: 24, p. 22.
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If reasons were constituted by maxims themselves, there could be no reasons 
with universal scope. No two persons could ever share the same reason because, 
as I noted earlier, it is in the nature o f maxims that they are subjective. Every 
maxim is always and necessarily a precept that some particular person makes for 
himself, to regulate his own inclinations and guide his own actions. An agent’s 
maxim thus cannot be simply reduced to some propositional content to which 
others can have equal access. For example, one cannot think that my maxim to 
care for my pet dog expresses the proposition “All persons should care for their 
dogs”, where I just happen to be the person that is presently uttering that 
proposition, but the same could be done by any other person. The important 
aspect o f my maxim that is lost in this construal is the fact that it is essentially 
bound to my standpoint. For Kant this is the very definitive characteristic of 
maxims, and that which makes them a necessary precondition for having reasons. 
Because maxims are always someone’s maxims, it is possible for particular 
persons to have reasons. If  maxims were shareable, the maxims o f no-one in 
particular, there could be no reasons that hold for anyone in particular. In fact, 
there could be no reasons at all because objective practical principles (rules o f 
reason) could not find application. To understand this point it is enough to 
consider why rules of reason govern some specific person’s deliberation. They 
do so because by formulating a maxim he implicitly proclaims the conformity of 
his deliberation with them. He forms a maxim by first calling an action good, and 
thereby becomes liable to objective criteria o f goodness. Now, if  he had not 
made this claim to goodness, he would not be accountable to rules o f reason. 
Even the categorical imperative issues a command to us only because we bring 
our maxims under the concept of goodness, and would not apply if  we could 
deliberate in some other way. In this regard, the personal dimension cannot be 
extricated from the concept o f a maxim.
Things are different if  one takes Kant to be holding a formal conception of 
reasons, as I have suggested. If a reason consists in the relation o f agreement 
between a maxim and a rule of reason, it is possible for the same reason to apply 
to different persons. This relation o f agreement requires the presence o f two 
elements, a maxim and an objective principle, but it does not require the presence 
o f some specific, unsubstitutable maxim. A potentially unconstrained number of
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different maxims can be part o f this reason-giving relation of fit with the reason 
staying the same throughout. As a result, an unconstrained number of maxim - 
creators can have that same reason. For instance, suppose that I want to have my 
breakfast outdoors, and that this will only be possible if  I clean up my balcony. 
My reason to clean up the balcony will consist in the conformity o f my maxim of 
cleaning up with the rule of skill that instructs me to pursue the means to my 
desired ends. Now suppose that my neighbour wants to cycle to work, but his 
bicycle has a punctured tyre. His reason to repair his bicycle will consist in the 
conformity o f his maxim to repair it with the rule o f skill enjoining him to pursue 
the means to his desired ends. It must be said that the two o f us have the very 
same reason, since our maxims stand in the same relation to the same rule of 
skill. That the two maxims have different content, and come from different 
authors, makes no difference to the matter.
In sum, in Kant’s conception reasons can apply universally because the reason- 
giving relation o f fit is not tied to any particular person or maxim. A reason that 
holds for someone else may hold for me even if, on the subjective side, its 
maxim is based on a desire that I do not share, and enjoins that person to actions 
that are alien and unimaginable to me. Reasons are a matter o f the correct form 
o f practical reasoning, not its content. To have a reason is to be rationally 
required to deliberate in a certain way -  so that one’s deliberation conforms with 
one or more rules o f reason -  not to pursue any specific ends. Therefore, it is 
possible to offer reasons that apply across persons, and moreover across persons 
that do not share any ends. Kant’s account thus answers the liberal demand for a 
conception o f reasons that allows for reasons-universality. It does not draw the 
questionable connection between impartiality and universality, in the way that 
Rawls does. It also shows how it is possible to offer universal reasons that are 
sufficient to guide action -  in contrast to Scanlon’s conception, which does not 
illuminate the grounds for “opting” to act on reasons. On account of the 
requirement of universality, Kant’s conception of reasons is a plausible candidate 
for employment in liberal justifications o f political principles. Some may, of 
course, regard Kant’s conception of reasons implausible on other accounts -  for 
example, its basis in a thick metaphysical framework. This criticism cannot be 
addressed here. However, it should be remembered that less metaphysically
157
invested views o f reasons must also fulfil the task o f accounting for reasons- 
universality -  a task in which, as we saw, Rawls and Scanlon fail and Kant 
succeeds rather well.
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7. Identity as a transcendental concept
7.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I portrayed Kant’s approach to reasons as formal, 
meaning that it locates reasons in a certain relation between maxims and rules of 
reason. The account gives an answer to how reasons can be universally valid, 
which is a precondition for the viability o f reasons-based justification. In this 
chapter I will show how Kant’s conception of reasons gives rise to a 
transcendental concept o f practical identity. To see what is involved in 
investigating the identity of a Kantian self, it is useful to notice a concern that 
Kant’s formalistic conception is liable to. Since it pays vital attention to the first- 
person perspective of deliberating agents, it must explain how persons can act on 
reasons o f a purely formal kind. On Kant’s view, as I noted earlier, what makes 
something a reason for me is not the fact that it happens to be my reason, but that 
it could be anyone’s reason in relevantly similar circumstances. Reasons consist 
in an appropriate relation between maxims and rules o f reason, and it is irrelevant 
to that relation whose maxim stands under it. So, the fact that a reason involves 
my maxim falling under a rule of reason makes no difference to the reason being 
a reason. Someone else’s maxim, if  it can also satisfy that rule o f reason, can 
constitute the same reason. And yet it is, after all, I  who has to act on my reason. 
It must be clarified how this is possible, given the obliteration o f particularity 
that Kantian reasons involve.
The problem needs to be distinguished from a similar issue, which is to show that 
universal reasons are not necessarily impersonal. Contractarian liberals have 
been particularly keen to argue that point, insisting that their position does not
159
entail an impersonal view of individuals and their deliberation.1 Strictly 
speaking, contractarians reject impersonality as an approach to deriving 
principles o f justice, not as a view of reasons. In Rawls, for example, the 
rejection o f impersonality serves to ground the argument that the principle of 
greatest average utility would not be chosen by contractors behind the veil o f 
ignorance.2 This outcome o f the choice-scenario would be preferred by what 
Rawls calls classical utilitarianism, which he traces back to Hume and Adam 
Smith. Its distinctive feature is the adoption o f perspective of the impartial 
spectator that stands outside the society for which moral norms (in Rawls’s case: 
norms o f justice) are to be decided. Morally proper norms are those that would 
be accepted by an external observer who takes into account the interests o f all 
members o f the society without privileging any o f them. It seems natural to 
assume that the impartial observer perspective would favour an arrangement that 
delivers maximum utility to each person, compossible with its maximum utility 
to every other person. Since the interests o f no-one are privileged, the result 
would be a system of maximum average utility.
Rawls’s objection to the impartial spectator method of deriving principles of 
justice is that it fails to honour the separateness o f persons. In the classical 
utilitarian interpretation of the contractual situation, “The principle of rational 
choice for one man is taken as the principle of social choice as well.” Rawls’s 
point is not that some contractors’ well-being will remain unaccounted for in the 
utilitarian calculus. Since for the spectator every member of the society “counts 
for one and no more than one”, this criticism is off the mark. Rawls’s idea is, 
rather, that the interests o f all will be accounted for in the wrong way: utilitarian 
principles are guided by what is good fo r  each person, but fail to respect what is 
considered to be good by those same persons. Instead o f running roughshod over 
persons’ plans and commitments, principles of social organization must be an 
expression o f their ideas about what constitutes a good life. For Barry, similarly,
1 For an extended discussion o f  this debate see Susan Mendus, Im partiality in Moral and  
P olitical Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
2 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 183-92.
3 Ibid., p. 187.
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the elementary idea o f impartiality that must inform any plausible theory of 
justice is that “we live in a world that is full o f other people with different 
conceptions o f the good, and they should have a fair chance to pursue them even 
if we have the power to stop (some of) them.”4
It should be clear from my earlier depiction o f the Kantian perspective on 
reasons that it does not fall prey to the charge o f impersonality. The only 
standpoint from which judgements about the goodness o f maxims can be made is 
the first-personal one. To say that a person has a reason to do something is to say 
that his maxim, incorporating his inclinations, conforms with objective rules of 
reason.
Nonetheless, this position generates a different puzzle, which will be the topic of 
this chapter. For Kant, a reason arises as the solution to some specific person’s 
problem o f determining what to do. However, and seemingly paradoxically, it 
solves this problem without reference to anything about the content o f that 
person’s maxim. Its normative validity is grounded solely in a fact about the 
relation between his maxim and objective standards o f goodness. It follows that 
no person can claim to stand in any special relationship to his reasons. He adopts 
a maxim, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
a reason (the other being a rule o f reason). And even in that function he can be 
replaced by other maxim-adopters, so long as their maxims conform to the same 
rule o f reason. All this makes for a rather wide chasm between reasons and 
reasoning agents, with their particular circumstances and particular concerns. 
What is then unclear is how any self can act on Kantian reasons. I will present 
and assess this concern with reference to some of Bernard Williams’s famous 
objections to Kant’s deontological ethics. Ultimately, the points that will emerge 
from this discussion will be useful in determining how one may think about the 
practical identity o f a Kantian self.
4 Brian Barry, “Something in the Disputation Not Unpleasant,” in Impartiality, Neutrality and  
Justice, ed. Paul Kelly (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 237.
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7.2. The problem with categorical duties
The principal target of Williams’s attack on Kant’s ethics is its postulation of 
categorically overriding moral duties. He writes:
There can come a point at which it is quite unreasonable for a man 
to give up, in the name o f the impartial good ordering o f the world 
o f moral agents, something which is a condition o f his having any 
interest in being around in that world at all. Once one thinks about 
what is involved in having a character, one can see that the 
Kantians’ omission of character is a condition of their ultimate 
insistence on the demands o f impartial morality, just as it is a 
reason for finding inadequate their account o f the individual.5
Assessing Williams’s claims in the context o f my discussion requires some care, 
as they are not strictly cast in terms of individuals’ reasons. In fact, Williams 
does not use the notion o f a reason as a technical term, instead treating it 
interchangeably with terms such as “motivation”, “project”, and sometimes even 
“desire”. His charges against the Kantian view of the self can therefore be 
interpreted in various ways. For instance, his argument can be read as saying that 
the thesis o f the categorical priority o f morality founders on purely motivational 
considerations. The thesis requires persons to extinguish some goals and projects 
that are vitally important to them, which they could never bring themselves to do. 
It can then be said that the moral duty never really gets a grip on them. For 
example, it is not difficult to understand how the duty to refrain from bribing 
medical staff can fail to move a daughter whose mother is in desperate need of 
scarce medication. The duty is too taxing on her emotions and personal 
attachments, which together constitute her character, and by proclaiming its 
unreserved sovereignty the Kantians fail to appreciate the important motivational 
aspect of the human condition.
5 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 14.
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However, if Williams’s objection is given this strictly motivational 
interpretation, it fails to engage with Kant’s position on practical reasoning. We 
saw earlier that for Kant practical deliberation is not a matter o f considering 
desires themselves, but maxims which incorporate desires. If  this is so, one’s 
desires, no matter how strong they are, have no direct bearing on the issue of 
someone’s reasons. Inclinations cannot conflict, or defeat, reasons because they 
are not part o f the evaluative process that issues in action. To be sure, desires 
have a decisive indirect influence on individuals’ reasons, since our maxims can 
only be constructed from the material o f our desires. We are, so to speak, 
motivationally situated at the basic level. For the daughter above, this means that 
her reasons will have to take vital account o f her deep attachment to her mother’s 
well-being. But this attachment cannot simply be her reason. In order for it to 
impact her actions, she will have to fit it into a principle she makes for herself-  
and it is precisely in so doing that she becomes accountable to certain objective 
rules o f goodness.
This response might be considered too quick. It may be claimed that Williams 
has more resources at his disposal than just to claim that duties run up against 
desires. Indeed, it seems plausible to assume that Williams’s conflation of 
motivational and normative aspects o f practical reasoning is a not a result of 
conceptual confusion. Instead, it can be taken as indicative o f a thought that he 
develops more fully elsewhere.6 The thought is that motivational potential 
constitutes a condition of a consideration’s normative force. On this view, for 
some considerations to become rationally compelling for a person, they must first 
be capable o f moving him to action. Desires thus determine practical reasoning 
more immediately than in Kant, and the fact that a duty conflicts with a person’s 
desire does have a bearing on the issue o f his reasons. However, Williams can 
only establish the relevance o f desires to reasons by straying considerably from 
Kant’s position. His motivational condition (sometimes called the “internalism 
requirement”) is not a part of Kant’s approach to practical reasoning. For Kant, 
reasons are considered and employed in the heat o f action; as such, they are
6 Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981).
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always action-guiding. His position can be contrasted with what Onora O’Neill 
calls “a retrospective, spectator perspective on action or ethics”. On that view 
contemplating one’s reasons is, like theoretical speculation, concerned with what 
facts there are, and therefore can be undertaken an essentially impassive 
audience. But Kant’s position is different. For him, “The basic task of practical 
reasoning is to guide action rather than to adjudicate past acts.”7 Considering 
reasons has a profoundly practical function: to answer the first-personal question 
“What am I to do?” Because this is so, motivational potential is a necessary 
element o f what it is to be a reason. It is not, as Williams would have it, a 
condition that applies to pre-existing normative claims, sorting the legitimate 
from the illegitimate normative demands. For Kant, since every normative claim 
aims to settle a practical problem, the action-guiding function is built into 
normative demands from the very start.8
In order to assess the impact of Williams’s criticisms of Kant, it is necessary to 
frame them in terms that are compatible with Kant’s theory. This requires casting 
his arguments exclusively in terms o f reasons. Although this reinterpretation is at 
odds with the spirit of Williams’s claims, it is essential for determining to what 
extent they relate to Kant. Accordingly, Williams’s argument may be restated as 
saying that a person may sometimes have a reason to resist moral commands: 
specifically, when moral duties violate one or more of his “ground projects” -  
pursuits which are “closely related to his existence and which to a significant 
degree give a meaning to his life.”9 The concept o f a ground project does not 
necessarily refer to only one distinct objective or ambition; rather, it can 
encompass a “nexus” of projects, “and it would be the loss o f all or most o f them 
that would remove meaning”.10 The trouble with categorical moral duties is that
7 Onora O ’N eill, “Rationality as Practical Reason,” in The Oxford Handbook o f  Rationality, ed. 
Alfred R. M ele and Piers Rawling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 95.
8 As Korsgaard notes, “the Kantian supposes that there are operations o f  practical reason which 
yield conclusions about actions and which do not involve discerning relations between passions 
(or any pre-existing sources o f  motivation) and those actions.” (Korsgaard, “Skepticism About 
Practical Reason,” p. 8, emphasis added.)
9 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 12, original emphasis.
10 Ibid., p. 13.
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they may present demands that stamp over this basic framework of 
commitments. Since ground projects give purpose to a person’s life, accepting to 
sacrifice them would be truly insufferable, and hence unreasonable.
7.3. The assessment
In assessing Williams’s (restated) objection it is necessary to note that it relies on 
a particular view o f how moral duties present themselves to the person. On this 
view, persons experience moral norms as “side-constraints” on their otherwise 
morally neutral pursuits.11 The important aspect o f this view is that it regards 
moral obligations as distinct in kind from the considerations that spring from our 
ordinary attachments to parents, friends, and lovers. As Williams puts it, moral 
and non-moral motivations have “deeply disparate characters”.12 The chasm can 
be compared to the utilitarian distinction between a principle o f publicly correct 
conduct -  that o f maximum utility -  and the various principles that guide 
individuals’ private deliberations. It is not a part of the utilitarian position to 
require that persons comport themselves on the basis o f a calculation of which 
action will maximally benefit all members o f the society. They can be concerned 
with their own selfish interests as legitimately as they would be with the 
happiness o f all. The utilitarian schema leaves open the grounds o f private 
practical reasoning.13 However, there is one distinct principle, the utility
11 The term “side-constraints” was introduced in Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(N ew  York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 28-33.
12 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 2.
13 Cf.: “P]t is a misapprehension o f  the utilitarian mode o f  thought, to conceive it as implying that 
people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The 
great majority o f  good actions are intended, not for the benefit o f  the world, but for that o f  
individuals, o f  which the good o f  the world is made up; and the thoughts o f  the most virtuous 
man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as 
is necessary to assure him self that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights that is, the 
legitimate and authorized expectations o f  any one else. The multiplication o f  happiness is, 
according to the utilitarian ethics, the object o f  virtue: the occasions on which any person (except 
one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words, to be a 
public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider
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principle, that guides public deliberation -  for instance, deliberation concerning 
the distribution o f state resources. Importantly, this public criterion o f right is not 
reducible, or in other ways related, to the multifarious standards o f private 
practical reasoning. It is not, for example, somehow distilled from the 
heterogeneous private reasons, nor is it implied by them. The principle of utility 
would still be normatively valid for a society of egoists (even though it might be 
difficult to implement).
Similarly, Williams claims, the justification for Kant’s categorical imperative has 
nothing to do with the justification behind the less exalted considerations that 
move us -  considerations such at the loveliness of a lover’s smile, or the 
preciousness o f a friendship, or the soundness of saving for one’s retirement. If 
both kinds o f considerations derived from the same normative basis, it would be 
possible to imagine a situation in which prudential, romantic, filial and other 
such reasons can present a challenge to the primacy o f morality. Putting the point 
crudely, the numbers or the intensity of “low-worth” considerations might add up 
to contest the dominance of the “high-worth” ones. A loved one’s health might 
be so bad that bribing the medical staff might look like a reasonable option; a 
freedom-fighter’s cause might be so valuable that one might be willing to lie in 
order to save his life. Yet, according to Williams, Kantian duties never fall under 
such a challenge because their validity derives from a distinct and unique 
normative basis. It is due to this normative distinctness that the demands of 
morality can categorically override other considerations. This special normative 
status has a consequence for how persons experience moral norms: persons can 
only regard them as limiting their range o f acceptable options -  a range that 
would be larger if moral boundaries were not in place.
Williams is not alone in understanding Kantian moral duties as side constraints 
on the pursuit o f non-moral ends. In fact, this reading is a very common feature
public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness o f  som e few  persons, is 
all he has to attend to.” (John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism , ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 65-66.)
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of contemporary Kant interpretation.14 However, if  the account o f Kantian 
reasons I gave in the previous chapter is correct, that reading o f Kant should not 
be accepted. To begin with, I wish to suggest that moral and non-moral 
considerations are not as deeply disparate as Williams claims because both are 
framed in terms o f individuals’ reasons}5 The basis for the validity o f both sorts 
o f considerations is hence the same: conformity with objective rules of goodness. 
It is important not to misunderstand this point. It does not state that moral 
obligations can be somehow inferred from ordinary practical pursuits -  for 
example, by reducing all o f our non-moral considerations to a set o f shared 
commitments, or by using a special algorithm to purify our ordinary motives of 
selfishness and short-sightedness. In this regard, Williams is correct to claim that 
there is no way o f getting to morality from the non-moral starting point. But this 
need not mean that duties therefore have nothing in common with our 
particularist concerns. Even if moral commands cannot be derived from non- 
moral interests, it is still possible to maintain that both owe their validity to a 
shared source.
This, I have suggested, is what Kant maintains. Whenever we turn to practical 
reasoning to determine our actions, Kant argues, we consider and employ 
reasons. This is not tantamount to saying that we always act on reasons. There 
are very many occasions in which we do not conduct ourselves in the light of 
practical reasoning. For instance, it is not common to find people dispassionately 
judging their maxims against objective rules o f reason when deciding whether to 
ask for a lover’s hand in marriage, or whether to doze off in the afternoon sun, or 
whether to avenge an insult. However, according to Kant, only practical 
reasoning yields itself to rational investigation since its determining grounds are 
communicable. Unlike acting from love, or habit, or lust, practical reasoning is a 
conceptual activity, consisting in bringing maxims under the concept of
14 For instance, Barbara Herman sees Kant as maintaining that “principles o f  right constrain our 
pursuit or particular conceptions o f  the good”. (Herman, “Leaving Deontology Behind,” p. 210.)
15 Since Kant him self does not speak o f  reasons, this claim should be understood as shorthand 
only. It summarizes the thought that for Kant, the standards o f  correct practical reasoning are 
given by an appropriate relation between one’s maxims and one or more rules o f  reason.
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goodness. Kant’s focus on reasons is hence compatible with the (alleged) fact 
that most o f our everyday decisions can be traced to the influence o f emotions, 
moods and habits. A father may, for instance, be utterly consumed by love for his 
children. Kant should then not be understood as reducing, quite implausibly, all 
his feelings to reasons. His point is merely that fo r  the purpose o f  rational 
examination it must be assumed that our consummate father’s behaviour is 
grounded in his representation of his actions as good. Only on this assumption 
can his actions be “appraised by reason and hence through concepts, which can 
be universally communicated, not through mere feeling, which is restricted to 
individual subjects and their receptivity”.16 Once this point is accepted, the 
unified normative basis o f moral and non-moral considerations becomes clearer. 
A maxim o f any kind is worthy o f acceptance if and when it complies with rules 
of reason. Moral norms are not an exception in this regard. The concept o f a duty 
just denotes a special case o f this compliance -  the case in which an endorsed 
maxim conforms with the rule of pure reason, or categorical imperative.
If duties are themselves reasons, they do not conflict with or, strictly speaking, 
override particularist interests. Rather, it can be said that moral obligations 
express reasons that we necessarily have -  that is, reasons that we have by the 
mere virtue o f engaging in evaluative deliberation, regardless of what it is that 
we pursue. If this is so, the view of morality as a system o f side-constraints, upon 
which Williams’s critique rests, is implausible. Yet, it may be objected that this 
view neglects the fact that we sometimes feel resistance towards doing what duty 
requires. Without a doubt, living morally can sometimes feel impossibly hard. In 
the example above, the daughter required to refrain from bribing the medical 
staff at the expense of prolonging her mother’s pain will almost certainly think 
so. For Williams, compromising one’s ground projects for the sake of the moral 
law is so taxing as to be insufferable, which only seems to confirm that morality 
limits us -  sometimes oppressively so.
However, this line of reasoning should be resisted. In assessing it, the crucial 
question is just what is so hard about the moral life. Kant gives a surprising reply
16 Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 58, p. 51.
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that is not only plausible but also consistent with the interpretation that I have 
given. He writes:
Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the 
commands of duty presented to him by reason as so worthy of 
esteem -  the counterweight o f his needs and inclinations, whose 
total satisfaction he grasps under the name o f ‘happiness’. But 
reason, without promising anything to inclination, enjoins its 
commands relentlessly, and therefore, so to speak, with disregard 
and neglect o f these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims 
(which refuse to be suppressed by any command). From this there 
arises a natural dialectic -  that is, a disposition to quibble with 
these strict laws o f duty, to throw doubt on their validity or at least 
on their purity and strictness, and to make them, where possible, 
more adapted to our wishes and inclinations; that is, to pervert 
their very foundations and destroy their whole dignity -  a result 
which in the end even ordinary human reason is unable to 
approve.17
Crucially, Kant maintains that the unease we sometimes feel when confronted 
with a moral duty is not directed at performing what duty requires. We never can, 
or do, resent doing the moral thing -  even if  it means compromising the well­
being of one’s parents, or giving up a cherished project, or suppressing a deep 
disposition o f character. This claim sounds wildly radical, but in fact it is not. 
Kant’s point focuses on what grounds we may legitimately rebel against 
morality. Motives that one might cite in support o f refusing to do what duty 
requires can be emotive, or habitual, or temperamental: that he loves his parents, 
or that he has always played football with friends, or that he is just so constituted 
to take his anger out on others. But morality speaks in a different voice, the voice 
of reasons. It tells us that by making judgements about the goodness of our 
maxims, we become accountable to objective standards o f goodness. Facts about 
our habits, feelings and temperaments are irrelevant to this justification o f moral
17 Kant, Groundwork o f  the Metaphysic o f  M orals, I: 23 (405), original emphasis.
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requirements, and therefore cannot be summoned to challenge it. This is why it 
cannot be sensibly denied that we should do what obligations ask o f us. The only 
possible objection against duties is “to throw doubt on their validity or at least on 
their purity and strictness”. But this quibble concerns the moral law -  namely, 
whether it really exists as a law -  not the particular things we must do. It is hence 
unrelated to our perception of how hard it is to follow the moral commands. 
Instead, the natural dialectic arises from the worry that the principles that govern 
the operation of practical reason rest on an insecure foundation. In this way, 
argues Kant, “the common reason o f  mankind is impelled, not by any need for 
speculation... but on practical grounds themselves, to leave its own sphere and 
take a step into the field o f practical philosophy.”18
7.4. The deeper objection
Williams’s objection to Kant’s view of the self fails because it relies on the 
mistaken view of Kant’s moral requirements as side constraints. However, in the 
course o f making this objection Williams also hints at the possibility for a 
different criticism o f Kant, one that need not rely on a, flawed interpretation. This 
criticism is underdeveloped in Williams’s article, and must be reconstructed. The 
task is nonetheless worthwhile because the new objection asks rather more 
penetrating questions o f Kant, which will be helpful in working out a Kantian 
concept o f identity.
The new objection is given in Williams’s claim that the Kantian perspective on 
reasons provides “ultimately too slim a sense in which any [of my] projects are 
mine at all.” 19 Originally, the claim is closely tied to the view o f morality as side 
constraints. Williams’s idea is that moral constraints are insufferable because 
they undermine practical character. Yet the suggestion that each person has a 
practical character that makes his actions uniquely his is separable from the 
notion o f moral constraints, and hence merits attention. It can be introduced by
18 Ibid., I: 23-24 (405), original emphasis.
19 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 12.
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briefly considering Williams’s critique of utilitarianism, which is strictly parallel 
to his attack on Kant. The utilitarian position, with its postulation of the 
uncompromising objective o f public utility, misrepresents the nature o f practical 
reasoning. It portrays the reasoning agent as
a channel between the input of everyone’s projects, including his 
own, and an output o f optimific decision; but this is to neglect the 
extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as 
the action and decisions which flow from the projects and 
attitudes with which he is most closely identified.20
In other words, there is no sense in which the conclusion o f utilitarian practical 
deliberation belongs to the reasoning agent, or is expressive of his particular 
nature: it is merely the preferred outcome o f a procedure o f utility-maximization. 
But if  this is so, it is difficult to see why he should live by it. A similar 
obliteration o f character is suffered, argues Williams, by a person surrendering 
himself to Kant’s moral duties. In an example he made famous, Williams 
considers a hypothetical scenario in which a person must decide whether to save 
his wife from a drowning ship.21 Kant’s ethics certainly requires that the person 
save his wife, which accords with our intuitions that he really ought to save her. 
But the Kantian view o f the situation is plausible only superficially, as it asks of 
the husband to come to his wife’s rescue for the wrong reason. In order for his 
behaviour to qualify as moral, he is required to act in complete disregard o f what 
looks like the only appropriater consideration to move him: the fact it is his wife 
that is in peril. Instead, the husband must arrive at the decision to rescue in a 
strangely detached fashion: by treating his own wife as one among many persons 
that deserve help on account of their rational nature. By bracketing all o f his 
particular attachments, the husband is thus required to act on “one thought too 
many”.22 As a consequence, his choice will not be recognizably his.
20 J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), pp. 116-17, original emphases.
21 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” pp. 17-18.
22 Ibid.
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From this point, Williams goes on to supplement his critique o f utilitarianism and 
Kant with a positive theory of what makes a person “own” his actions. According 
to that theory, an agent’s choices are expressive o f his character if  and when they 
are mandated by his “ground projects”. In order to understand the notion of a self 
defined by its core commitments it is useful to appreciate the context in which 
Williams proposes it. The notion first emerges in the context o f his discussion of 
some of Derek Parfit’s arguments about (metaphysical) personal identity. 
Williams appeals to the notion of ground projects to support his claim, against 
Parfit, that we have reason to care about our future well-being (more precisely, 
that we have reason to care about what happens to our future selves). He argues 
that the thesis that persons do not care about their future can only be sustained if 
it is possible for persons to imaginatively project themselves into the future. This 
imaginative leap, in turn, requires or persons to possess a concept o f themselves. 
They have to be able to conceive o f themselves in the future so as to determine 
that their interests beyond the present are not worth caring about.
And yet, argues Williams, once persons form a concept o f themselves, it 
becomes impossible for them to be indifferent about what will happen to them. 
Self-conceptualization is inseparable from discerning certain core concerns that 
make one the person that one is. To think o f oneself, as a distinct agent, just is to 
detect a certain unity o f purpose and commitment -  a unity that, at the most 
fundamental level, endows persons with some particular character. Since one can 
only think o f oneself as a person who cares about certain things, to imagine 
oneself in the future is also to envisage a person with certain basic commitments. 
It might be objected that this argument only shows that the future version of 
myself will have some basic concerns. They need not be concerns that I now 
recognize as mine. The disconnect between my present and future selves hence 
still seems possible: if  a future self is committed to altogether different projects 
than me, why should I care about happens to him? However, as Williams notes, 
to maintain that a future self has different ground projects than me is to maintain 
that he is not my future self. I f  one accepts Williams’s understanding of a self as 
defined by his basic commitments, the volitional continuity o f a self cannot be
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denied. And if  the self indeed is so temporally extended, one must have an 
interest in one’s future states.23
The views about the self that Williams raises in opposition to Kant are an 
extension o f his critique of Parfit. The idea o f character that is marked out by 
certain constitutive concerns is here not used in support o f the volitional 
continuity of the self. Instead, it is meant to explain individuals’ practical 
investment in the world. Against Parfit, Williams aims to show why we are not 
indifferent towards our future; against Kant, he wants to show why we are not 
practically indifferent generally. The questions he sets out to answer are: Why do 
we bother making practical choices? How come it makes a difference to us that 
things turn out in some specific way, rather than another? Why is it that we 
ponder, let alone worry about, what to do -  why not do whatever, or just nothing 
at all? Williams finds the unifying answer to these questions in
the idea that my present projects are the condition o f my 
existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the 
conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should 
go on at all: the world, certainly, as a kingdom of moral agents, 
has no particular claim on my presence or, indeed, interest in it.24
Should Kantians accept Williams’s thick notion of practical character that is 
constituted by ground projects?25 Everything depends on Williams’s claim that
23 As Williams notes, if  a person “clear-headedly knows that his present projects are solely the 
projects o f  his youth, how does he know that they are not merely that, unless he has some view  
which makes sense of, among other things, his own future? One cannot even start on the 
important questions o f  how  this man, so totally identified with his present values, will be related 
to his future without them, i f  one does not take as basic the fact that it is his own future that he 
w ill be living through them.” (Ibid., p. 10, original emphasis.)
24 Ibid., p. 12.
251 cannot here discuss whether W illiams’s critique o f  Parfit succeeds. Let me just note that that 
critique ultimately rests on a particular understanding o f  the se lf that might not be compatible 
with Parfit’s theoiy. In particular, Parfit rejects the understanding o f  a se lf  as temporally unified 
in any way, preferring to regard it in terms o f  the Humean bundle o f  perceptions. Much o f  the
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they need to accept it in order to make sense of agents’ practical investment in 
the world. If  this claim is correct, the Kantian outlook will need to undergo 
drastic revision. Most importantly, it will have to abandon the view that 
considering reasons is a purely formal activity that consists in discerning 
relations between maxims and rules o f reason. Practical deliberation will then be 
guided by substantive ends after all -  ends related to the preservation and 
furtherance of one’s core concerns.
However, the problem to which the conception o f practical character supposedly 
offers a solution is unclear. It is not at all easy to understand what Williams 
means by saying that we are “propelled” forward in life, and that this requires an 
explanation. A plausible assumption is that the sense of Williams’s statement is 
motivational. Presumably, it means that in order for one to be susceptible to the 
normative influence o f any consideration, one must first be able to be moved by 
it. It can then be said that this ability to be moved by certain considerations and 
not others can only be explained if one’s self has a determinate and fixed 
structure. Without this structure, constituted by one’s ground projects, everything 
in this world would leave us cold. As Williams puts it, “unless such things exist, 
there will not be enough substance or conviction to a man’s life to compel his 
allegiance to life itself.”26 However, once again, this purely motivation-centred 
interpretation o f Williams does not relate to Kant. On the Kantian view, our 
ability to be moved by considerations does not need to be explained. What 
“propels” persons forward is reasons. The basis for caring to act on a maxim is 
just that it presents a rationally plausible answer to the question o f what to do. 
Action-guiding potential is an aspect o f normative claims from the very start. 
Since this is so, there is no need to postulate a substantive notion of practical 
character to explain the action-guiding nature of practical reasoning. Williams’s 
notion thereby becomes superfluous.
poin t o f  his treatment o f  metaphysical identity lies in this rejection. It is then unclear why 
Williams’s criticism, coming from a very different philosophical perspective, should exercise 
him.
26 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 18.
174
Perhaps Williams’s claim about us being “propelled” forward can be understood 
differently, in a way that does relate to Kant. Earlier in this discussion I noted 
that this is only possible if Williams’s theses are restated in terms of reasons. 
Consequently, it may be argued that ground projects constitute higher-order 
reasons: they are the source o f reasons fo r reasons. Practical character would 
then offer a response to a seemingly puzzling question: if  particular reasons (to 
perform this or that action) express what behaviour is rationally warranted in 
some specific circumstances, what makes acting on reasons rationally warranted? 
The appealing possibility is to say that every reason owes its normative 
dimension to the fact that it expresses the agent’s ground commitments. In this 
regard, ground concerns make up the primordial material from which reasons are 
built. They situate agents within the world, which is a precondition for any action 
at all to be rationally warranted. Without this “stu ff’ that fuels practical 
reasoning, the formal activity o f discerning relations between maxims and rules 
o f reason would be completely vacuous.
However, this line o f reasoning runs two considerations too closely together. One 
of them is that we are, through some feature of our natural constitution, disposed 
toward seeing some actions as rationally warranted. We are, so to speak, 
naturally attuned to find reasons for doing certain things. The other consideration 
is that we have reasons for doing certain things. On my restated interpretation, 
Williams wants to explain the latter fact by means o f the former. The argument is 
that since we have to be somehow situated in the world in order to have reasons, 
this situatedness also explains why we have reasons. But this conclusion does not 
follow from the premisses. Structurally, it is identical to explaining the cause o f a 
patient’s illness by stating that he has a disposition to get ill -  for instance, due to 
a weakened immune system. This explanation cannot work because potentiality 
is not the same as actuality. It takes something to move a person from a state in 
which he merely has the potential for sickness to the state o f being sick. That 
extra factor might, for example, be exposure to a virus. By the same token, citing 
persons’ basic-level investment in the world only illuminates a necessary, not a 
sufficient condition o f their reasons. The lacking ingredient is an account o f what 
it is that transforms mere potentiality for reasons -  agent’s receptivity to the 
world -  into actuality.
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Kant has an explanation o f how this transformation occurs, and is therefore not 
pressed to accept the unsubstantiated account o f the self that Williams proposes. 
For him, it is the agents themselves that refashion, in accordance with rules of 
reason, their sensibly conditioned desires into reasons. This also enables us to see 
why, in the context of Kant’s theory, the idea of higher-order reasons is 
fundamentally misguided. Kant has no need for the notion o f practical character 
because his framework rules out the concern whether persons have any reason 
for acting on reasons. A maxim’s conformity with one or more objective criteria 
o f goodness leaves no further questions to be asked. This favourable relation 
signals that the maxim fully complies with the standard that, by making a claim 
about goodness, it sets itself. Such a maxim is as perfectly justified as it can be. 
The only way to deny this is to contest the validity o f rules towards which 
maxims must orient themselves, the most basic of which is the categorical 
imperative. But, as in the case o f reservations about moral duties, this challenge 
concerns rules o f  reason, not reasons themselves. Since the worry is about the 
reality o f laws that structure evaluative deliberation, the appropriate response to 
it is philosophizing, not doubting that we ought to do what we have reason to do.
7.5. Practical identity as a transcendental concept
This chapter started off by identifying a potential problem with Kant’s account of 
reasons, which is that it is unclear how particular persons, with particular cares 
and concerns, can act on reasons o f a purely formal kind. My discussion so far 
has illuminated one way in which this concern cannot be framed. This is to insist, 
as Williams does, that no person would have a reason to act on such reasons. The 
Kantian approach to morality, he argues, “has never succeeded, and could not 
succeed, in answering the question, by what right does it legislate to the moral 
sentiments?”27 As I have shown, this objection disregards the fact that for Kant 
practical reasoning sets its own standards o f objective validity. The criteria
27 Bernard Williams, “Preface,” in M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
p. x, original emphasis.
176
against which maxims are to be judged are entailed by the very activity of 
adopting maxims -  specifically, the activity of practical evaluation. Once these 
criteria are satisfied, the resulting reasons need no further justification.
However, some of Williams’s claims also point to a better way of understanding 
the initial question. It can be taken to mean not how it is possible for persons to 
have formal reasons, but how it is possible for persons to be disposed to have 
formal reasons. The query, in this restated form, is a variation of Williams’s 
concern about explaining agents’ practical investment. It asks how it is that we 
can be responsive to the world in a way that enables us to have formal reasons. 
Since this is the only question that can be asked about the nature or character of 
the Kantian practical self, it may be called the question about Kantian identity. 
Discussing this topic will require a more decisive foray into Kant’s metaphysics 
than what I have done so far. To begin with, it will be necessary to explain the 
thesis that basic-level receptivity to the world provides the matter o f reasons. 
This thesis, as will be seen, has some rather surprising consequences with regard 
to the possibilities for self-knowledge.
First, it is useful to dispel a possible misunderstanding of Kant’s claims about 
practical judgement as essentially evaluative. In particular, it is worth noting a 
dissimilarity between the role o f the concepts o f good and evil in practical 
judgement, and that played by the categories in theoretical judgement. Kant 
defines judgement in general as “the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of 
determining whether something stands under a given rule (casus datae legis) or 
not.”28 In the case o f theoretical judgements, this means bringing two or more 
concepts under the rules o f synthesis that Kant calls categories.29 It might seem 
that the concepts o f good and evil are the functional equivalent o f the categories 
in practical judgement. A maxim, as we saw, can only be adopted on the basis of
28 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, trans. Allen W. Wood and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A 132/B71, p. 268.
29 Categories can be understood as different ways in which concepts can be connected in thought, 
and include forms o f  quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In accordance with the categories, 
for example, the judgement “All candies are sweet” is universal, affirmative, categorical, and 
assertoric.
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a representation o f some action as good. Hence, it might be assumed, the 
overarching concept of goodness is what allows our concepts o f objects and 
actions to be synthesized, or conjoined, in practical thought.
However, this assumption would be incorrect. The categories partly constitute 
the objects o f theoretical reason by imposing a certain structure on the 
deliverances of the senses, or the “manifold of sensible intuitions” . Since they 
order experience, the categories cannot themselves be derived from, or present 
in, experience. They are pure concepts o f the understanding. By contrast, argues 
Kant, the concepts of good and evil take no part in constituting the objects of 
practical reason; instead, they presuppose them as given.30 The role o f the pure 
concept that synthesizes empirical data is, in practical reasoning, played by the 
Idea o f free causality. That is to say, in order for us to represent to ourselves an 
action as a possible object o f our choice, we must first regard ourselves as an 
uncaused cause. As is the case with the categories, the Idea of freedom is pure, or 
non-empirical. On the other hand, the concepts o f good and evil are empirical in 
that they can find no application without the presence o f some deliverances of 
our senses. The idea o f the empirical nature o f evaluative judgements can be 
reframed in terms of Kant’s oft-used distinction between form and content.31 
Although practical judgement is purely formal, consisting in the discernment of 
the relation between maxims and rules o f reason, it must have a basis in some 
content. Both form and matter are necessary for the activity of judging to be 
possible.32 Therefore, in order for it to be possible for persons to have reasons, 
they must enter the process o f practical deliberation with some pre-existing 
material for judgement -  material that can be “subsumed under a rule” .
30 Kant, C ritique o f  Practical Reason , 5: 65, p. 56.
31 The dualism o f  form and matter is one o f  the cornerstones o f  Kant’s entire critical system. He 
writes: “These are two concepts that ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up 
with every use o f  the understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the latter 
its determination (both in the transcendental sense, since one abstracts from all differences in 
what is given and from the way in which that is determined).” Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason , 
A 266/B322, pp. 69-70.)
32 As Kant memorably puts it, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts 
are blind.” (Ibid., A51/B75, pp. 193-94.)
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Material for practical judgement is provided by the agent’s desires, which 
ultimately depend on a modification of the “receptivity belonging to inner 
sense” .33 At the bottom of each desire lies the person’s affection by factors 
external to him, with regards to which he is passive rather than active. I say 
“ultimately” and “at the bottom” to avoid exaggerating the point about the 
affective nature o f desires. I am not espousing the view that for Kant desires are 
straightforward affections. On this view, to say that a person has a desire is to say 
that he is “struck” by some external object in a way that elicits in him an 
expectation o f pleasure or agreeableness. Importantly, this expectation is not of a 
reasoned kind: for example, we do not crave chocolate because we recognize that 
we have a reason to crave it. Rather, desires impress themselves on our minds, 
and we play no part in their creation. Yet Kant does not think that desires invade 
us from without, but that we rationally conceive them. He thus writes: “The 
faculty o f  desire is the faculty to be by means of one’s representations the cause 
of the objects of these representations.”34 It is clear from this Kant’s remark that 
he attributes the “pull” of desires to the agent’s activity of conceptualizing 
external stimuli, rather than to his passive surrender to them.
However, it is also implausible to think that for Kant desiring is a pure, or non- 
sensible, activity, which would render the origins o f the content of practical 
deliberation mysterious. The task for Kant interpreters is therefore to explain 
how the sensible strain o f desiring in Kant’s can be maintained without thinking 
that all desires are just affections. One such explanation has been given by 
Andrews Reath. He suggests that in Kant pathological affection must be taken to 
figure in the causal history of every desire.35 However that does not mean all 
desire are directly sourced in affection. A pleasure-based desire often leads to 
activities, interests and forms of human interaction that are then enough to
33 Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 58, p. 51.
34 Immanuel Kant, The M etaphysics o f  M orals, ed. Maiy Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 6: 211, p. 11.
35 Andrews Reath, “Hedonism, Heteronomy, and Kant’s Principle o f  Happiness,” in Agency and  
Autonomy in K ant's M oral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 38.
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stimulate desires on their own, without any agreeable modification o f the 
subject’s senses. In Reath’s example, one’s intimate familiarity with the nuances 
o f baseball and a sense of community with other baseball fans may be sufficient 
to give one grounds for desiring to follow the game, after and independently of 
the enjoyment one felt on his first visit to the stadium.36 It is not important here 
whether Reath’s argument succeeds. What matters is the point that underlies his 
reasoning: that it cannot be assumed that for Kant desires contain no affective 
element whatsoever. Even if not all desires must be immediately rooted in the 
modification of the person’s sensibility, indirectly affection plays a part in the 
formation of every desire. For instance, although in Reath’s example the fan 
develops a liking for baseball that does not derive simply from the pleasure of 
watching the game, it was that initial pleasure that created the conditions for his 
rational affection. In that sense, there can be no desire without a basis, however 
remote, in affection.
This last thought offers a way o f thinking about practical identity. Since desires 
are ultimately rooted in sensible affection, there must be an explanation of how 
this impingement is possible. One possibility would be to say that the 
explanation can be found in certain features o f the objects that entice us. 
However, for a Kantian this explication does not reach far enough. The fact that 
we feel the tug o f desires cannot be properly accounted for if  one only assumes 
that things outside the mind have a certain property -  some sort of ability to 
affect our minds. What would remain unexplained is the interaction between the 
world and our consciousness -  that is, the precise way in which objects exert 
pressure on our consciousness, so as to give rise to desires. Accounting for 
desires requires postulating an extra factor that enables this union. One way of 
doing this is to say that the invasive power o f external objects must be matched 
by a corresponding susceptibility to invasion on the part o f person. The notion of 
a Kantian practical identity would then refer to a certain arrangement of an 
agent’s receptive apparatus that allows him to experience desires.
36 On the basis o f  similar arguments, Thomas Nagel has argued that “many desires, like many 
beliefs, are arrived  a t by decision and after deliberation.” (Nagel, The P ossibility o f  Altruism, p. 
29, original emphasis.) Desires, on his view, can be motivated as well as motivating.
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The concept o f identity as the basis for desires will seem disappointing to anyone 
hoping for a more immediate connection between identity and reasons. However 
since the basis for the validity o f reasons is clear, and has nothing to do with the 
particularity o f any person, the desire-centred concept o f the practical self looks 
like the only one possible. Furthermore, the Kantian perspective requires taking 
an even more unfamiliar step: regarding identities, including one’s own, as 
perfectly inscrutable. The structure of receptivity that underlies a person’s 
desiderative engagement with the world is out o f bounds o f his cognition. Since 
this thesis can be understood in two senses it is important to note which one is 
intended here. On the one hand, the thesis o f inscrutability can just mean that a 
person’s identity cannot be represented in his consciousness. This claim relies on 
the fact that we do not bring our desires into existence. They depend on the initial 
impingement o f our senses by the world, which we cannot spontaneously achieve 
ourselves. Therefore, the only evidence upon which we can base our knowledge 
o f our identities is the bare sensation o f desiring -  a sensation which we did not 
bring about, but found ourselves having. From this bare sensation, in turn, 
nothing can be inferred about the desiring subject. For instance, learning that I 
have a desire for chocolate is no basis for self-knowledge because it still leaves 
me wondering why I have this desire -  that is, what features o f my self make this 
desire possible. Our passivity with regard to our desires thus cuts off any 
possibility for self-knowledge.
While this line o f reasoning is correct, I am proposing the thesis of inscrutability 
in a stronger sense: that a person’s identity necessarily cannot be represented in 
his consciousness. The difference is that this new reading does not turn on our 
inability to attain self-knowledge. The weaker interpretation presents the thesis 
o f inscrutability as dependent on the fact that we are mere bystanders to our 
natural motives and inclinations. By contrast, the stronger claim I am proposing 
does not rely on what we empirically can or cannot do. It hangs on a requirement 
o f judgement -  namely, the fact that the existence of “content” is a condition of 
the possibility o f practical judgements. It is especially important that this content, 
being a precondition for making judgements, must precede the activity of 
judging. As Kant notes, the understanding “demands first that something be
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given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain 
way.”37 It then follows that for a person to have a representation of his own 
identity, he would first need to be presented with some content. However this is 
impossible, because identity is presumed to refer to the most basic structure of 
receptivity, the structure that accounts for all given content. In other words, there 
is no higher source from which the sensibility can receive the substance that is 
required for representing one’s identity. What is the condition of all experience 
cannot itself be experienced.
Let me conclude by briefly considering how this transcendental concept of 
identity fits with, and explains, Kant’s claim that the concept of happiness is 
indeterminate. Happiness, Kant maintains, is the sole end that can be predicated 
of all persons, “so far as they are dependent beings to whom imperatives 
apply”.38 However, an obstacle to understanding the claim o f indeterminacy is 
Kant’s apparent inconsistency in defining happiness. H.J. Paton has for example 
argued that Kant held two views o f happiness that cannot be readily reconciled: 
one is that happiness consists in the individuals’ enjoyment of the maximum 
amount o f pleasure and avoidance of pain; the other holds that happiness refers 
to the satisfaction of all o f his ends, considered as a mutually compatible set.39 
The objects picked out by the two definitions are not the same, and pursuing 
them may result in different actions. In other words, seeking maximum pleasure 
can be distinct from trying to fulfil the totality of one’s ends, considered as a 
compossible whole. Sometimes the two pursuits can even be inimical, as when, 
in one of Kant’s examples, a gout sufferer refuses to “kill the enjoyment of the 
present moment” at the expense of long-term damage to his health.40 In the 
choice between Kant’s two definitions of happiness Paton squares firmly with 
the one that emphasises the satisfaction o f all of one’s ends, rejecting the
37 Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, A267/B322-23, p. 70.
38 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, II: 415, p. 83.
39 H . J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 
1971), pp. 85-87.
40 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, I: 399, p. 67.
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hedonistic alternative as “inadequate for the description of action”.41 This 
definition renders the imperative o f prudence, which governs the pursuit o f 
happiness, as a principle of “ integration”: to aim at the satisfaction o f one’s 
desires “in a whole organised and systematic life”.42
There is reason to doubt whether there really are two incompatible views of 
happiness in Kant. Daniel O’Connor has convincingly argued that there is no 
clash because while the “integration reading” view represents the definition of 
happiness, the “maximum enjoyment” view gives the criterion o f happiness. On 
this consolidated reading a requirement for adopting ends, which can then be 
harmonized, is the expectation of pleasure from their achievement.43 Thus, 
although the rational activity of combining one’s ends remains an important 
element o f happiness, an equally vital aspect of it is “rooted in the sensible 
order”.44 Paton suppresses this sensible aspect o f happiness because he assumes 
that it would reduce desiring to pleasure-seeking. However, as my earlier 
discussion o f Reath has shown, this assumption is incorrect. It is possible to 
maintain that all desires are ultimately based on some affection o f the sensibility 
without compromising the thought that desires are rationally conceived.
The sensible aspect of happiness is central to Kant’s claim that we cannot form a 
conception of happiness. He writes that “the concept o f happiness is so 
indeterminate a concept that although every man wants to attain happiness, he 
can never say definitely and in unison with himself what it really is that he wants 
and wills”.45 Such a strong claim would not be warranted if  happiness were to be 
understood merely as the systematic satisfaction of one’s ends. On this view, 
forming a conception of one’s happiness would be difficult', the trouble would be 
to imagine how precisely one’s various ends can be combined without clashing. 
But Kant says that “it is impossible for the most intelligent, and at the same time
41 Paton, The C ategorical Imperative, p. 85.
42 Ibid., p. 87.
43 Daniel O ’Connor, “Kant’s Conception o f  Happiness,” Journal o f  Value Inquiry 16, no. 3 
(1982): pp. 189-91.
44 Ibid.: p. 190.
45 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, II: 418, p. 85.
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most powerful, but nevertheless finite, being to form here a determinate concept 
o f what he really wills.”46 The key to his idea is that we are finite beings, which 
means that we have empirical needs that implicate us in the world o f sense.47 We 
are bound to seek satisfaction from the world outside us, and do so through 
desiring.
However, as I argued earlier, our sensible basis for this interaction with the 
world, our identity, must remain obscure to us. This inability to access one’s 
identity explains why happiness is an indeterminate concept. Happiness requires 
the satisfaction o f all desires, and yet we cannot know anything about the way in 
which our receptive faculty is constituted. Hence, we can strive to attain what our 
desires demand, but can have no guarantee that this will bring us satisfaction. 
Since we are at the most fundamental level opaque to ourselves, we cannot be 
sure that attending to one desire will not inconvenience us in ways that we cannot 
comprehend, and thereby produce new needs and desires. It is therefore an 
illusion to think that we can form a conception o f our happiness because we have 
no way o f knowing what makes us happy. We are caught in a cycle o f second- 
guessing ourselves — a cycle in which we must be frustrated because our 
identities, the sensible condition of the possibility o f desires, cannot itself be 
intuited.
46 Ibid., II: 418, p. 85, emphasis added.
47 Cf.: “The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, and to 
this extent his reason certainly has a commission from the side o f  his sensibility which it cannot 
refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view  to happiness in this life 
and, where possible, in a future life as well.” Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 61, p. 53.)
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8. Conclusion: Transcendental identity and legitimacy
8.1. The n o rm ativ e  significance o f tran sce n d en ta l iden tity
The problem with which this thesis started is that current concepts o f identity are 
unclear and undertheorized. Taking into account this shortcoming of available 
treatments o f identity, I have examined the possibilities for developing a concept 
on identity from the perspective of reasons-based liberalism. Specifically I have 
evaluated those approaches to identity that regard it as a determinant of 
individuals’ reasons for action. An argument that is inspired by John Rawls states 
that identities generate reasons insofar as individuals care to maintain their self- 
respect. However I showed that Rawls’s “social bases o f self-respect” cannot be 
understood in the way that is required for the argument to succeed. I then 
considered Harry Frankfurt’s claim that identities give rise to constraints on 
individuals’ power of willing. The claim fails, I suggested, because Frankfurt 
cannot show that it is truly impossible for us to disregard our identities. I also 
examined Christine Korsgaard’s view of identities as the subjective ground of 
maxim-adoption, and argued that it vacillates between an unacceptably naturalist 
understanding of identity and one that cannot account for persons’ commitment 
to particular identities. Following these criticisms, I suggested that the link 
between identities and reasons needs to be investigated by reconsidering the 
notion o f a reason for action. I argued that for a conception of reasons to be 
acceptable to liberals, it must present reasons as universal in scope. This 
condition is met by Kant’s conception, according to which reasons consist in the 
conformity o f maxims with certain objective principles. Finally, this account 
allowed me to present identity as a sensible condition for the possibility of 
universal reasons.
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The substantive argument of this dissertation ends with the elaboration of the 
transcendental concept o f identity. In this final chapter I will offer some 
speculative remarks about the implications o f that concept. These remarks should 
be taken as pointers towards the wider relevance o f my findings, rather than as 
elements in an argumentative case. In this spirit, I would like to address the 
following worry about my concept o f transcendental identity: that it seems 
normatively insignificant, even though it claims connection with the normative 
theory o f reasons-based justification.
Consider, first, one way in which my claims about identity are weaker than those 
made in the ordinary identity-discourse. I have proposed thinking o f a person’s 
identity as a certain arrangement of the receptivity belonging to his “inner 
sense”. It is a sensible condition o f desiring, which ultimately provides the 
material for practical reasoning. However, my claims about transcendental 
identity do not show that each person has a unique identity that is different from 
everyone else’s. To make sense of desiring it is necessary to assume that the 
receptive apparatus o f each person is arranged in a certain way -  so that he is 
susceptible to affection by the world outside his mind. But this claim does not 
warrant the conclusion that basic receptive arrangements differ from person to 
person. Against this claim one might argue as follows: different individuals have 
different desires, which can be taken as indicative o f differences in these 
individuals’ basic conative constitutions. However this line o f argument is 
unpersuasive. The reason for this is that even though desires depend for their 
existence on initial sensible affection, desires themselves are reasoned. They are 
conceptual representations o f external stimuli. Being reasoned, desires are 
agents’ creations rather than externally given attributes o f the person. Therefore, 
the fact that different people desire different things is not a sure sign of 
differences in their receptive apparatus.1
1 It is interesting to note that Williams also denies that his argument about practical character 
establishes the distinctiveness o f  characters across persons. The idea o f  character is necessary, he 
argues, for a person to think that he has a reason to live his life rather than resign him self to 
passivity. And yet “that is compatible with these drives, and his life, being much like others’”. 
(Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 15.) W illiams’s claim is that it must be
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Although it is widely, albeit implicitly, assumed that identities are unique, they 
might ground normative claims even if  they are not. Even if  we are all pretty 
much the same with regard to our conative constitutions, it might still be the case 
that those constitutions warrant public protection. However, I have advanced a 
further claim about identities that rules out the possibility o f making this case. A 
person’s identity, as the sensible condition of desire-based reasons, is inscrutable 
to himself and others. Even if  our reasons bottom out at our identities, the 
configuration o f our receptivity is inaccessible to us because there is no 
standpoint from which it could be experienced. This precludes the possibility of 
any normative claims that are directly based on identities: one cannot maintain 
that his identity depends on preserving a certain body o f language or customs, or 
complain that an obscene work of art offends against his identity, or petition 
against lax immigration laws on the basis that they endanger his national identity, 
or that impartial norms are too demanding because they run roughshod over his 
identity. None o f these claims can be made because they rely on the assumption 
that a person is in a position to discern, directly and especially intimately, his 
identity. I have argued against this assumption: at the most basic level, which 
concerns our sensuous engagement with the world, we cannot know ourselves.
Given that identity cannot directly ground any normative claims what, if 
anything, can be normatively significant about it? In this chapter I would like to 
suggest that its normative relevance lies in the fact that is structures our thinking 
about political norms. In this respect, the role o f transcendental identity can be 
usefully compared to the one played by self-respect in Rawls’ theory of justice. 
As I noted in chapter 3, although there is great temptation to interpret Rawls as 
espousing a psychologistic notion o f self-respect, his account o f self-respect is 
restricted to the context o f the original position. It is a property of the parties 
choosing principles of justice behind the veil o f ignorance, not o f citizens in real- 
life circumstances. Therefore, there is no way o f justifying public demands by 
appealing to the contribution o f some policy or measure to persons’ self-respect.
supposed that each person must have some grounds for going on but this does not necessarily 
mean that these grounds are singular or exceptional.
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However the concept o f self-respect fulfils an indispensable constructive 
function in Rawls. It is part of the procedure that derives and justifies his 
principles o f justice, which are meant to apply in actual political conditions. 
Specifically, the notion o f self-respect answers the question o f why contractors 
engage in any choosing: they do so, argues Rawls, because they care to preserve 
their sense o f the worth o f their deliberation and choice. Without settling this 
question, Rawls’s theory could not as much as get off the ground. Thus, although 
the self-respect o f particular, flesh-and-blood persons cannot be invoked to 
justify laws and policies, the general idea of self-respect is nonetheless 
normatively significant.
1 would like to suggest that the general idea o f transcendental identity is 
normatively significant in a similar sense, only not in relation to conceptualizing 
justice but legitimacy. This should not be surprising as it follows the guiding idea 
o f the reasons-based approach to justification. As I noted in chapter 1, the 
guiding thought behind that approach is that only political norms that can be 
supported by reasons that hold for all can be legitimately enforced upon all. On 
this liberal view, political rule involves the exercise o f power, an important part 
of which is the subordination of the citizens’ wills to public decisions. Once laws 
and various other instruments o f political rule are in place, subjects are expected 
to comply with them regardless of, and sometimes even contrary to, their 
choosing. The search for legitimacy is the search to answer what, if  anything, 
makes this subordination o f wills acceptable. It should be noted that what stands 
in need o f justification is not the exercise o f political power per se, understood as 
the enforcement o f political rules. The liberal question about legitimacy does not 
come from the anarchist corner, which regards all power as intrinsically suspect. 
It is only a particular feature o f political rule that makes it normatively suspect: 
the fact that its commands sometimes enjoin persons to act against their own 
judgement -  to refrain from avenging wrongs done to them by others, to tolerate 
public criticisms o f their religion, and so on. As Nagel says, “The real problem is 
how to justify making people do things against their will.”
2 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 16, no.
3 (1987): p. 224.
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The liberal answer to the problem of legitimacy is to insist on the justifiability of 
political measures (or at least, o f the basic norms that ground these measures) to 
all citizens. I f  one is subjected to commands supported by reasons that are valid 
for him, so the argument goes, he has no right to complain about his subjection. 
The rule over him is legitimate, and he has an obligation to obey it. Various 
aspects o f this argument demand closer inspection, but I am here principally 
interested in whether the concept o f transcendental identity has any place in it. 
My claim is that it does, in the sense that it structures our thinking about 
legitimacy. To be more specific: the transcendental concept o f identity is part of 
the explanation o f why individuals have a claim to a legitimate political order. 
The connection between legitimacy and identity can be presented through a 
sequence o f three Kantian claims:
(1) Individuals’ claim to a legitimate political order is entailed by their innate 
right to external freedom.
(2) Individuals’ external freedom is their ability to act on their sensibly 
conditioned judgements unimpeded by the deliberate interference of 
others.
(3) Transcendental identity is a condition o f the possibility of sensible 
affection.
Identities thus make demands for legitimacy possible in an indirect fashion: they 
ground the possibility o f desire-based external freedom, the concept o f which 
entails the requirement for establishing a legitimate political order.
While claim (3) was discussed sufficiently in the previous chapter, the other two 
claims that compose this argument need further elucidation. However, engaging 
with them extensively would go beyond the scope of this chapter as the issues 
they raise are too diverse and complex to be dealt with quickly. It does not help 
that Kant’s Metaphysics o f  Morals, from which (1) and (2) are drawn, is a book 
that is notoriously difficult to interpret. Its understanding is hindered not only by 
Kant’s characteristically dense writing style but also by its fragmentary nature. In 
what follows I will therefore present only a very brief sketch o f the concepts of
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“external freedom” and a “claim to legitimacy”, as much as is necessary for 
appreciating the normative relevance o f transcendental identity. I will take up 
this topic first. Then I will turn to an aspect o f the above sequence that I can 
afford to examine in greater detail as I have already foreshadowed it in the 
previous two chapters. This is the idea that practical judgement is sensibility- 
driven. I will explain why this point is important for Kant’s approach to 
legitimacy and how my interpretation o f Kant accommodates it.
8.2. External freedom and legitimacy
Kant’s view of what occasions the demand for legitimacy can be usefully 
contrasted with a more popular approach to legitimacy. According to this liberal 
approach, individuals have a claim to a justification o f state laws and policies 
because their enforcement encroaches upon their ability to design their lives in 
accordance with their choices. The “political subjugation” of citizens, as Jean 
Hampton calls it, is that they are subjected to state commands, backed by the 
threat o f coercion, that limit their ability to lead their lives as they see fit.3 These 
constraints on individuals’ rights and liberties are often, even if  only implicitly, 
conceptualized in terms o f natural rights -  to self-determination, to the free 
enactment of one’s judgement, or something like it. A conception that is the 
unstated background of many present-day treatments o f legitimacy is John 
Locke’s theory of the natural right to self-government.4 In Locke, individuals 
possess an unalienable prerogative to freely conduct themselves, the grounds for 
which are found in their pre-political obligation to maintain themselves as God’s 
creatures. Stripped o f its original religious grounding, the Lockean presumption 
of individuals’ right to non-interference by others and the state is the basis of 
much work on legitimacy today.
3 Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy (Boulder: W estview Press, 1997), pp. 3-4.
4 John Locke, The Second Treatise o f  Government, ed. J. W. Gough, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1966).
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The claim about natural rights as the basis for the demand for legitimation is not 
uncontentious. Not only is it not clear whether it can be sustained without 
recourse to Locke’s, or some other, thick metaphysical outlook, the plausibility 
o f thinking that pre-civil rights apply in the civil condition is also not obvious. 
Kant thus thinks, like Hobbes, that there is a sharp discontinuity between the pre- 
civil and the civil condition, such that rights that obtain in the state o f nature do 
not carry over into the political context. Hence both thinkers, controversially, 
reject the idea o f a moral right to revolution. Putting this point aside, it is here 
more important to explain how Kant diverges from thinking that the claim to 
legitimacy arises in virtue o f the invasiveness of political rule. Instead, he 
maintains that the demand for legitimate political relations follows from the 
persons’ right to exercise external freedom. For Kant a person’s external freedom 
consists in “other agents’ deliberate non-interference with the agent’s recognized 
capacity for rationally self-directed choice and action.”5 External freedom needs 
to be distinguished from several other terms that Kant uses when talking about 
freedom. It needs to be kept distinct from the concept o f internal freedom, which 
in the Metaphysics o f  Morals Kant uses in the same way as the term positive 
freedom elsewhere. In the Groundwork and First Critique positive freedom 
refers to the will’s capacity to start a causal chain in nature by means of a 
representation of a pure practical law. What makes this type o f freedom positive 
is that its operation is not arbitrary: it is constrained by the lawlike form and the 
various other stipulations that Kant specifies in the formulae o f the categorical 
imperative. By contrast, negative freedom in Kant is just the capacity of the will 
to reach decisions interference from outside, which is achieved by acting on 
maxims. This is what we saw, in chapter 5, Kant calling the “freedom of the 
turnspit” since it does not rule out the possibility that the will is in conditioned 
from the outside. All it requires is that choice does not feel unconditioned from
5 Katrin Flikschuh, Freedom: Contemporary Liberal Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 
93-94. Kant’s definition o f  external freedom is that it involves the “follow ing authorizations, 
which are not really distinct from it ...: innate equality , that is, independence from being bound to 
others to more than he can in turn bind them; hence a man’s quality o f  being his own master (sui 
iuris), as well as being a man beyond reproach (iusti) ...;  and finally, his being authorized to do to 
others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to 
accept it...” (Immanuel Kant, The M etaphysics o f  M orals, 6: 238, p. 30.)
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the first-person perspective. In sum, it can be said that a person is negatively free 
whenever he acts on a maxim, whatever that maxim is. He is positively or 
internally free when his maxim conforms with the rule of pure reason, or the 
categorical imperative.
Kant regards the right to external freedom as innate, or natural. However it 
serves to ground a conception o f political legitimacy that is fully political, by 
which I mean that it does not appeal to normative criteria that are independent of 
the relations within the political society. The transition from a natural right to a 
civil conception o f legitimacy relies on two features o f external freedom: its 
relational, or social, character, and its basis in materially conditioned desires. 
Unlike the concepts o f positive (or internal) and negative freedom, external 
freedom requires regarding an agent in relation to other reasoners. More 
specifically, it concerns the relationship between the deliberate actions of 
individuals and the deliberate actions o f others. As Kant says, external freedom is 
a “reciprocal relation of choice”, that is, “a practical relation o f one person to 
another, in so far as their actions, as facts, can have (direct or indirect) influence 
on each other”.6 This definition excludes the relations between persons and 
natural factors: it cannot be said, for example, that handcuffs or a debilitating 
illness can limit a person’s external freedom. The effect o f others’ unintentional 
behaviour is also irrelevant to a person external freedom. A person that comes to 
block my exit from a bus as a result of the vehicle’s sudden movement does not 
present an obstacle to my external freedom.
The interdependence of individuals’ choices that is at the heart of external 
freedom is a function o f the desirative basis o f human choosing. I should note 
that the suggestion I am making here relies on a contentious interpretive claim. 
My assumption is that the choosing that is relevant to Kant’s concept of rights is 
o f a kind with the deliberation that he discusses in his moral philosophy. 
However, this interpretative claim appears suspect in light o f the difference in the 
status o f practical principles that govern these two kinds o f choosing. Principles 
o f public Right, which have to do with the proper relation between persons, are
6 Kant, The M etaphysics o f  M orals, 6: 230, pp. 88-89.
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enforceable, whereas principles o f morality, which concern the proper 
disposition o f the human will, are essentially unenforceable. This division, it 
seems, warrants thinking that politically relevant agency falls outside the remit of 
moral agency. Strict right, Kant says, “is not mingled with anything ethical.”7 My 
suggestion, however, is that that the two types o f agency share the same 
structure: both consist in forming rational representations on the basis o f sensibly 
conditioned material provided by desires. An argument for the idea that moral 
agency displays this structure was in the background o f my discussions in the 
previous two chapters. I will make it more explicit, with reference to the issue of 
practical judgement, below. The argument that politically relevant agency is a 
desire-driven but nonetheless rational activity cannot be discussed here. 
Examining it would require a sustained exegesis of obscure and highly technical 
passages in Kant, which would be distracting in the present context. The 
interested reader can consult the work o f Flikschuh for a thorough interpretation 
o f Kant that brings economic desires under the umbrella o f morality.8
The innate right to freedom is exercised by acting on the basis o f one’s sensibly 
conditioned desires. However, this activity is subject to an inevitable constraint. 
Rawls has popularized, drawing on Hume, one view o f limitations that apply to 
individuals’ reasoning outside the civil condition.9 Under the “circumstances o f 
justice” no person is guaranteed to succeed in his life-plans because of the 
moderate scarcity o f goods and the disinterest of others in his well-being. For 
Kant, however, the limitations on persons’ external freedom are not empirical but 
given prior to experience. His core claim is that desires always aim at the 
attainment o f external objects, which exist within a spatio-temporally bounded 
domain, the spherical Earth. The fact that humans must seek the satisfaction of 
their desires in a domain that does not stretch infinitely in space and time is an
7 Ibid., 6: 233, p. 25.
8 See Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and  Modern P olitical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 80-112.; and Flikschuh, “Kantian Desires: Freedom o f  Choice and 
Action in the Rechtslehre."
9 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 126-130.; Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles o f  
M orals, III. 1.; David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), III.ii.2.
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important determinant o f their quest. It means that in looking to realize their 
desire-based projects persons run up against others, looking to realize theirs. 
Furthermore, they must necessarily do so: the choice o f others is an inevitable 
limitation on persons’ practical pursuits. It is an objective constraint, which 
means that it does not arise from the properties or the functioning o f the human 
will, in which case it would classify as subjective. Rather, it is a condition that 
restricts desire-based reasoning “from the outside” -  independently o f the first- 
person perspective o f reasoning agents.
Kant’s account of the claim to legitimacy arises from his characterization o f the 
constraints on agents’ external freedom. The formation o f a legitimate political 
order is the resolution o f the tension that is implicit in the concept o f external 
freedom. While agents have an innate right to freedom, they cannot realize that 
freedom because o f the a priori constraints issued by the presence o f others. The 
first right o f individuals in the state of nature thus, once taken to its logical 
conclusions, calls for the establishment o f a system o f political rights, guided by 
the following Universal Principle of Right: “Any action is right if it can coexist 
with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim 
the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance 
with a universal law.” 10 Kant’s thought is that while the claim to legitimacy 
arises out o f the natural right to external freedom, its realization requires 
overcoming natural rights and stepping into the civil condition. The natural right 
anticipates its own abolishment.
8.3. Desires and judgement
I have suggested that the normative significance o f transcendental identity lies in 
the fact that it (indirectly) grounds the possibility o f a claim to legitimacy within 
Kant’s normative system. This claim relies on the idea in Kant that moral and 
political agency share the same structure, in the sense that they are both, at 
bottom, sensibility-driven. Although it has not been possible to discuss this claim
10 Kant, The M etaphysics o f  M orals, 6: 230, p. 24.
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in relation to political agency, I am in a position to elaborate and defend it with 
regard to moral, or more generally practical, agency. I will present my reading of 
Kant as a friendly amendment to Onora O ’Neill’s account of practical 
judgement.
My revision of O’Neill can be approached by first considering her opposition to 
an interpretation o f Kant that understands his views on judgement on the model 
o f reflective judgement. A good representative of that view is Alessandro 
Ferrara, who draws on Hannah Arendt’s reading of the Critique o f  the Power o f  
Judgement.n This reading gives special weight to the fact that politics, 
understood as an essentially social activity that often revolves around struggle for 
political power, was not o f much interest for Kant. The works in which Kant 
writes about politics are in fact centrally concerned with issues in the 
metaphysics o f law (or Right), philosophy o f history, and anthropology. This led 
Arendt to remark that Kant “never wrote a political philosophy”, 12 and to 
reconstruct from his views on judgement a political philosophy that he should 
have written. His ethical treatises, writes Arendt, cannot serve as a guide in this 
enterprise because they concern “the conduct of the self in its independence of 
others” .13 By this Arendt means that human plurality plays no part in determining 
the content of Kant’s moral principles. For Kant, Arendt suggests, human 
interaction is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of morality insofar as it 
gives rise to individuals’ motives and incentives that moral standards must 
suppress. However, what those standards enjoin appears to have nothing to do 
with the fact o f human sociability.14
11 See Alessandro Ferrara, The Force o f  the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm  o f  Judgment 
(N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 2008).; Alessandro Ferrara, Justice and Judgment: The 
Rise and the Prospect o f  the Judgement M odel in Contem porary P olitical Philosophy (London: 
SAGE, 1999).; Hannah Arendt, Lectures on K a n t’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner 
(Brighton: Harvester, 1982).
12 Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 7.
13 Ibid., p. 19.
14 A similar line o f  argument, which charges Kant with espousing a “monological” account o f  
morality, is pursued by Jurgen Habermas. See for example Jurgen Habermas, M oral
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One Kant’s distinction that is especially emphasised in Arendt’s revisionist 
reading of Kant, and which also figures centrally in Ferrara’s account of 
judgement, is that between reflective and determinant judgement. After calling 
judgement the faculty of thinking “the particular as contained under the 
general”,15 Kant writes:
The power o f judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty 
for reflecting on a given representation, in accordance with a 
certain principle, for the sake o f a concept that is thereby made 
possible, or as a faculty for determining an underlying concept 
through a given empirical representation. In the first case it is the 
reflecting, in the second case the determining power o f 
judgment.16
In the case o f determinant judgement the universal, a rule o f correct action, is 
given and the task of judgement is to find particulars, specific acts that fall under 
it. In reflective judgement, by contrast, only the particular is given and a rule 
must be found in terms o f which that particular can be understood and assessed. 
In the first case judgement is a matter o f algorithmic subsumption o f an act under 
an existing principle, as when one know what conditions make a good chair and 
then asks whether some specific chair satisfies them. In the second case 
judgement is creative: when a person contemplates an action for which no 
determinate norm exists, he is compelled to make one for himself in order to be 
able to evaluate that action. For example, there are no hard and fast rules 
specifying what counts as bravery in battle. When assessing the conduct of a 
soldier, therefore, one has to reconstruct from his actions a principle that will
Consciousness and Communicative A ction , trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 20: 202-203, pp. 8-9.
16 Ibid., 20: 211, p. 15.
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allow one to determine whether his behaviour was brave, or foolhardy, or 
cautious, or cowardly.
Ferrara argues that reflective, rather than determinant, judgement constitutes a 
proper “model of validity” for conceptualizing justice in the aftermath of the so- 
called linguistic turn. The principal contribution of the linguistic turn, as Ferrara 
conceives it, to political philosophy was that it illuminated the dependence of 
norms on the conceptual schemes within which they originate. This point 
discredits “foundationalist” normative approaches, which start from facts or 
principles that are supposedly immutable and self-contained. In one form or 
another, foundationalist theories are grounded in what Williams called the 
“absolute conception of reality” that is independent of the cognizing subject. In 
opposition to foundationalist theories, philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Quine 
and others argued that all thinking is conceptually laden. In this vein, for 
example, Wittgenstein rejects the “Augustinian” theory of meaning. As we saw 
in chapter 1, the disagreement between realists and nominalists is over whether 
abstract objects exist, or whether abstract terms are just names. Nonetheless, the 
two positions agree that all words refer to objects. This view of reference is 
mistaken, argues Wittgenstein, because the claim that words pick out things in 
the world assumes that the world is already divided up into discrete things for us 
to name.17 But the assumption of the basic orderliness of the world, which our 
language is supposed to map onto, is arbitrary and illegitimate. This unwarranted 
presumption can be avoided, Wittgenstein suggests, by regarding words in light 
o f the intention behind their use, or the practical point o f view o f the speaker. 
This leads to a picture very different from that which presumes a pre-existing 
orderliness o f the world: “How we group words into kinds will depend on the 
aim o f the classification— and on our own inclination.”18 Categorial 
discriminations constitutively depend on the points o f view, plans, and interests
17 Wittgenstein writes: “When we say: ‘Every word in language signifies something’ we have so 
far said nothing whatever, unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make.” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 7, original emphases.)
18 Ibid., p. 8.
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of the speakers.19 Their meaning is given by the function they play in “language
• 20games” -  in the activity of speaking, understood as “a form o f life.”
The point about the conceptual ladenness o f language, argues Ferrara, applies 
also to moral principles. Kant views moral reasoning, Ferrara suggests, as a 
species o f determinant judgement: its hallmark is the subsumption o f particular 
maxims under the constant, a priori rule that is the categorical imperative. 
However Kant’s view must be revised. There are no fixed, universally valid rules 
under which maxims can be brought because all moral standards are expressions 
of, and hold only within, “holistic frameworks that are situated and do always 
come in the plural.”21 The solution, according to Ferrara, is to understand moral 
reasoning on the model of reflective judgement, as the process o f transcending 
the particularity of one’s position but without succumbing to the illusion of a 
“view from nowhere”. This is the outlook which he attributes to Rawls, 
Habermas, Ackerman, Larmore and most other leading figures in contemporary 
liberalism. The project is one in which justice does not demand absolute 
impartiality, but only impartiality “with respect to a finite set of actual 
conceptions of the good”.22 Although this groundedness o f the philosophical 
enquiry in some specific social and political context is inescapable, it does not 
require surrendering the striving for rules that are in some sense objective. 
However it is a particular kind of objectivity, in which practical reason 
constructs, out o f the material o f empirically situated claims, the principles for 
assessing those same claims.
While Ferrara’s reflective model of normative validity may be useful as a 
reconstruction o f much of contemporary liberal theory, it is unsatisfactory as an
19 For example, writes Wittgenstein, there is more than one way o f  viewing the array o f  handles 
that one finds in the cabin o f  a locomotive: the engineer will be able to discern and distinguish 
the handle o f  a crank, the handle o f  a switch, the handle o f  a break-lever, the handle o f  a pump, 
and so on. For the layman, there will be nothing to set the various handles apart. (Ibid., p. 7.)
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 Ferrara, The Force o f  the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm  o f  Judgment, p. 19.
22 Ferrara, Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect o f  the Judgement M odel in 
Contem porary Political Philosophy, p. 3.
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account of practical judgement. In one sense, his reading o f Kant on judgement 
cannot be accused of interpretative inaccuracy because it is explicitly 
revisionary. However, the revision must not be so drastic that it contradicts the 
central tenets of Kant’s philosophical system. It is in this sense that Ferrara’s 
interpretation is unacceptable, since it runs counter to a distinctive and important 
aspect of Kant’s critical philosophy: his idea that practical reason, unlike its 
theoretical counterpart, creates its own object.23 In Kant, theoretical reason is 
concerned with determining what there is, in which activity it is compelled to 
rely on the deliverances o f the senses. Its access to its objects is not direct but 
mediated by sensible intuitions, which is to say that reason in its theoretical 
employment seeks to apprehend, not manufacture external reality. Principles of 
theoretical reason -  categories or pure concepts o f the understanding -  are 
therefore consigned to a regulative role. They specify how the understanding 
must order given intuitions in order for representations o f object to be possible. 
The determinations of practical reason, on the other hand, “do not have to wait 
for intuitions in order to receive meaning”.24 The objects o f practical reason -  the 
concepts o f good and evil -  refer to disposition of the will, with regard to which 
reason can be active. The good will is not something that a person cognizes and 
from which he is therefore necessarily at a remove. It is something that he brings 
about, using rules o f reason as constitutive o f practical reality. Principles of 
practical reason “have objective reality in their practical use, that is, in the moral 
use.”25
In reflective judgement, however, the particular is given, not created by the 
activity o f judging. The task o f reflective judgement is to ascend to a type from a 
present token -  to extract a practical rule from an act that has already happened. 
Hence, contrary to Ferrara’s claims, it cannot be regarded as an instance of 
practical judgement. For example, the reflective judgement o f a soldier’s bravery 
presupposes that he has already committed certain actions in battle that cannot be
23 See Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 65-66, pp. 56-57.; Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, 
A 807-808/B 835-836, p. 678.
24 Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, 5: 65-66, pp. 56-57.
25 Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, A807-808/B835-836, p. 678.
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subsumed under a hard and fast standard. Unlike what Kant thinks of practical 
reasoning, this kind o f reflection is compelled to work within the boundaries of 
what there is. The orientation o f reason is retrospective, concerned with 
adjudicating past acts, rather than prospective, aimed at producing action in 
accordance with laws that specify what there ought to be. Onora O ’Neill writes:
Both determinant and reflective judging are forms o f theoretical
judgement that may be used when a particular is given: but they
have no role when no particular is (yet) given. No amount of
theoretical judgement will help us when the task is practical, and
we have to judge what to do... For here it is in the nature o f  the
26case that the particular is not given.
Avoiding the assimilation of the practical standpoint to a “retrospective, 
spectator perspective”27 is a central aim of O’Neill’s interpretation of Kant on 
practical judgement. This implies abandoning the ambition to understand 
practical deliberation on the model o f either determinant o f reflective judgement. 
One may note a superficial resemblance between O’Neill’s construal of practical 
judgement and how Kant describes determinant judgement. O’Neill thinks that 
practical judgement is akin to subsumption in that its major premise is given. 
That premise is either a moral duty or some non-moral principle o f action that the 
person makes for oneself -  a principle that expresses the person’s long-term 
commitments, plans, and interests, such as to bring about the communist 
revolution, or to master chess.28 The task o f practical judgement is then to bring 
one’s particular actions under these universal rules. However the resemblance 
between this activity and determinant judgement breaks down in two ways. First, 
for O’Neill, practical deliberation is forward-looking: it looks to bring about 
actions rather than assess past acts from a detached and impassioned standpoint.
26 Onora O ’N eill, “Experts, Practitioners, and Practical Judgement,” Journal o f  M oral Philosophy 
4, no. 1 (2007): p. 159, original emphasis.
27 O’N eill, “Rationality as Practical Reason,” p. 95.
28 The task that individuals face when employing practical judgement is “to search for ways o f  
acting which meet the constraints o f  all the principles (and the varied goals) which they see as 
important.” (O ’N eill, Bounds o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 60.)
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It does not pass verdict on what has already happened but determines what ought 
to be done. Second, practical judgement is not algorithmic. A determinant 
judgement that brings some specific act under an exhaustive and fixed norm 
allows no variance o f outcome. Whether the act either falls under the norm or 
not, the deliberator has no latitude in judging. For example, the question of 
whether a student deserves to be awarded a degree under University regulations 
usually leaves no discretionary scope for the awarding body. If  the student has 
fulfilled all the necessary requirements he automatically gains the right to the 
degree, and vice versa. But practical judgement, argues O’Neill, is different. 
Rather than being a blind application o f principles, it is an activity that leaves 
scope for deliberators’ creativity.
O’Neill’s point about the non-algorithmic nature o f practical judgement is based 
on a particular view she takes of practical principles. Appealing to Kant, she 
presents both moral and non-moral principles as constraints on agents’ various 
pursuits that do not fully determine action. I already discussed and opted against 
the interpretation of Kant’s rules of reasons as side-constraints in chapter 7. Here 
I would like to focus on the idea that rules of judgement are indeterminate. 
According to O’Neil, practical principles do not “regiment action”; they 
“recommend types of action, policy and attitude rather than providing detailed 
instructions for living. They usually specify no more than an aspect of action, 
and this often quite vaguely.”29 Norms, whether they are moral or non-moral, 
specify how we must not act: we must not lie, smoke in bed, move the rook 
diagonally in a chess game, hurt our loved ones, and so on. Since they can be 
honoured in a multitude of ways, these negative prescriptions leave open the 
issue o f what precisely we are to do. This is not true, o f course, when there are 
only two available courses o f action, one o f which is ruled out by the normative 
prohibition; then the negative requirement fully determines action (albeit 
indirectly). However, argues O’Neill, such cases are not paradigmatic of 
practical principles. Even when norms leave few possible courses of action, 
judgement is required for deciding between them -  for bridging the gap between 
principle and action. For example, even when we are asked not to move the rook
29 Ibid., p. 53.
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diagonally, this still leaves us having to decide whether to move it horizontally or 
orthogonally. Typically, though, the task of judgement is more complex, with 
more possibilities for enacting any given principle. This is compounded by the 
fact that individuals usually judge what to do in light o f various principles. More 
often than not, there is more than one requirement that bears on a situation, and 
making up one’s mind requires striking a balance between them, or 
compromising some in favour of others. Judgement is then “a question o f finding 
ways o f meeting multiple constraints and recommendations set by a plurality of 
principles.”30
O’Neill’s account of practical judgment is attractive on several levels. It presents 
practical deliberation as a genuinely forward-looking activity, rather than the 
impassive contemplation o f past acts. It also suitably explains how acting on 
practical principles can leave room for the agent’s creativity. Finally, it displays 
sensitivity to the complexity o f practical reflection by stating that appraising a 
prospective action typically involves consideration o f  diverse and competing 
principles. Nonetheless, it suffers from a phenomenological shortcoming: her 
claim that every act of judgement is done on the basis o f the person’s pre­
existing principle seems untrue as a general description o f how persons actually 
judge. To clarify my point it is necessary to distinguish two possible senses of 
the claim that judgement requires pre-existing principles. First, it can be taken to 
mean that an act o f judgement requires principles that are conceptually prior. 
This claim draws on Kant’s thesis, in the Groundwork, that practical reasoning 
must be regarded as law-governed. Kant writes: “Everything in nature works in 
accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance 
with his idea o f laws that is, in accordance with principles and only so has he a 
will.”31 Therefore, it is necessary for some principle to be prior to judgement 
because it enables judging as a reasoned activity. This idea is certainly present in 
O’Neill’s account, albeit mostly implicitly, but it is not the one I wish to 
challenge.
30 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
31 Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals, H: 412, p. 80
202
My issue is with the claim o f the priority of principles in another, temporal sense. 
This claim, which O’Neill’ repeats frequently, is that persons enter deliberation 
with principles of evaluation that they gave themselves at a prior time. From the 
phenomenological standpoint, there is something odd about the picture in which 
persons have the most important part o f the practical task figured out before they 
even get down to judging -  in which they survey their options with a rulebook in 
their hand, as it were. This makes practical reasoning into a strangely pre­
meditated and impassive activity, even if  it is not algorithmic. Even if a 
judgement must make use of a conceptually prior rule in order to be reasoned, 
the thesis o f the temporal priority o f long-standing personal policies or 
resolutions seems dubious. Many o f our decisions are made on the basis of 
personal principles that are created on the spur o f the moment, tweaked and 
modified at the time o f deciding, or without having settled in advance on what 
sort o f behaviour to commit to. A significant part o f practical reflection seems to 
be making one’s principles as one goes along. O’Neill view of judging as 
instantiating indeterminate but nonetheless previously fixed rules appears 
incapable o f accommodating this fact.
The artificial assumption o f temporally pre-existing principles can be avoided by 
maintaining that neither of the two components o f judgement -  particular actions 
or universal rules -  takes logical precedence in the agent’s consciousness. The 
starting point for practical reflection is not the person’s awareness of an act or 
maxim for which a rule must be constructed. Nor is it his awareness o f a rule 
with which acts must be brought into accord. The particular and the universal 
element in practical judgement enter the agent’s first-person perspective 
simultaneously as they are dialectically related. As I argued in chapter 6, the 
particular element, a maxim, can only be conceived o f in terms o f a universal 
rule of reason. Since for Kant practical reasoning must be evaluative, and the 
only evaluative principles that express necessary goodness are rules o f reason, a 
maxim just is a subjective principle that claims conformity with one or more 
rules o f reason. Conversely, a rule o f reason, as the universal element in practical 
judgement, can only be conceptualized with reference to a particular maxim. It 
does not have an existence that is separate from agent’s maxims. Rather, rules of 
reason are valid as requirements on action only because there are maxims that
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utilize the concept o f goodness. Even the categorical imperative applies to us 
only because our subjective principles o f volition take the evaluative form.
The acknowledgment o f the dialectical relationship between maxims and rules of 
reason helps in identifying what is creative in practical judgement. Practical 
creativity consists in the fact that judgement is a problem-solving activity, in 
which the problem is set by our sensible nature -  this is the regard in which our 
practical judgement is sensibility-driven. The claim I am making here borrows 
something from Korsgaard’s moral psychology, although it also departs 
importantly from her position. What I inherit from her outlook is the view that as 
desirative beings we are always and necessarily implicated in the world of sense, 
which sets us the task o f orienting our reasoning. What is implausible about 
Korsgaard’s account is her view that our implication in the world o f sense 
directly delivers desires. She maintains that desires, caused by the world 
impinging upon our senses, are the primary element in practical judgement -  
they are what is given prior to judgement, and with which judgement must work. 
Therefore, on Korsgaard’s view, the guiding question o f practical reflection is 
“How should I rationally respond to my various externally given inclinations, 
cares, and concerns?”
However Korsgaard’s view of the context in which maxims are considered is 
undermined by the implausibility of her interpretation o f desiring. It cannot be 
assumed that sensible affection forces desires upon us. Instead, sensible affection 
presents persons with material whose conative status they must determine. The 
starting points for judgement are “raw” deliverances o f the “inner sense” that 
precede, and make possible, all practical experience. These are biddings from the 
outside in relation to which the person must take a stand. As such, they are the 
practical equivalent o f the sensible manifold in theoretical cognition. Once 
presented with some impingement of his “ inner sense”, the person has a problem: 
to determine, by means of conceptual representation, whether he enjoys it and 
wants more o f it, whether he wants it to stop, or is indifferent. In other words, he 
must determine whether the sensation is one whose future occurrence he desires 
or not. It is only on the basis o f this determination that both the particular and the 
universal element o f practical judgement -  a maxim and a rule o f reason -  can
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jointly come into being. This is not to say that a conative representation of a 
sensible affection must be a prelude to practical judgement. As I noted in the 
previous chapter, we are sometimes content to be guided by a desire, as when we 
give in to the pleasant feeling o f sleepiness in the afternoon sun, or to a desire for 
revenge. The point is merely that practical judgement could not occur without the 
initial impetus provided by the external conditioning of our “inner sense”. Once 
that conditioning is accounted for conatively, it is possible for the person to form 
a maxim -  an evaluative principle enjoining him to pursue or shun the future 
occurrence o f the sensation. And that subjective principle, as noted, must contain 
within itself a reference to one or more objective evaluative principles.
If my argument is correct moral agency in Kant is sensibility-driven, which is to 
say that it is at the most fundamental level enabled by an affection of the “inner 
sense”. Various commentators, whose authority I have here assumed, have 
argued that political agency is also driven by sensibly-rooted desires. Sensible 
affection therefore serves as a link that connects morally and politically relevant 
types o f reasoning. The notion of transcendental identity that explains its 
possibility is, then, at the bottom of Kant’s claims about legitimacy.
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